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Preface
This project grew out of an appreciation for Faulkner 
that began with the reading of As I Lay Dying during my last 
semester as an undergraduate English major. It is a 
continuation of a Masters thesis focused on Faulkner's image 
of time in his characterization of Quentin Compson and Harry 
Wilbourne. I read A Fable for the first time while working 
on this thesis, and my fascination for this most 
intransigent of Faulkner's texts suffered no diminishment 
from the work that resulted in the text that follows.
Indeed, the project has elicited questions about Faulkner—  
the writer, the thinker, the man— that inspire still more 
attention to the novel.
The assistance and support Professor Lewis P. Simpson, 
who directed the project, greatly facilitated my work. 
Besides the inspiration of his extraordinary literary 
criticism and the excitement of intimate conversations on 
literature and history in general, and Faulkner in 
particular, his encouragement, remarkable patience, and 
friendship enabled me to complete the project. Professor 
John R. May, in addition to providing a careful reading of 
the text as well as extremely helpful formal and ideational 
suggestions, offered genuine friendship and indispensable
1 1 1
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support throughout my association with the Department of 
English. Most of the discursive ideas and texts that inform 
the dissertation were disclosed in conversations with 
Professor Cecil Eubanks, whose positive influence, both 
personal and professional, will accompany me henceforth. 
Professor Rick Moreland carefully read and re-read the text, 
offered valuable insights from his infinite reservoir of 
knowledge about Faulkner, and inspired further thought on 
Faulkner's image of the relation of art and life in A Fable. 
Thanks are owed also to Professors Bainard Cowan, Fred 
Schwarzbach, John Lowe, and Bill Demastes for invaluable 
help along the way. A debt of gratitude is also owed to 
Professor Michael Grimwood of North Carolina State 
University, who directed my first big project on Faulkner 
and at whose polite insistence I first read A Fable. And 
special thanks is due Professor Jim Springer Borck.
For the love, support, and guidance of my parents, 
Harold and Margie Matthews, whose influence positively 
informs all of my achievements— both tangible and spiritual- 
-I shall always be indebted. Triche saw me through much of 
it with love and self-sacrifice. And Sydney, Gabrielle, and 
Amy, the darlings of my existence, cannot know of the joy 
they brought to the process.
IV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Contents
Preface iii
Abstract vi
Introduction: "Two Approaches to Art" 1
I: "The Textual Case for Faulkner's Aestheticism" 9
II: "Remythology and Spoliation: the Mythopoeic
Utterances of Faulkner's Failed Artist-Figures" 49
III: "Strife, Structure, the Dissemination of Voices 90
and the Destruction of Truth in A Fable"
IV: "The Artist's Directive: Remythologizing the 135
Kerygma in A Fable"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Abstract for "Faulkner, Truth, and the Artist's Directive:
A Reading of A Fable," a dissertation by Bobby L. Matthews.
The old general in A Fable embodies the resolution of 
questions about the relation of art and life that Faulkner 
evoked in his invention of Quentin Compson in The Sound and 
the Fury and pursued in a series of subsequent 
characterizations. This artist-figure motif discloses 
Faulkner's implication of the relation in the modern crisis 
of faith. Faulkner images in narrative fiction what 
Nietzsche asserts in discourse, namely, the need for a 
reversal of the Platonic valuation of eternal "truth" 
(ideality) over art. The characterization of Quentin shows 
the potentially terrible consequences of man's propensity 
for mythopoeic invention, as Quentin's unconscious 
remythologizing of Christian mythos results in the nihilism 
it seeks to overcome. In A Fable, several characters repeat 
the paradigm of artist-figures who attempt through 
mythopoeia to override ontological conditions and establish 
ideal projections. The general, by contrast, recognizes the 
open—  "aestheticist"— condition of existence, predicated on 
man's physiology, which entails the universality of 
perspectivism and makes valuation essential to the well­
being of man's existence. Aware of both the mythic 
proportions of his public image and the need of his culture
VI
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for a sustaining grand illusion, the old general consciously 
develops a legend of himself that satisfies this need 
through a reaccentuation of Christian mythos. In this 
action he suggests Heidegger's reinterpretation of 
Nietzsche's reversal, a reading that postulates the "strife" 
between closure and disclosure as the inherent existential 
operation whereby art allows truth "to happen." The 
dissertation includes four chapters: (1) "The Textual Case
for Faulkner's Aestheticism"; (2) "Remythology and 
Spoliation: The Mythopoeic Utterances of Faulkner's Failed
Artist-Figures"; (3) "Strife, Structure, the Dissemination 
of Voices and the Destruction of Truth in A Fable"; (4) "The 
Artist's Directive: Remythologizing the Kerygma in A
Fable."
Vll
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Introduction; Two Approaches to Art
A Fable is a novel far too rich to lend itself easily 
to holistic analysis. Though given time and space the critic 
might well attempt such a study, the aim here is to isolate 
a primary element of the whole, to offer a rhetorical 
evaluation and interpretation of the novel in relation to
this element, and to suggest, on the basis of this
evaluation, the relation of the novel to some of Faulkner's 
earlier major fiction. My intention is to explore how the
characterization of the "marshal" or "old general" of this
novel culminates— in a convincing image of the relation of 
"truth" to language or art— Faulkner's personal quest 
through writing to comprehend existence.
The questions that Faulkner first images in the 
characterization of Quentin Compson in The Sound and the 
Fury dominate the history of western thought. Do 
identifiable constants inform existence and human 
experience? Is truth knowable? What is the relation of art 
and truth? Of art and life? Although Faulkner never 
explicitly poses these questions, his fiction is virtually 
controlled by them. The underlying discursive problem 
pertains to the ageless question of will, insofar as this 
term is defined in the somewhat crude traditional sense of a 
presumed human capacity for making conscious decisions that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2change the composition of an upcoming moment of experience 
from what it otherwise would have been. By the time 
Faulkner was working on The Sound and the Fury in 1928 his 
interest in this question had set him on the course of 
narrative inquiry that would shape his fiction. In the 
texture of the mature fiction he does not merely express 
what happens to his characters; instead, what happens to 
them is always posed in the light of conditional factors 
that influence the events in their lives. Consequently, the 
Faulknerian narrative always implicitly asks, "Might not the 
event have occurred differently from the way it did?" As 
Rosa Coldfield speculatively asserts to Quentin in Absalom, 
Absalom!, "there is a might-have-been which is more true 
than truth."1 If Rosa is correct, then experience is not 
fixed but contingent. The general problem Faulkner poses 
throughout the mature fiction entails ascertaining whether 
her assertion is affirmable and, if it is, how man might act 
so as to realize the "might have been." If it is not, then 
the question of the value of life itself is raised. In 
consonance with the views of prominent modern discursive 
writers, Faulkner's resolution of this problem hinges on his 
view of an inherent relation of aesthetics and ontology.
Faulkner's fictional consideration of the problem of 
truth rises in A Fable to levels beyond those imaged in
^William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! (New York: 
Vintage, 19 72), p. 143.
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3earlier texts devoted to the same problem. In various 
characters and narrative situations in other novels, he 
presents two major historical perspectives on the question. 
Isaac McCaslin's discussion with McCaslin Edmonds about the 
ghost buck is perhaps the outstanding of several examples of 
the Platonic view that truth is inherent and thus knowable 
from within. Faulkner's "verities," which he expressed in 
public and incorporated in the fiction, seem to correspond 
to Kant's postulation of synthetic a priori truths. But 
major voices in the novels suggest Faulkner's ultimate, if 
reluctant, embrace of the pre-Socratic view of truth as 
aletheia, or happening. Truth, to speak in the simplest 
terms, is what occurs, or at least what an individual 
perceives to be occurring. It is what the individual man 
experiences. Truth lies in the operative condition of 
consciousness' relation both to itself and to the world, a 
relation that not only enables but actually compels the 
invention of mythopoeia designed to account for experience.
In a letter to Malcolm Cowley the Platonic strain of 
Faulkner's internal dialectic of metaphysics is disclosed.
Art is simpler than people think because there is so 
little to write about. All the moving things are 
eternal in man's history and have been written before, 
and if a man writes hard enough, sincerely enough, 
humbly enough . . .  he will repeat them, because art
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4like poverty takes care of its own, shares its bread.^
Faulkner suggests, first, that "man's history" is 
constituted by the repetition of "eternal," "moving" 
occurrences and, second, that the implicit valuative 
definition of art is a synecdochal image of one such 
occurrence. Calling them "moving things," Faulkner thus 
implicitly asserts the reality of what Kant termed 
"universal categories." He also asserts the capacity of art 
to image ("repeat") these "eternal" aspects of existence, 
which, he implies, are categorically few in number. History 
is seen as the ineluctable unfolding of events that, while 
they differ in terms of specifics, fall generically under 
one of a few metaphysically constant categories. Of course 
Faulkner, not discourser but artist, never names these 
categories, but his frequent recitation of the "eternal 
verities" offers insight into his thinking along this line. 
In the familiar words of McCaslin Edmonds in Go Down, Moses, 
"Truth is one. It doesn't change. It covers all things 
which touch the heart— honor and pride and pity and justice 
and love. Y e t  if Faulkner iterated his conviction of 
metaphysical constancy when he told creative writing
" t o Malcolm Cowley, Saturday, early Nov. 1944," in 
Joseph Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William Faulkner 
(New York: Random House, 1977), pp. 185-86.
^William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York: Vintage,
1973), p. 297.
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5students at the University of Virginia that each new 
generation will "inherit" the "ageless, eternal struggles, 
he also at times spoke in a negative vein, as when he wrote 
Cowley that "life is a phenomenon but not a novelty, the 
same frantic steeplechase toward nothing everywhere and man 
stinks the same stink no matter where in time.
Still, Faulkner frequently suggested that the 
conditions of man's existence are not inherently static. 
Setting up a contrast between himself and writers who 
despair over the ameliorative potential of humanity, he 
asserted that "one can hate man's condition," yet "try to 
change it, and possibly will change it."® Asked whether or 
not the American language is developing, he said, "the only 
alternative to change and progress is d e a t h . T h e  optimism 
evident in such remarks stands in contrast to the above 
statements that support the claim for the universality of 
the conditions of experience. The contradiction in 
Faulkner's commentary thus ironically exemplifies his regard 
for conflict as the essential characteristic of being. He
^Frederick L Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds., Faulkner 
in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 239.
®"To Malcolm Cowley," in Blotner, Selected Letters, p.
185.
®Gwynn, p. 122. The specific reference in this case is 
to H. L. Mencken, who, according to Faulkner's paraphrase, 
suggests that "man stinks and always will stink. I don't 
agree with that."
^Gwynn, p. 151.
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lived his own characterization of man's existence as "the 
human heart in conflict with itself," and in no aspect of 
his life more decisively than in his irrepressible 
epistemological compulsion, which posed the antipodal 
questions of whether art is simply a synecdochal image of 
one of life's "moving things," or whether it is inherent in 
human being and thus entails what Alan Megill terms 
"ontogenesis," the principle of radical creativity that 
makes possible genuine amelioration of the quality of life.® 
A recurrent canonical motif of conflict as an inherent 
paradoxical condition informing existence underscores 
Faulkner's inability to accept unreservedly the reality of 
the verities. Besides his compulsive Platonic inclination, 
Faulkner suffered the cogent, ultimately undeniable 
influence of genuine doubt, which is manifest in the 
agnosticism expressed by numerous prominent voices in the 
fiction. As a consequence of the internal strife created by 
this collision of a powerful urge to believe in the 
actuality of "courage and honor and pride, and pity and love 
of justice and of liberty" and a doubt-informed urge to 
know, Faulkner's modernistic confidence in man's capacity 
for "truth," like that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, succumbed 
to a postmodernistic reservation about this capacity. The 
drive for "objective truth," imaged most starkly in the
®Alan Megill, Prophets of Extremity (Berkeley: Univ. of
California Press, 1985).
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7characterizations of Quentin Compson in both The Sound and 
the Fury (1929) and Absalom, Absalom! (1936) and Isaac 
McCaslin in Go Down, Moses (1942), gives way to an assertion 
of the primacy of aesthetics and aletheia in the image of 
the old general. Yet, paradoxically, this conception of 
truth holds open the possibility, be it ever so ambiguous, 
for conscious, future-directed input into the stream of 
experienced event.
The dust jacket of the first printing of A Fable 
asserts the inevitability of "many controversial 
interpretations" that will be "read into" the book. My 
treatment reads the novel as a narrative image that in a 
general sense comports with a reading of existence that 
occurs in post-Nietzschean discourse. Following the 
terminology in Megill's analysis of Nietzsche, Heidegger, 
Foucault, and Derrida, I have elected to use the term 
"aestheticism" (the adjective being "aestheticist") in my 
study of A Fable. Aestheticism emphasizes being over 
knowledge, perpetual crisis over historicism, an "eternal 
present" over temporal linearity, differentiation over 
unity, interpretation over definition. Fundamentally, 
aestheticism regards existence as radically potential rather 
than consistent, static, and yielding of universal truths.
In the chapters that follow I aim to show that the texture 
of Faulkner's fiction indicates that Quentin Compson and the 
series of important Faulknerian artist-figures who succeed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8him fail adequately to understand this characteristic of 
existence and that the old general in A Fable is their 
singular opposite.
A Fable demonstrates the consonance of Faulkner's major 
works with the main line of western discourse from its roots 
in Pre-Socratic texts to its postmodern incarnations in 
texts contemporary with Faulkner's own. I am thinking here 
most especially, though not exclusively, of Heidegger, whose 
four-volume analysis of Nietzsche's writings perhaps reveals 
as much about his own conclusions about the nature and 
constituents of Being as it does about those of his subject. 
My argument that A Fable presents a distinctively postmodern 
image of existence draws heavily from Volume One, entitled 
Nietzsche; The Will to Power as Art, and suggests a major 
parallel in the relative weltanshauungs of Faulkner and 
Heidegger, who probably knew little, if anything, of each 
other's works. In using other writers' conceptions of the 
relation of art and life, especially those of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, it is not my intention to place the philosopher's 
hat on Faulkner, but merely to elucidate some of the ideas 
that underlie images in the fiction. If, incidentally, 
particular discursive works and ideas are illuminated in the 
process, this result will be a happy consequence of my 
primary goal of letting heretofore unexpressed ideas that 
inhere in Faulkner's fiction see the light of day.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter I
The Textual Case for Faulkner's Aestheticism
In concert with the tendency of modernist writers to 
acknowledge the fluctuant character of experience while 
seeking simultaneously to disclose more basic— constant—  
forces such as Nature or History underlying it, Faulkner 
frequently expressed his conviction that "man's condition" 
is one "in which he is in conflict with himself or with his 
environment or with others," and he reprised throughout his 
mature fiction images of conflict as the defining 
characteristic of man's existence. Asked at the University 
of Virginia whether his characters are "universal," he 
stated that man's "struggle is against his own heart, 
against— with the hearts of his fellows, and with his 
environment. E m i l y  Grierson was a case "of the poor 
tragic human being struggling with its own heart, with 
others, with its environment. "You write a story . . .  to 
tell about people, man in his constant struggle with his own 
heart, with the hearts of others, or with his environment.
^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds., Faulkner 
in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 197, my
italics.
^Gwynn, pp. 184-85, my emphasis.
^Gwynn, Faulkner in the University, p. 239, my emphasis.
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This triad of self pitted against self, against others, or 
against environment appears too frequently in his remarks to 
be a position that Faulkner had not thought through 
carefully and fully embraced. His metaphysic of conflict as 
imaged in the fiction, however, falls short of the category 
of theses that purport to identify the ground of existence. 
Faulkner's sense of the primacy of conflict notwithstanding, 
the texture of the mature fiction suggests that existence 
resists final definition. In accentuating the relative over 
the absolute, Faulkner's texture asserts his hard-won 
conclusion that the search for objective truth is quixotic 
and delusory, and ought therefore to be replaced with an 
awareness of man's essentially aesthetic condition and of 
the consequential importance of valuation.
Faulkner's aestheticism occurs as a general narrative 
composite of emphases on (1) time, imaged as the 
adventitious experience of consciousness; (2) the 
physiological basis of "human being"; (3) perspectivism as 
the basic condition of man's experience and communication, 
both with himself and others; and (4) man's propensity to 
embrace mythopoeia in attempting to understand and accept 
his place in the world. This composite informs Faulkner's 
textual motif of conflict as both the basic characteristic 
of existence and the enabling open condition for man's 
inherent faculty for creative responses to the world of his 
experience.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The inventing of Quentin Compson during the writing of 
The Sound and the Fury embodied a purgation of Faulkner's 
inability to accept in his life the consequences of temporal 
process. In this novel he imaged for the first time in the 
texture^ of his fiction— specifically, in Quentin's 
monologue— the kinetic backdrop of man's existence that 
would henceforth appear in all of the major texts. Quentin 
constitutes Faulkner's recognition that, the strength of 
one's sense of it notwithstanding, a projected invisible, 
providential dimension that overlays or undergirds, as the 
case may be, the visible, "fallen" universe, has only 
noumenal existence. Had Faulkner been able to convince 
himself of the reality of such a metaphysical overlay, he 
would have had universal justification for the unfortunate 
occurrences in his own life that informed the 
characterization of Quentin. Accordingly, Quentin would 
have taken a characterological shape quite different from 
what he came to be. But in developing Quentin, Faulkner was 
responding to his need to work through an extreme personal 
conflict between the world as he was experiencing it and the 
world as he wanted it to be. As Faulkner's fictional
By texture I simply mean, following C. Hugh Holman in 
A Handbook to Literature (Indianapolis; Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), 
p. 443, "the elements which remain in a work of literary art 
after a paraphrase of its argument has been made. Among such 
elements are details of situation, metaphor, meter, imagery, 
tone color, rhyme— in fact, all elements that are not 
considered to be a part of the structure of the work." I 
would also specify syntax and diction.
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surrogate, Quentin challenges the phenomenal world in an 
attempt to force it to disclose its perceived metaphysical 
foundation. The harm he thereby perpetrates upon himself 
stands as Faulkner's self-acknowledgement of the quixotic 
nature of the quest for formal transcendence of contingency.
Yet despite the lesson that inheres in Faulkner's 
characterization of Quentin and several successor artist- 
figures in his fiction, the strife that informed the 
inception and development of A Fable, the late novel that 
Faulkner intended to be his "magnum o," manifests the 
writer's failure to overcome the urge to embrace, and 
thereby make real, Platonic shadows of his imagination.^
His narrative inquiry into the problem of the discrepancy 
between desire and reality assumes its structure on the 
basis of an internal dialectic between the two poles of his 
impulse to believe that fundamental changes in human being, 
both individually and socially, are possible, and his sense 
of the ontological impossibility of such transformations.
His basic narrative vision moves between these two poles 
which demarcate in the fiction what Heidegger terms the 
beginning and the end of western philosophy— (l)Platonism, 
expressed most forcefully in what Faulkner referred to as 
the verities, and (2)aestheticism, based on a conviction of
"To Malcolm Cowley, Tuesday, April 23, 1946," in Joseph 
Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William Faulkner (New York: 
Random House, 1977), p. 233.
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the open character of existence.^ The opposition between
these two positions can be reduced to two hypothetical 
syllogisms: (1) If being is invariable, then fundamental
change is impossible, and value resides in universels.
Truth in this sense is Platonic, a priori, inevitable. (2) 
If being is contingent, then the possibility for creative 
interpolation exists, but it exists within a value-less 
vacuum; that is, values are relative and subject to 
creation. Truth in this sense is Pre-Socratic, immanent, 
and variable. Faulkner's textual accentuation of this 
latter view of truth marks his hard-won transition from
^Aestheticism is not a word Heidegger specifically uses 
to denominate this postulated transition in western discourse. 
I borrow the term from Alan Megill in his Prophets of 
Extremity (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985),
because it effectively suggests what Heidegger sees occurring 
as a result of Nietzsche's concept of "will to power," namely 
the end of metaphysical discourse and the beginnings of a new 
attentiveness to manifest existence. Nietzsche's term 
essentially parallels Plato's metaphysical nihilism (a term 
that, for Heidegger, would be a redundancy), but makes 
possible the new focus of post-Nietzschean thought. For 
Megill aestheticism marks the general "postmodern" debunking 
of historicism in texts of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and 
Derrida. My reading of Faulkner owes much to Megill's thesis 
that traditional readings of Romanticism which assert a 
dialectic of "alienation, through spiritual crisis, to a 
redemptive reintegration" with an undergirding "primal unity" 
ignore the more compelling "idea of primal difference or 
differentiation that Nietzsche and his successors put 
forward." The Romantic concept of "empathetic understanding, 
with its concern for mere reproduction, gives way to a notion 
of 'active' or 'productive' interpretation . . . ." This
accent on production and its concomitant of "truth" as an 
"open" moment of the perpetual unravelling of experience, at 
the expense of reproduction and its intrinsic assumption of 
the representation of truth, provides the basis for my 
borrowing of Megill's term. See especially pp. 1-25.
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modernist to postmodernist, from absolutist to 
"aestheticist."
In ascribing to Faulkner the aestheticist label, I 
suggest his ideational concurrence with the school of 
thought which finds the whole of existence to be basically 
aesthetic. Aestheticism as here defined holds that the 
condition of man's existence, or of his experience, 
precludes knowledge of objective truth. Experience is 
perspectival, not general, so the mind's particular slant on 
a segment of its experience is necessarily anomalous and 
relative. Writers who subscribe to this general description 
of existence find "art," or "creativity," or 
"interpretation," for instance, as opposed to some 
identifiable constant such as Man, or Culture, to be the 
basis of knowledge. Faulkner's adherence to this view of 
man's condition is evident in his textual image of 
consciousness, which he largely casts as a matter of the 
subject's immediate sense of time. Whether it be an 
individual's or a group's, consciousness or time exists as 
the perpetually unfolding product of the interplay of man's 
physiology and his environment. This generic narrative 
image offers the sustained implicit argument that the 
recurrence of experiential conflict in man's relations 
occurs as the inevitable result of a condition of 
physiologically based conflict that fundamentally informs 
consciousness. Faulkner consistently images this condition
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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in the texture of his mature fiction, making the relation of 
texture to unfolding narrative event analogous to the 
relation of physiology to experience. As the predominant 
image in the canon, this metaphor of man's fundamental 
condition establishes Faulkner's aestheticism, which 
generally agrees with the conception of existence developed 
by Henri Bergson, whose influence Faulkner acknowledged on 
several occasions. Faulkner's aesthetic ontology, moreover, 
generally parallels the shared view of Nietzsche and his 
most insightful reader to date, Martin Heidegger, that man's 
impulse both to create and to respond aesthetically to 
creation constitutes the very ground of his being. Thus, 
juxtaposing his fiction with prominent elements of their 
discourse on art creates an inter-illuminative relationship 
between the texts. ± mean to avail myself of this 
reciprocity in my attempt to establish Faulkner's 
aestheticism, indicating affinities, though, only for 
purposes of elucidation, eschewing the less interesting and 
more laborious and speculative practice of demonstrating 
influence. In short, recourse to the general idea of 
aestheticism that appears in the texts of several discursive 
writers offers a means of establishing the aestheticist 
slant of Faulkner's major fiction.
Bergson's description of man's experience of time 
elucidates the idea of physiological conflict that informs 
Faulkner's fiction. Acknowledging his general agreement
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with Bergson's view of time, Faulkner told Loic Bouvard, 
"There is only the present moment, in which I include both 
the past and the future, and that is e t e r n i t y . On another 
occasion he asserted that "time is a fluid condition which 
has no existence except in the momentary avatars of 
individual people."® Faulkner's meaning is not that time 
literally is nothing, but that man's experience of time is 
necessarily a matter of the state of his consciousness in a 
given moment. Bergson's analysis of the interpenetration of 
memories, perceptions, and tendencies in consciousness 
clarifies this idea:
In the depth of my being that which is most uniformly, 
most constantly and most enduringly myself [is] a 
continuous flux which is not comparable to any flux I 
have ever seen. There is a succession of states, each 
of which announces that which follows and contains that 
which precedes it. . . . Whilst I was experiencing them 
they were so solidly organized, so profoundly animated 
with a common life, that I could not have said where 
any one of them finished or where another commenced.
In reality no one of them begins or ends, but all
^Loic Bouvard, "Interview with Loic Bouvard," in Lion in 
the Garden: Interviews with William Faulkner, 1926-1962, ed.
James B. Meriwether and Michael Millgate (New York: Random
House, 1962), p. 70.
®Jean Stein, "Interview with Jean Stein Vanden Heuvel," 
in Lion in the Garden, p. 255.
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extend into each other.^
Thus Bergson sees time as a composite of the 
constituents of consciousness in a given moment. A "moment" 
of consciousness involves the experience of an anomalous, 
ultimately irreducible confluence of forces. The dynamic 
moment "contains," as it were, the ongoing physical process 
of consciousness. This complex instant is fundamentally 
creative, in the sense that ever materializing, changing 
experience occurs as consciousness, which is itself 
paradoxically caught up in the natural process. The typical 
image of this condition in Faulkner emphasizes an active 
(dynamic, vital, emergent, "processive," materializing)—  
creative— natural world, at the center of which stands 
consciousness and its capacity for expressive action. 
Aristotle termed this condition dynamis, which Heidegger 
defines as "force, the capacity to be gathered within itself 
and prepared to work e f f e c t s . T h e  complex of "memories, 
perceptions, and tendencies" that comprise one moment of 
experience stands in at least a minimal degree of contrast 
to that of any other m o m e n t . S t r i f e  inheres in the 
operation whereby one dynamic composite vitiates itself in
^Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. 
T. E. Hulme (New York; 1922), pp. 9-10.
^^Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume I: The Will to
Power as Art (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 64.
l^Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9.
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the process of giving way to another. Thus the experience 
of consciousness in any given "moment" is necessarily 
different from that of any other moment, and precisely this 
fluid repetition of difference within consciousness— an 
innate empirical corollary of which is perpetually evolving 
perspective— constitutes the constant which is the basis of 
Faulkner's ontological aestheticism.
Roughly put, the condition is one in which dynamic 
constituents yield with extreme reluctance to would-be 
constituents. The key to the paradox rests in the word 
"yield," which demonstrates the "open" character of the 
condition. The conflict is expressible as an inherent 
dynamic antagonism between forces that currently constitute 
a moment of experience and forces vying to comprise it. The 
condition both does and does not admit potential entrants. 
This is the operative mechanical dimension of the paradox of 
strife that Faulkner images as the fundament of being, an 
inherent condition that stands as a situation in which the 
only constant factor is the very opposite of what by 
definition is constant, namely, the principle of change. 
While it is a principle that arguably permeates the entire 
universe, in terms of consciousness as imaged by Faulkner it 
simply involves the premise that the present exists as a 
condition of contingency, open to alteration by external 
forces— including future acts of consciousness itself— which 
enter the present, as it were, by a process of
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internalization. The motif suggests the interplay of 
consciousness with both phenomena and noumena as the primary 
formative relation of human being. In these images 
consciousness does not relate to experience, but 
experience, which in this context must be defined as a 
process and thus be said to be ultimately indeterminate and 
indefinable. With its unyielding stress on physiology, the 
texture of Faulkner's major fiction implicitly indicates his 
abjuration of the Cartesian interpretation of existence and 
his allegiance to the view that subject and object coexist, 
as it were, and therefore make experience inherently 
perspectival. Faulkner's sense of the centrality of this 
condition to human being induces him to accentuate the 
interrelation of choice and valuation as the operation 
whereby man embraces or repudiates moral responsibility.^^
^^The assertion of primacy for the aestheticist
position appears to contradict the assertion that Faulkner's 
fiction generally disavows the claim that absolutes are 
discernible and expressible, for the concept of primacy 
appears to contradict aestheticism as defined above. If 
Faulkner's orchestrating point of view is aestheticist, how 
can one assert that it offers a general image of conflict as 
the dominant force informing existence? Aestheticism disputes 
the concept of absolutism, yet apparently passes off itself as 
the one constant characteristic of being. The answer depends 
upon the particularities of this image. The rhetorical
elements that combine to produce it show conflict to be the 
controlling factor in the variableness of experience. The
image of the "mechanism" of conflict that inheres in the
relation of consciousness and experience has the constancy of 
such post-Enlightenment postulates as Man, Culture, or 
History. It differs, though, first, in that it attempts to 
describe empirical reality, as opposed to some invisible, 
though potent, force, and, second, in that its fundamental 
characteristic is its inconstancy. In brief, it is a constant
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Faulkner's generic aestheticist image of consciousness 
suggests that experiential conflict is secondary to the 
physiological condition of perpetual conflict, from which 
the former necessarily derives. The motif yields only 
reluctantly to analysis, yet attempts to describe it ought 
to be made since it embodies Faulkner's most definitive 
conclusion about human being. Fundamentally it is an image 
of the present of consciousness as a process comprised of 
various elements, with varying levels of force, co­
operating, as it were. The perceptual basis of this dynamic 
complex, of course, is the human brain and its multifaceted 
relationship to the entire organism. Yet, as a writer, not 
a scientist, Faulkner is uninterested in the purely 
technical aspects of the complex, though his textual 
emphasis on physiological factors indicates his conviction 
of its fundamental importance to man's experience. Rather, 
what interest him are the manifest elements of the 
operation, which might conveniently be termed "phenomena," 
and the other— "immaterial"— mental elements, which may be 
represented by the term "noumena." Among the first category 
are perceptions and feelings, insofar as the latter word
condition of inconstancy. The interplay of syntax, imagery, 
and narrative discourse in Faulkner produces a texture which 
suggests that, rather than cancelling out each other, the 
apparently contradictory absolutist and aestheticist positions 
actually reinforce one another.
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denotes a purely physical experience. Among the category of 
noumena are thoughts, imagery in the "mind's eye," memories, 
and emotions. By no means unimportant are, to use the 
Freudian metaphor, subconscious elements that impact on the 
"now" that constitutes consciousness. In any event, the 
condition is inherently paradoxical, as consciousness is 
both a part of that evolving world and simultaneously 
capable of awareness of its own microcosmic relation to the 
holistic process.
This general condition makes the realization of human 
projects extremely difficult and largely predicated on a 
practical understanding of it. Quentin experiences the 
uncanniness of his experience of time at numerous moments on 
the last day of his life, the events, moods and mental 
phenomena (such as memories and visions) of which he details 
in his tormented monologue— which, to be more accurate, is 
actually an ongoing dialogue with himself. It is the 
experience of Harry Wilbourne throughout "Wild Palms," and 
of the young Isaac McCaslin, as when, upon entering the 
locus of "his novitiate," "the wilderness closed behind his 
entrance as it had opened momentarily to accept him, opening 
before his advancement as it closed behind his progress, no 
fixed path the wagon followed but a channel non-existent ten 
yards ahead of it and ceasing to exist ten yards after it 
had passed, the wagon progressing not by its own volition 
but by attrition of their intact yet fluid circumambience.
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drowsing, earless, almost lightless."^^ Isaac similarly 
senses the eeriness of time when he sees the footprint of 
the bear appear, then "fill with water until it was level 
full and the water began to overflow and the sides of the 
print began to dissolve away." Isaac attentively keeps pace 
with the succession of evanescing prints until, "emerging 
suddenly into a little glade," he notices that "the 
wilderness coalesced," "rushed, soundless and solidified"
(p. 209, my emphasis).
By accentuating the influence of "man's nature" and 
"his environment" on his conscious relation to himself and 
others, Faulkner's texts offer images of physiologically 
informed conflict as the ground of e x p e r i e n c e . H i s  
aestheticism, like that of Nietzsche and Heidegger, is based 
on his interpretation of man's physiology, which is the 
source of the individual's immediate sense of experience, 
the temporal aspect of which Faulkner stresses. Both 
commentary and imagery in the fiction indicate the impact of 
physiology on man's perspectival condition. Simply stated, 
man's physiologically-induced mood occurs as the distance 
between what an individual immediately feels and what he 
desires to feel. The idea contained in the Greek word 
aisthesis, roughly translated as "feeling," elucidates this
^^William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York: Vintage,
1973), p. 195. The emphasis is mine.
l^Gwynn, p. 118.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
conception of man.^^ Experience is constituted by a state, 
or feeling, that derives from the relation of man's bodily 
self to the phenomenal world in which it exists. In The 
Wild Palms, Harry Wilbourne recalls how several times during 
his relationship with Charlotte Rittenmeyer he was lulled 
into listlessness by the daily ritual of "eating and 
evacuation and fornication and sitting in the s u n . T h i s  
emphasis on the creaturely aspect of man, which organically 
interplays with the individual's mood or sense of time, 
involves characters' typically torturous perceptual 
encounter with phenomena. Thus, in The Sound and the Fury, 
Quentin is agonized by the smell of honeysuckle, which 
elicits painful reminders of his sister's and his own 
sexuality. Harry is similarly tortured by visual and 
auditory impressions that evoke memories of Charlotte, 
though he eventually makes a conscious choice to seek out 
such experiences. Rosa Coldfield in Absalom, Absalom! 
recalls to Quentin her "summer of wisteria," in effect an 
elaborate, mnemonically-rooted myth based on her childhood 
observation of the romance of Charles Bon and Judith Sutpen, 
and on her own frustrated "romance" with the "demon" Sutpen. 
According to her recollection, a "sweet conjunction of root
l^Heidegger, Nietzsche; Volume I, p. 83.
l^William Faulkner, The Wild Palms (New York: Vintage,
1966), p. 133.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
24
bloom and urge and hour and weather" fed her experience.
The yearly blooming of wisteria evokes a Proustian renewal 
of the mood.
Faulkner's emphasis on the relation of physiology to 
man's immediate sense of the world underlies his general 
concurrence with Nietzsche that perspectivism, the principle 
that minds never absolutely converge, governs human 
experience. Because the constituents of consciousness are 
never static, but in constant evolution, there can be no 
facts, only interpretations. This correlate of Faulkner's 
conflict-informed ontology postulates a condition which 
forces the individual to choose, from conflicting 
interpretations, which ones he will embrace and what actions 
he will therefore undertake. The capacity for responsive 
action on the part of those who have achieved insight into 
the conflict that informs natural processes is the central 
element of Faulkner's aesthetics. Conflict, as the inherent 
condition that delimits man's relation to the world and 
accentuates the importance of choice and valuation for human 
existence, is the ground of the ontology that impels 
Faulkner to stress physiology as the dominant affective 
factor in man's experience, and point of view as the 
dominant tangible manifestation of man's faculty for 
creation. Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche's
^^William Faulkner, Absalom, Absalom! (New York; 
Vintage, 1964), p. 144.
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"physiological aesthetics" effectively glosses this 
principle in Faulkner; "My having various states— the ways 
I find myself to be with something— participates essentially 
in defining how I find the things themselves and everything 
I encounter to be."^®
Quentin is Faulkner's first extensive narrative image 
of the potent influence of the physical world on individual 
consciousness. A projection of Faulkner's own mythopoeic 
response to crisis, Quentin's mythos synecdochally 
illuminates the writer's sense of the importance of creative 
process to man's capacity for adaptation. To explain my use 
of the term mythopoeia in this context, I rely on Harold 
Bloom's chapter "The Mythopoeic Mode" in his Shelley's 
Mythmaking. Like Shelley, interested in the empirical 
experience of mind, Faulkner determined that in its 
interplay with world, consciousness is a force capable of 
creative self-interpolation. Bloom distinguishes between 
two general attitudes which result from the interaction of 
mind and nature. Commonplace experience involves an I-It 
relation in which the mind is not "bound up" with the object 
as it is in an I-Thou relation. The second, "imaginative," 
mode of experience involves a heightened relation to the
^^Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volume I, p. 83.
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w o r l d . T h e  I-It relation is inclusive, analytical, 
intellectual, experiential; the I-Thou relation, exclusive, 
synthetic, poetic, relational. Bloom finds in some of 
Shelley's poems evidence of an I-Thou relationship with 
natural phenomena that elicits improvisational activity on 
the part of the poet. Quentin undergoes precisely this 
process. The experience of anguish transports him into a 
mythopoeic relationship with nature and evokes poetic 
responses that eventually assume the substance of an 
idiosyncratic mythos.
Anguished memories sustain Quentin in a mode of 
mythopoeic perception. From the beginning of the monologue 
it is apparent not only that his experience of the world has 
been mythopoeic for some time, but also that he has brought 
a highly literary sensibility to the relation. The first 
image he describes is the light-induced "shadow of the 
sash," painful to him because it signifies his being "in 
time again," the medium of his sister's unacceptable 
actions, of his awareness of them, of life i t s e l f . ^0 Once 
Quentin sees the shadow, he begins to hear the ticking 
watch, which elicits an image of time as a corridor of "long
Martin Buber, I and Thou, tr. Ronald Gregor Smith 
(Edinburgh, Clark, and New York; Scribner's, 1937), quoted in 
Harold Bloom, Shelley's Mythmaking (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1959), pp. 1-2.
^®William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York: 
Random House, 1984), p. 86. Further references to this "New, 
Corrected Edition" of the novel appear in the text.
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and lonely light rays" down which Jesus walks (p. 76).
Jesus he associates with St. Francis, whom he associates 
with Little Sister Death, who painfully reminds him of his 
sister, Caddy. Thus, Quentin masochistically employs the 
poetic techniques of symbol and allusion, creating by 
verbalization the quality of his experience. It is the 
reader's first evidence of the poetic process that Quentin 
believes will eventuate in a satisfactory resolution of his 
problem.
Imaged as a voice, itself a natural phenomenon, Quentin 
responds to agonizing phenomena which evoke noumena that 
ultimately overwhelm him. His utterances in response to 
every momentary flicker or image of light indicate his 
enraptured aesthetic state. A few such images exemplify 
numerous others: He sees Shreve's glasses "glinting rosily"
(p. 77); he sees Gerald Bland's "oars catching the sun in 
spaced glints," and immediately thinks "Did you ever have a 
sister" (p 92); "the river glinted beyond things in sort of 
swooping glints" (p. Ill); fishing poles looked "like 
balanced threads of running fire" (p. 121); the flight of a 
butterfly suggests that "one of the sun-flecks had come 
loose" (p. 140); "dust motes whirled and slanted" (p. 144).
The dominant evanescent images in the monologue involve 
twilight, and they occur with increasing frequency as the 
monologue progresses along with the day. To nurse Quentin's 
swollen eye, Shreve brings a water basin with "a round blob
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of twilight wobbling in it" (p. 187). On the streetcar 
Quentin "could see the twilight again, that quality of light 
as if time really had stopped for a while." The most 
troublesome image, of course, is constituted by twilight and 
honeysuckle: "when it rained the smell began to come into
the house at twilight either it would rain more at twilight 
or there was something in the light itself but it always 
smelled strongest then." This double image manifests 
Quentin's association of time and light, as it evokes images 
from the past: "looking down a corridor of grey halflight
where . . . all I had done shadows all I had felt suffered 
taking visible form antic and perverse mocking without 
relevance" (pp. 194-95). Quentin's is no ordinary mode of 
existence, but reminiscent of Nietzsche's physiological 
grounding of the act of creation as "an explosive condition" 
involving "the extreme sharpness of certain senses, so they 
understand a quite different sign language— and create 
one". Throughout the monologue Quentin comes into 
conflict with his environment and reacts poetically.
Engulfed by sensory impressions that evoke anguishing 
recollections regarding Caddy, such as the sunlight on 
Gerald's wet oars, Quentin utters a poetic description 
("spaced glints") of the perception, which reminds him of
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, tr. Walter 
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House,
1967), pp.428-29. The italics are Nietzsche's.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
twilight, a general image he associates with Caddy ("Did you 
ever have a sister?"). To be sure, what happens when 
Quentin encounters images of light is unique to himself. It 
is an interpretation, but not, for Quentin, one that he 
chooses. His perspective is fixed, its potentially open 
condition vitiated by the particular obsessive orientation 
of his consciousness.
Note the similarities in Harry Wilbourne's experience 
in the final chapter of The Wild Palms, which details this 
character's increasing anguish, confrontation with despair, 
and meditation culminating in his resolve to cherish 
memories of Charlotte. Throughout this process Harry exists 
in poetic relation to the wind, which symbolizes his 
involvement with her. While she lies dying in a beach 
cottage, the wind seems to Harry a living presence "just 
interfering for the fun, the hell of it. . . .  It was 
risible, it was almost a chuckling; it did not really want 
to come in" (p. 281). He hears painfully evocative sounds 
that Faulkner presents onomatopoeically, usually created by 
the interaction of wind with an object— the ambulance 
"wailing" (p. 292), the wheels of the stretcher "making a 
sucking sound" (p. 294), the smocks of the doctors 
"flicking," the nurses' skirts "rustling" (p. 304).
Stepping from the ambulance, Harry hears "the palms rustling 
and hissing again as if they were being played upon by a 
sand blower" (p. 295). In the room where Charlotte's body
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lies, he perceives "not a cool wind blowing into the room 
but a hot one being forced out" by an invisible ventilator. 
It stirs "a lock of the dark, savagely short hair," and as 
he stands in anguished meditation upon the contrast between 
her former vivacity and the present lifelessness of her 
body, the stretcher team cruelly whisks her away, a button 
clicks, and "the hum of the blower" stops (pp. 305-07). 
Harry's sustained existence in this state of conflict 
informs his mythopoeic resolution at the conclusion of "Wild 
Palms."
Faulkner's sense of conflict is not synonymous with the 
divinely informed strife that drives Hegel's dialectical 
interpretation of existence, though it not infrequently 
aspires to be, but is rather more similar to the 
revelational strife that informs the images of nature-as- 
process that one finds in pre-Socratic texts or, more 
recently, in the later works of Heidegger. The 
absolutist/aestheticist tension that dominates Faulkner's 
mature fiction perhaps rises to its greatest pitch in the 
struggle of Isaac McCaslin in Go Down, Moses to comprehend 
God's truth and to act thereon. At a central point in the 
engaging dialogic encounter with his cousin McCaslin Edmonds 
in Part Four of "The Bear," Isaac recalls an earlier 
encounter between the two when Edmonds, who embodies the 
Platonic position that stands in opposition to the 
aestheticist Weltanschauung inherent in the texture of the
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novel, utilizes Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn" in attempting 
to define "truth" to his young kinsman. Edmonds' assertion 
that "Truth is one," that it is changeless, elicits Isaac's 
unspoken contrast between the "truth" ostensibly embodied in 
"somebody talking in a book" and the truth embodied in his 
failure to fire at Old Ben "long before the fyce covered the 
twenty yards to where the bear waited" (p. 297). Isaac 
privileges the latter— "simpler"— truth, borne out of the 
reality of the powerful internal conflict the incident 
evoked in him. In presenting Isaac's retrospective 
visualization of this "moment" of experience, Faulkner's 
text images truth as aletheia. In contrast to the Platonic 
version of truth as inherent a priori knowledge, and to the 
Hebraic conception of prophetically revealed truth, Isaac's 
sense of truth, at least in this instance, corresponds to 
the general Pre-Socratic conception of truth as perspectival 
(experiential) revelation— as Heidegger states it in his 
commentary on "The Anaximander Fragment," the experience of 
"approach and withdrawal as the basic trait of advent.
It is "processive," anomalous, ontogenetic. Yet in his 
later decision to embrace an idiosyncratic Christian 
(Platonic) interpretation of events, Isaac ignores, or at 
least forgets, his own insight.
Martin Heidegger, "The Anaximander Fragment, in Early 
Greek Thinking, trans. David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi 
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984), p. 31.
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The general detachment of the third-person voices of A 
Fable offer a view of the world of perpetual process to 
which consciousness necessarily relates. In this novel 
Faulkner occasionally depicts the whirl of natural phenomena 
in the language of a narrator who speaks as though he were 
observing it from an elevated position. For example, the 
detached narrator of the initial chapter, entitled 
"Wednesday," tells of an infantry battalion "emerging from 
the Place de Ville in close route column, led by a light 
tank with its visor closed for action, which, as it advanced 
parted the crowd like a snowplow, thrusting the divided 
parting back from either curb like the snowplow's jumbled 
masses, the infantry deploying into two parallel files 
behind the advancing tank, until at last the whole boulevard 
from the Place to the old gate was clean and empty again 
between the two thin lines of bayonetted rifles."^3 A 
similarly detached narrator in the fifth chapter, "Tuesday, 
Wednesday," describes an anguished community of citizens 
"seeming, as they approached the compound, to increase in 
speed as a wave does nearing the sand, on, until it suddenly 
crashed against the wire barrier, and hung for an instant 
and then burst, split into two lesser waves which flowed in 
each direction along the fence until each spent itself" (p.
William Faulkner, A Fable (New York: Random House,
1954), p. 6. All further references to this first printing of 
the novel appear in the text.
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130). Both passages stand as metaphors for the world of 
perpetual change and motion that Faulkner's protagonists 
encounter.
Correspondences in Faulkner to Nietzsche's aesthetic 
theory, particularly as this theory has been interpreted and 
expanded by Heidegger, offer a means of clarifying 
Faulkner's narrative image of man's aesthetic existence. I 
do not mean to suggest that Faulkner read either Nietzsche 
or Heidegger carefully or that parts of the fiction stand as 
conscious narrative representations of discursive schema.
No one can reasonably doubt, however, given their prominence 
in intellectual milieus, that Faulkner encountered ideas of 
both thinkers, if only indirectly in discussions that he is 
known to have participated in with other writers and 
intellectuals. John Irwin makes a credible case for the 
presence of the concept of "eternal return of the same" in 
The Sound and the Fury and Absalom, Absalom!. Thomas 
McHaney sees Thus Spake Zarathustra as a dominant influence 
on The Wild Palms. B u t  the issue of provenance aside, 
affinities among positions fundamental to both the fiction 
and the discourse demonstrate that Faulkner reached 
strikingly similar conclusions to those of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger about man's capacity for and susceptibility to 
art. The textual correspondences derive from the profound
^^Thomas L. McHaney, William Faulkner's "The Wild Palms" 
A Study (Jackson; Univ. Press of Mississippi, p. xix.
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influence of the Platonic world view on the three writers. 
Nietzsche reads the modern crisis of faith in Christianity 
as the inevitable conclusion of the nihilism that inheres in 
Platonism. Confidence in the reality of a transcendent, 
"ideal," realm, in which Being exists in perfection and 
stasis, distracts man from the possibilities that inhere in 
attentiveness to "lived" existence in this world. Faulkner, 
like the discoursers, fascinated by but skeptical of the 
Platonic postulation, presents in the texture of his fiction 
a generic image of existence as the dynamic "now" of 
consciousness. In all three writers, obsessive focus on the 
immediacy of experience in this world stands as a reaction 
to Platonism. And in all of them it is the capacity for art 
that inheres in the composition of this immediacy that most 
fundamentally defines man.
Heidegger's reading and further development of 
Nietzsche's view of art as the basic human activity offers 
an illuminative approach to Faulkner's view of man's faculty 
for creation. In Heidegger's view the task Nietzsche 
consciously undertook entailed setting aside the errors of 
traditional metaphysics, lodged in the two poles of Platonic 
idealism and Aristotelian positivism. Nietzsche's 
resolution of the error lies in his concept of will to 
power, which holds that all occurrence in nature is informed 
by an inherent tendency toward heightening or increasing the 
power of the acting phenomenon. His primary objective is to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
35
develop an effective interpretation of all occurrence, of 
which life is "the form . . . most familiar to us." And of 
all the phenomena of life, it is in the artist that, in 
Heidegger's words, "Being lights up for us most immediately 
and brightly." The artist is the person who is most clearly 
"able to bring something forth," "to establish in Being 
something that does not yet exist." The activity of the 
artist thus epitomizes Nietzsche's conception of the ground 
of Being, which he calls "will to power," as the capacity to 
bring forward something not yet in e x i s t e n c e . ^5 in terms of 
an "expanded concept of artist," Nietzsche defines art in 
broad terms as the result of man's use of his innate ability 
to add to the quantum of existence. By the same token, "art 
in the narrower sense is that activity in which creation 
emerges for itself and becomes most perspicuous." It is 
"the supreme configuration" of will to power, Nietzsche's 
term for man's fundamental b e i n g . T h e  activity of the
^^Heidegger, Nietzsche; Volume I;, p. 69.
^^Heidegger, Nietzsche, p. 72. Heidegger clarifies 
Nietzsche's concept by seeing it as partaking of aspects of 
Aristotle's definitions of dynamis ("force, the capacity to be 
gathered in itself and prepared to work effects"), energia ("a 
being empowered," "the being-at-work of force"), and 
entelechia (force "as willing out beyond itself, precisely in 
that way to come to itself, to find and assert itself in the 
circumscribed simplicity of its essence"). Compare Otto 
Rank's definition of will as "an autonomous organizing force 
in the individual which . . . constitutes the creative
expression of the total personality and distinguishes one 
individual from another," in Beyond Psychology (Camden, N.J.; 
Haddon Craftsmen, 1941), p. 50.
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artist, then, provides the clearest possible manifestation 
of art and, concomitantly, of will to power.
From this basic view of the correspondence of the 
creative faculty and a general capacity to establish in 
being something that does not yet exist, Heidegger derives 
his own aesthetics, which is fundamentally similar to 
Faulkner's general image of the paradox of conflict. In the 
concept of will to power, Nietzsche purports to invert 
Plato's emphasis on the transcendent and to ground man's 
life in the dynamic immediacy of the present. Heidegger 
supports the Nietzschean project, but asserts that will to 
power is, ironically, merely the nihilistic conclusion of 
the strain of western discourse that began with Plato. In 
short, will to power stands as a metaphor for the essence of 
existence, and as such is no more substantial than Plato's 
postulate of an ideal world of which this world is but a 
shadow. What Nietzsche apparently did not see, according to 
Heidegger, is that will to power is not a descriptive term 
but a general metaphor for occurrences in nature. Thus, as 
George Steiner summarizes Heidegger's assessment of 
Nietzsche's aesthetics, "will to power is not a 
transcendence of western metaphysics but, on the contrary, 
its natural and nihilistic c l i m a x . H e i d e g g e r  wants to
^George Steiner, Martin Heidegger (New York; Penguin, 
1980), p. 150. Earlier in his discourse on Heidegger, Steiner 
asserts, "for all its lyric magnetism, the Nietzschean Will- 
to-Power is itself only a wildly exalted subjectivity," p. 70.
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approach as near as possible to a literal description of the 
principle of dynamic process that underlies natural 
occurrences, and while, like Nietzsche, he finds aesthetics 
to be the key to the insight he seeks, his solution is not 
in terms of an Apollonian-Dionysiac dialectic, but in terms 
of a pre-Socratic "primalism" in which the word supposedly 
was not metaphoric but immediate to the portion of reality 
to which it corresponded.
Heidegger's description, in "The Origin of the Work of 
Art," of the strife-driven interplay of "world" and "earth" 
as the process through which creation occurs bears strong 
resemblance to Faulkner's motif of the paradox of conflict.
I assert the parallels between these two writers' views of 
art not because one man influenced the other, a highly 
unlikely event despite their being coevals, but because 
their conceptions of art mutually reinforce each other. 
Several compelling reasons for the occurrence of this 
correspondence may be offered, though neither individually 
nor as a set are they conclusive. The root of Faulkner's 
agreement with Heidegger's description of the general 
process of creation most assuredly arises from the fact that 
their ideas derive from intense interest in the major 
questions that modernism posed in intellectual circles in 
the post-World-War-I western world. The fiction of the one 
and the discourse of the other are driven by these 
questions. Both writers responded to the crisis of values
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
38
that afflicted the consciousness of modern man, Faulkner, 
like Nietzsche, through an answer to Schoepenhauer's 
pessimism (especially in The Wild Palms), and Heidegger 
through an analysis, evaluation, and innovative furtherance 
of Nietzsche's project. That both men developed an 
aestheticist response to the question of man's capacity for 
instituting an effective interplay of knowledge and action 
surely owes something to their similar views on the 
significance of death, both as an image and as an event.
The nihilistic crisis of modernity derives from man's 
inability to teach himself what Rosa Coldfield in Absalom, 
Absalom! refers to as a "boon of death" (p. 143). For both 
writers man's capacity for effective creative acts depends 
upon a practical acceptance of death. But it is their 
common conclusion about the controlling influence of 
consciousness, or time, as the medium of man's being that 
marks the most basic parallel in their shared aestheticism.
In the "Origin," published seven years after the 
appearance of Being and Time, Heidegger transposes his 
description of the "thereness" of Dasein as a condition of 
"veiled" presence into his sense of the innate relation of 
art and truth. According to Heidegger's reading of the 
Greek term for truth, aletheia, truth "happens" as the 
result of a conflict between what Heidegger terms "world" 
and "earth." Heidegger invents the verb "to world" to 
indicate the strife between world and earth that eventuates
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in truth or art. Creation involves the "opening up of a 
world," by which process "all things gain their lingering 
and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope 
and limits."28 The world is never objective reality, but 
the process whereby reality undergoes evolution. "The world 
worlds, and is more fully in being than the tangible and 
perceptible realm in which we believe ourselves to be at 
home" (p. 44). In terms of the work of art— in contrast to 
"nature creating," so to speak, or to the "made" tool— being 
is brought from concealment into the "Open," which is 
established "in its structure" by the "setting forth" that 
takes place in the strife of world and earth (p. 45).
Earth, "that which comes forth and shelters," corresponds 
to what Faulkner images as the realm of contingency within 
which consciousness exists and to which it has the capacity 
simultaneously to relate (p. 46). The difference between 
the work of art and the "made" work in general, both of 
which eventuate from the process of "worlding," is that the 
latter "disappears" into the end for which it was made, 
whereas what is established in the work of art derives from 
its relationship to the ability of consciousness to perceive 
what otherwise would have no avenue for coming to be, hence 
no being. "All this comes forth as the work sets itself
^Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in 
Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hoftstadter, (New 
York: Harper Colophon, 1975), p. 41. All further references
to this work appear in the text.
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back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the 
firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster 
of metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, and into 
the naming power of the word" (p. 46).
Heidegger speaks of world/earth strife in terms of the 
interplay of a "clearing" and "concealing" that constitutes 
the "establishing" or "happening" (aletheia) of truth (p. 
61). That which exists "conceals" that which does not 
exist, and that which is in the process of coming to 
existence "clears" its way as it relates to that which 
exists. The "concealing" element of the equation resists 
the "clearing"— in Heidegger's words, "juts through" the 
clearing element— but it nevertheless yields to some extent 
(p. 49). This extent, or perceptible remainder, constitutes 
the work. Paradoxically, as it opens, reveals, or clears 
the way to "truth" or aletheia, it simultaneously assumes 
the position of concealing element. However similar this 
description may seem to the Hegelian dialectic, it is in 
fact fundamentally different. The process is not 
inevitable, nor does it result in a divine revelation. It 
is contingent, letting "ontogenetic" truth happen rather 
than ferreting out a priori truths. The earth, into which 
the world worlds, brings the irreducible quantity of 
phenomenal difference that causes dissemination of meaning 
and potential.
Not so much Faulkner's definitions of time as a "fluid
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condition" existing in individual consciousness or as a 
"present moment" including both past and future, but his 
images of time, like those above from A Fable, parallel 
Heidegger's discussion of the identification of "being" and 
time. In his great discourse of 1927 on existence, entitled 
Being and Time, Heidegger, in his self-conscious elaboration 
of Nietzsche's views on being, attempts to establish this 
identity. His aim entails the undermining of all western 
metaphysics since Plato, who wrote of "Being" as a timeless 
realm apart from the flux of human experience. The primary 
characteristic of Dasein (loosely, Heidegger's term for 
man's existence) is its "thrownness" into what Heidegger 
calls "thereness." In this sense it is a condition 
ultimately beyond the control of the (human) being existing 
within it. This being or Dasein is thus in a position of 
perpetual strife between itself and the condition of its 
thereness. Moreover, the fact of this condition "is veiled 
in its 'whence' and 'whither,' yet [paradoxically] is 
disclosed in itself the more unveiledly. Analogously, 
Faulkner's "present moment" of consciousness contains its 
"whence" (past) and its "whither" (future), and aspects of 
these temporalities are present despite the essential 
absence of these "dimensions" of time. To exemplify from 
one of Faulkner's texts, consider the moment during his
^^Quoted from Steiner, Martin Heidegger, p. 87.
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involvement with Julio's sister when Quentin sees her 
"black, secret, friendly gaze, the half-naked loaf clutched 
to her breast." The image recalls to Quentin a painful 
earlier moment with Caddy when, attempting to affect her 
thinking and thus her behavior by evoking jealousy, he tells 
her that he was "hugging" Natalie. Instead of successfully 
controlling her consciousness, however, Quentin is, as it 
were, hoist by his own perspectival petard, as his mind 
focuses on "the mud flatting her bodice through her dress it 
smelled horrible" (pp. 137-38). Loaf, mud, and the breasts 
of the two girls become associated in his mind, as the 
present moment with the little girl paradoxically holds what 
it does not hold, aspects of Quentin's past as well as his 
future. In Steiner's gloss of this idea in Heidegger, man 
does not live "'in time,' as if the latter were some 
independent, abstract flow external to our being"; rather, 
man "lives" time.^O
As the image of Quentin's "moment" with Julio's sister 
demonstrates, Faulkner's texture images Heidegger's 
statement that in relation to the work projected by 
consciousness, surrounding phenomena "first enter into their 
distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they 
are." What they appear to be as a consequence of context is 
"what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and
30gteiner, Martin Heidegger, p. 78.
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rising in itself and in all things physis. It illuminates 
also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We 
call this ground the earth." By earth, Heidegger does not 
mean mere matter, but "that whence the arising brings back 
and shelters everything that arises as such. In the things 
that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering 
agent" ("The Origin," p. 42).
In the monologue of Quentin, in all of the voices of 
Absalom, Absalom!, and in most of the voices of The Wild 
Palms, Go Down, Moses and A Fable Faulkner similarly 
accentuates, through the peculiar combination of syntax, 
image, diction and content, the interplay of consciousness 
and an emerging world. Consider, for instance, the 
inception of Absalom,Absalom!, which is comprised of an 
extended moment ("From a little after two o'clock until 
almost sundown") in which Quentin, in a physiologically 
evocative setting ("a dim hot airless room . . . latticed 
with yellow slashes full of dust," shaded by a burgeoning 
wisteria vine and disquieted by "random gusts" of sparrows), 
experiences the rise of Colonel Sutpen ("out of quiet 
thunderclap he would abrupt") and "his band of wild niggers" 
as they "overrun suddenly . . . the tranquil and astonished 
earth and drag house and formal gardens violently out of the 
soundless Nothing and clap them down like cards upon a 
table" (pp. 7-8). Although in this case it occurs 
noumenally, in the vision of a particular character, this is
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Faulkner's imagery of emergence, a narrative metaphor for 
the aesthetic condition of man's existence. The perspective 
here is Quentin's, induced both by a narrative tone (Rosa's) 
intended to convey the speaker's sense of an outrage 
perpetrated against her and by Quentin's own obsession 
regarding the nature of time. The oxymoronic image of 
Sutpen's emergence underscores the uncanniness of the 
experience for both of them, inasmuch as they are powerless 
in relation to it. To further accentuate the enfeebling 
effect of the occurrence, Faulkner substitutes for a verb an 
adjective ("he would abrupt") that is far more descriptive 
than any of the synonymous verbs he might have used (i.e., 
"appear," "emerge," "surface," even "materialize").
This image at the beginning of Absalom underlines 
Faulkner's awareness of the essential role language plays in 
the aesthetic relation of consciousness to the realm of 
contingency of which it is a part. Referring to the process 
whereby the mind grasps the classification of a plurality of 
specific things under one general concept (eidos), Heidegger 
writes that "the essential directive in the procedure is 
granted by language, through which man comports himself 
toward beings in g e n e r a l . " A b r u p t , "  for instance, rather 
than "emerge," as the verb for the action Quentin visualizes 
indicates the particular quality of his comportment toward
^^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 172.
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the story Rosa tells. Indeed, in his characterization of 
Quentin in this initial segment of the novel, Faulkner 
suggests not only the essentiality of language to experience 
but also the manner in which language may split 
consciousness and thus create multiple selves or sub-selves, 
as it were. This aspect of the process is manifest in the 
narrator's reference to the "two" voices of Quentin 
listening to Miss Rosa Coldfield tell her story of "the 
demon" Sutpen. He "would seem to listen to two separate 
Quentins now," one "having to listen, to one of the ghosts 
which had refused to lie still even longer than most had, 
telling him about the old ghost times," and one "too young 
to deserve yet to be a ghost"— "the two separate Quentins 
now talking to one another in the long silence of notpeople, 
in notlanguage" (p. 9). The passage debunks the concept of 
the unified subject, as Quentin hears two powerful, 
contradictory voices. But rather than hearing the voice of 
Miss Rosa, the person doing the talking, he hears two voices 
that are constituents of his consciousness, one of which, 
moreover, is that of "the ghost which had refused to lie 
still," implicitly that of Colonel Sutpen, the protagonist 
of Miss Rosa's story and thus knowable to Quentin only 
through the medium of her voice. The most interesting 
epistemological implication appears in the reference to the 
"silence of notpeople," which reverberates in "notlanguage." 
Here, besides the obvious indication that language is the
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resonant medium of existence of that which neither does 
exist nor can exist— in this case, the voice of a man now 
dead— an equally rich suggestion postulates the unconscious, 
non-linguistic "talking" of the "two separate Quentins" to 
each other.
An easy resolution of these paradoxes would follow from 
a critique that reads Faulkner's use of speech as a metaphor 
for Quentin's internal strife regarding the terrible story 
of the Sutpens. Accordingly, Quentin is torn by the 
conflict of his innocence with unknown, unavoidable 
elemental forces. This interpretation is by no means 
altogether invalid, but Faulkner appears to be positing a 
more fundamental relation of language and consciousness.
The clash of forces that constitute the experience of 
Quentin is not exclusively linguistic, but it is knowable 
only through his capacity for language. This medium enables 
both Quentin and the reader to see Sutpen and "his band of 
wild niggers . . . drag house and formal gardens violently 
out of the soundless Nothing" (p. 8). Conveying this image 
in a third-person voice, rather than that of Miss Rosa, 
enables Faulkner to suggest that what she literally says and 
what Quentin consequently experiences are not the same.
What he experiences is "notpeople" and "notlanguage," though 
the basis for these images is linguistic.
Faulkner's texts make clear that consciousness need not 
necessarily be thus overwhelmed by its innate propensity for
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painful mythopoeic response to experience. Eric Voegelin's 
interpretation of Plato's concept of the "in-between" that 
characterizes the existence of individual man illuminates 
this aspect of Faulkner's aesthetics. According to 
Voegelin, man's existence "has the structure of the In- 
Between of the Platonic metaxy, and if anything is constant 
in this history of mankind it is the language of tension 
between life and death, immortality and mortality, 
perfection and imperfection, time and timelessness." Man 
has the potential to be "conscious of reality as a process" 
and of his own consciousness "as a mode of participation" in 
this process. Further, as a conscious participant man has 
the ability "to engender symbols which express his 
experience of reality." Faulkner's texts indicate his 
agrément with Voegelin that man can recognize the symbols he 
engenders "to be part of the reality they symbolize," though 
the fiction demonstrates his doubt that many people ever 
achieve this level of consciousness regarding the process. 
Besides Quentin, especially in The Sound and the Fury, 
Faulkner considers in Rosa Coldfield, Harry Wilbourne in The 
Wild Palms (1939), and Isaac McCaslin in Go Down, Moses 
(1942), a series of highly intellectual individuals in whom
^^Eric Voegelin, "Equivalences of Experience and 
Symbolization in History," quoted in Dante Germino, "Eric 
Voeglin: The In-Between of Human Life," in Anthony de
Crespigny and Kenneth Minogue, eds.. Contemporary Political 
Philosophers (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1975), p. 103.
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the impulse to mythopoeic utterance is a powerful force.
Each character's highly idiosyncratic, "creative" 
interpretation of Christian mythos and subsequent 
application of it to his life results in either death or 
emotional debilitation. Clearly the impulse to create art, 
so powerful a force in Faulkner himself as to command almost 
complete dedication to it, also evoked in him grave 
reservations about its ultimate value. These reservations 
derive not from Faulkner's sense of art as an accessory to 
life, to be taken or ignored, but from his conviction of a 
basic relation of art and life. Not until he was well into 
his work on A Fable (1954) was he able to resolve these 
misgivings and confidently ascribe to art the high valuation 
he had always unconsciously given it.
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Remythology and Spoliation:
The Mythopoeia of Faulkner's Failed Artist-Figures
Faulkner shares with Nietzsche and Heidegger the view that 
the neurosis of modernity is attributable to man's largely 
unconscious questioning of the value of existence. This 
pervasive skepticism largely derives from an unsettled 
relation to Christian values that have been the predominant 
influence on western culture for nearly two millennia. In 
accordance with this diagnosis, both writers inquire 
earnestly into the ultimate human value of this mythos. 
Nietzsche regards Christianity as a historical consequence 
of "Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as 
such." And while in The Genealogy of Morals (1887) he rails 
against its deleterious effects on the moral strength of 
western man, calling it variously "the slave revolt in 
morals,"1 "a truly brilliant politics of vengeance," an 
"unspeakably cruel mystery" with "debilitating narcotic 
power,"2 in the companion text published a year earlier. 
Beyond Good and Evil, he asserts the existence of a positive
Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Genealogy of Morals," in The 
Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis 
Golffing, (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor, 1956), p. 168.
^Nietzsche, The Genealogy, in The Birth of Tragedy and 
The Genealogy of Morals, p. 169.
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dialectical "tension of the spirit"— manifest in "need and 
distress"— that is being experienced by "good Europeans" who 
ineluctably respond to Christianity and therefore
potentially sense "the arrow, the task, and— who knows? the
goal. Faulkner's similarly ambivalent feelings about 
Christianity are manifest in informal statements and in the 
fiction. In conversation he tried to downplay the thematic 
significance of Christian allusion in his work, saying that 
"the Christian legend is part of any Christian's background, 
especially the background of a . . . Southern country boy," 
that he "assimilated that . . . without even knowing it," 
and that its presence in his work "has nothing to do with 
how much of it I might believe or disbelieve— it's just 
there."4 The apparent contradiction in these remarks (i.e., 
his oblique reference to himself as a Christian while 
disclaiming the importance of belief to the fiction) is
interesting but not likely to simplify comprehension of
Faulkner's views. There is much in the fiction, however, to 
demonstrate Faulkner's sense that the cultural impact of 
Christianity is terribly problematic, in particular the 
major artist-figures who wreak extreme suffering on either 
themselves or others (or both), arguably as a result of
^Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, pp. 3-4.
^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds., 
Faulkner in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p.
86.
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their compulsive relation to Christian mythos.
This is not to suggest that Faulkner regarded 
Christianity as an inherent evil to be extricated from the 
western world. On the contrary, like Shakespeare,
Faulkner's moral education was fundamentally Christian, and 
he instinctively tried to embrace the tenor of this mythos 
in his personal life and to image in his fiction the ironies 
of its unrealized standards in both individual experience 
and cultural history. Yet like Nietzsche he ascribed the 
cause of the general condition of neurosis in modernity to a 
crisis of confidence in the religious mythos which was the 
emotional mainstay of western man for nearly two millennia, 
its eminence as the embodiment of timeless perfection having 
waned considerably by the early twentieth century. As 
Quentin Compson's father puts the matter, Christ "was worn 
away by a minute clicking of little w h e e l s . Faulkner 
shares with Nietzsche the compulsion to articulate a 
credible theodicy that would replace the ineffectual 
Christian one. Yet while Nietzsche asserts the possibility 
of a wholesale "transvaluation" within western culture, 
predicated on man's inherent capacity for art, the 
relatively large number of characters in Faulkner's fiction 
who create deleterious theodicies suggests that he, despite
^William Faulkner, The Sound and the Fury (New York; 
Random House, 1984), p. 77. All further references to this 
"New, Corrected Edition" appear in the text.
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his many parallels with Nietzsche's thought, including the 
ontological privileging of this capacity, remains 
fundamentally pessimistic about the likelihood of man's ever 
making widespread effective use of it.
The old general of A Fable is the logical continuation, 
indeed the fulfillment, of the pattern of metaphysical 
problems Faulkner concerned himself with in the early works. 
Quentin, through whom Faulkner considered the crisis of an 
individual whose compulsive religio-cultural perspective 
forces from him an aesthetic reaction to family occurrences 
that clash with this perspective, is Faulkner's first mature 
narrative image of the impact of the problem on humanity. 
This character's inability to resolve his conflict of values 
in an actual sense eventuates in his projection of an 
imaginary (suicidal) settlement predicated on his visionary 
re-interpretation of the Christian mythos. In The Sound and 
the Fury, Faulkner asserts the ontological impossibility of 
a reversal of temporal event, presenting dialogue in which 
both Quentin and his father express this constant of man's 
condition. Yet despite his overt acknowledgement of this 
condition, Quentin chooses imaginatively to empiricize, as 
it were, a visionary restructuring of Christian mythos that 
overrides it. Through her myth of the relation of time, 
being, and the difficulty of effective creation, Rosa 
Coldfield derides the promises of this mythos. In Harry 
Wilbourne, an obvious reconsideration of Quentin, Faulkner
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images consciousness choosing to acknowledge the 
irreversibility of events and to reject a Platonic 
interpretation of being, opting rather to embrace a 
conception of possibility founded in the material world, 
albeit one that eventuates in a nihilism comparable to the 
Hebraic paradigm Harry repudiates. Having considered these 
various responses to the Christian mythos of his culture, 
Faulkner moved to a consideration of the general effects of 
this mythos in Go Down, Moses. Yet the focus is still 
characterological, as Isaac McCaslin's application of 
Christian principles to the history of his family supplies 
the writer with a vehicle for the consideration of a more 
general influence of the mythos than the problems of 
Quentin, Rosa, and Harry provided. Thus the conflict imaged 
in A Fable, when the corporal, a proponent of the 
perfectibility of man, manages to bring to a halt a dispute 
of international proportions, constitutes a further 
broadening of Faulkner's consideration of the influence of 
Christian mythos on western man.
As Faulkner's first mature image of an inherent 
interrelation among impulses to art and truth in man,
Quentin became the paradigm for Rosa Coldfield, Isaac 
McCaslin and, most especially, Harry Wilbourne. Although it 
has largely gone unremarked, the parallel between Quentin 
and Harry was implied in a 1946 letter from Faulkner to 
Robert Linscott, senior editor at Random House, in which the
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author suggested that "TSAF and THE WILD PALMS section from 
that book" be published in a single Modern Library volume.® 
Moreover, his French translator, Maurice Coindreau, recalls 
that in the summer of 1937, when the invention of The Wild 
Palms was already underway, Faulkner "seemed to know The 
Sound and the Fury by heart, referring me to such-and-such a 
paragraph, to such-and-such a page, to find the key to some 
highly enigmatic o b s c u r i t y . T h e  critical events in 
Faulkner's life in 1937, similar to those in 1928 when he 
was writing The Sound and the Fury, suggest his impulse to 
objectify a narrative resolution to personal crisis. In 
response to crises similar to Faulkner's, Quentin and Harry 
create mythopoeia designed to alleviate and account for 
their anguish, thus constituting synecdoches of Faulkner's 
quest through narrative to justify the inevitability of 
anguish. Yet despite their similar backgrounds and 
attitudes profoundly influenced by Judaeo-Christian ethos.
Joseph L. Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William 
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 228. Faulkner's
suggestion follows his penchant for publishing in the same 
book stories with unconnected plots but with thematic 
parallels and contrasts, as in The Wild Palms (1939), the two 
stories of which are "Wild Palms" and "Old Man." He also had 
used this technique in the three other novels he published 
prior to the letter of 1946 to Linscott: The Unvanquished
(1938), The Hamlet (1940), and Go Down, Moses (1942). John 
Irwin makes an excellent case, moreover, for conscious 
authorial parallels between The Sound and the Fury and 
Absalom, Absalom! See Doubling and Incest, Repetition and 
Revenge (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1978).
^Blotner, Faulkner: A Biography (New York: Random
House, 1974), II, 960.
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each protagonist creates mythopoeia founded on a theory of 
aesthetics that stands in inverse relation to that of the 
other.
Severe personal disappointment conjoined with exposure 
to the intellectual climate of the 1920s to influence the 
shape of The Sound and the Fury (1929), in which Quentin 
stands as the ironic resolution of Faulkner's earliest 
severe conflict between the world and a particular image of 
it that he valued. The loss of his childhood sweetheart, 
Estelle Oldham, when she married Cornell Franklin in 1918, 
initiated this pattern, which recurred in 1926 and 1937.
His response to the first crisis was to join the Canadian 
RFC, thereby removing himself from Oxford, where the failed 
courtship and dreaded marriage occurred. He objectified 
subsequent misfortunes, however, by transforming his tension 
into literary products. For Helen Baird, whom Faulkner 
courted in New Orleans and Pascagoula, Mississippi, in 1927, 
he hand-made two gift-books: Mayday, an Arthurian allegory
depicting a frustrated romance that brings the protagonist 
face-to-face with death— thus anticipating Faulkner's 
treatment of this theme in The Sound and the Fury and The 
Wild Palms; and Helen; A Courtship, a sequence of love 
sonnets of the theme of romantic love and immortality. 
Baird's wedding a rival suitor in 1927 agonized him. Early 
in that year Faulkner and Estelle resumed their courtship 
when she returned to Oxford after divorcing Franklin. This
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renewal of romance was surely complicated by Faulkner's 
involvement with a thus-far unidentified woman about whom he 
wrote to his Aunt 'Bama in early 1928.® Years later he told 
Maurice Coindreau that he had written The Sound and the Fury 
at a time "when personal problems had placed him under a 
severe strain." According to Coindreau, he "was grappling 
with problems of an intimate n a t u r e . These problems quite 
likely involved a conflict between his well-seasoned love 
for Estelle and his desire for fulfillment with the woman he 
mentioned to his aunt. Whatever their specific nature, the 
problems influenced his characterization of Quentin, much as 
the portrait of Harry some ten years later resulted to a 
large extent from Faulkner's repetition of the familiar 
cycle of desire and anguish when he met, loved, and lost 
Meta Carpenter in Hollywood during the late 1930s. Like 
Estelle and Helen, Meta married while still the object of 
Faulkner's intense romantic fixation.
The early works Mississippi Poems, Helen; A Courtship, 
and Mayday figured prominently in Faulkner's development of 
themes that would inform his most important texts up to and 
beyond A Fable. The theme of man's apparent lack of
David Minter points out that the reference cannot have 
been to Estelle, whom Aunt 'Bama had known for some time. See 
his William Faulkner: His Life and Work (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Univ. Press, 1980), p. 92.
^Maurice Coindreau, The Time of William Faulkner: A
French View of American Fiction, trans. George M. Reeves 
(Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1971), p. 52.
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immortality and its significant offshoots— the insatiable 
desire for romantic fulfillment, the transience of events, 
the importance of physical perception to man's experience of 
time and memory— recur throughout these early works. In 
terms of style and technique as well as subject matter these 
works anticipate the mature fiction that began to appear in 
the late nineteen twenties.
Late in December, 1924, Faulkner gave to his childhood 
friend and schoolmate Myrtle Ramey a volume of twelve poems 
on onionskin sheets. Entitled Mississippi Poems, the 
collection featured eight poems that he would publish in the 
1933 collection A Green Bough. Poem I begins with the 
speaker's inquiry about the endurance of memory: "Shall I
recall this tree, when I am old,/ This hill, or how this 
valley fills with sun?"^® The speaker answers himself 
emphatically: no; memory, like all other natural processes, 
is ephemeral. But the intensity of the poet's desire to 
retain forever his memory of important feelings compels him 
to describe an eternal form of awareness whereby "The hushed 
wings of wind," which "shape the tree tops," shake also his 
"heart with hill and vale for aye/ When hill and vale itself 
no longer live." Among the Mississippi Poems, the poet's 
most profound assertion of his immortality occurs in poem
Quotations from Mississippi Poems and Helen: A
Courtship are from William Faulkner, Helen: A Courtship and
Mississippi Poems, ed. Carvel Collins (New Orleans: 
Yoknapatawpha Press, 1981).
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VII, "Mississippi Hills: My Epitaph." "Return I will," he
reasons, for "there's still spring to shake and break my 
sleep"; and "Though I be dead,/ This soil that holds me fast 
will find me breath." These attempts to verbalize assurance 
of eternal being foreshadow the elaborate mythos Quentin 
develops in response to the irreversibility of time.
Parallels in the characterizations of Quentin and Harry 
reflect Faulkner's need to account for the periodic 
irruption of extreme suffering, which, as a consequence of 
his successive romantic misfortunes, had taken on the 
character of an inevitable condition of human existence. 
Although the ten-year period between his loss of Estelle and 
the writing of The Sound and the Fury in 1928 provided him 
with the hindsight that accompanies detachment, her return 
to him during the period of his unfulfillment with the woman 
mentioned in the letter to Aunt 'Bama intensified his sense 
of loss and probably significantly influenced theme and 
character in the novel. To be sure, Quentin's desire to 
overturn the basic conditions of temporality so that Caddy's 
virginity can be restored reflects Faulkner's feelings about 
his early loss of Estelle. Similarly, Meta's marriage to 
Wolfgang Rebner in 1937, shortly after Faulkner had made the 
anguishing decision not to divorce Estelle so that he could 
marry Meta, informed the frustrated romance of Harry and 
Charlotte in The Wild Palms. In both novels the 
protagonists' mythopoeic inventions parallel Faulkner's
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narrative pursuit of a satisfactory theodicy.
Both characters' extreme sensitivity results in their 
preoccupation with fluid images that reflect the 
devastatingly swift passage of time. Visual, auditory, and 
olfactory images repeatedly irritate Quentin: the Harvard
students "running for chapel," their "flapping collars 
flushing past like debris on a flood" (p. 88); a ringing 
bell that "stayed in the air, more felt than heard, for a 
long time" (p. 90); the honeysuckle "coming and coming 
especially in the dusk when it rained" (p. 153). While 
Harry speaks to McCord of "the current of time that runs 
through remembering," his experience of a succession of 
evanescent impressions supports the theory he is uttering 
(p. 137). He sees Charlotte "enter the vestibule and 
vanish." Of the waiter who serves them in the station bar, 
Harry sees "the same white sleeve, the anonymous feature­
less waiter-face you never actually see" (p. 130). A few 
moments later, "the waiter's hand set the refilled glass on 
the table and withdrew" (p. 136). Still later, three 
discrete perceptions blend into a single image: "The
loudspeaker spoke again; they made to rise at the same time; 
at the same moment the waiter materialized and McCord paid 
him" (p. 139). Acutely aware of time as an enigmatic, fluid 
medium of irreversible occurrences, Quentin and Harry, like 
the author who invented them, attempt to capture its essence 
in words.
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The similar descriptions of time expressed by Quentin 
and Harry provide the basis for the mythopoeia they develop 
in response to disheartening events. Quentin remembers his 
father's statement— "time is your misfortune . . . .  A gull 
on an invisible wire attached through space dragged" (p. 
104). Similarly, Harry describes consciousness as a 
condition of being "attached to [time], supported by [time] 
in space" (p. 137). These intransigent poetic ontologies 
reluctantly disclose meaning. "Space" in both descriptions 
simply means the set of impressions received. As Coleridge 
wrote, any mode of mental experience "must receive all its 
materials ready made from the law of association."^^ In 
short, both characters describe consciousness as a condition 
of attachment to time through perception of space.
This basic similarity notwithstanding, Quentin and 
Harry have substantially different feelings about the 
constituents of consciousness. Furthermore, this difference 
results in the contrasting theories of aesthetics with which 
they confront the dread of nihilism. A longer quotation 
from the passage in which Harry's description appears will 
help to clarify the contrast. In dialogue with McCord at 
the Chicago train station, Harry describes himself during 
most of his relationship with Charlotte as having been 
"outside of time," though
Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "On Poesy or Art," in English 
Romantic Writers, ed. David Perkins (New York; Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1967), pp. 491-92.
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still attached to it, supported by it in space . . . 
supported by it, but that's all, just on it, non- 
conductive, like the sparrow insulated by its own hard 
non-conductive dead feet from the high tension line, 
the current of time that runs through remembering, that 
exists only in relation to what little of reality . . . 
we know, else there is no such thing as time. (p. 137)
The descriptions of both characters express their sense of 
entrapment. Quentin sees himself as a "gull" passively 
"dragged" by the "invisible wire" of time since his mind is 
powerless to control the perceptions and painful memories he 
experiences through the process of association. At the 
point of his utterance, Harry has also been a passive 
receptor, "attached to" time through crass images of the 
commercial modern world. The difference is marked, 
nonetheless. Quentin's view is static. Having accepted his 
father's idea that experience is essentially accidental, 
beyond individual c o n t r o l , Q u e n t i n  values being "outside 
of time," inasmuch as he indicates his agony over waking to 
be "in time again" because "in time" he is in the world of 
perception and memory (p. 86).
By contrast, Harry's description confirms that the
l^He remembers his father's speaking of "man who is 
conceived by accident and whose every breath is a fresh cast 
with dice already loaded against him" (p. 177).
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condition of any given moment of consciousness need not be 
sustained. His expression is not reified but figurative.
As such, despite its contorted, periphrastic character, it 
provides a theoretical basis for amelioration. Harry's 
phrase "outside of time" is a metaphor for his previous 
insensitivity to the fundamental value of his relationship 
with Charlotte. His mind had been "non-conductive" of "the 
high tension line"— the line of "remembering" its value and 
thereby retaining it. My reading of this passage differs 
from that of Cleanth Brooks, who fails to discern Harry's 
various levels of meaning for "time." Brooks interprets 
Harry's expression accordingly: "time is felt as a
'current' that 'runs through remembering.' It flows out of 
the past through the present and toward the future.
However, this view makes "remembering" the present moment of 
consciousness and thus the base of all conscious experience. 
Consequently, Harry's syntax would situate him beyond all 
currents of time. Yet Harry's language shows that he is 
still "supported by" time through his sensory perceptions 
(space); thus, his syntax indicates that the sparrow is 
"insulated" only "from the high-tension line, the current of 
time that runs through remembering," and that Harry wants to 
be on this line. "Remembering" in this context is parallel 
to what Harry means by "inside of time"— again, aware of the
l^cieanth Brooks, Toward Yoknapatawpha and Beyond (New 
Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1978), p. 253.
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real value of their relationship. This line of remembering, 
like all others, necessarily exists "in relation to" the 
"little of reality"— that is, the reality constituted by 
impressions— we may know in a moment of consciousness.
While Quentin's poetry leaves him unalterably stuck on a 
"dragged" invisible wire, Harry's expression acknowledges 
multiple currents that the mind may experience, thus 
foreshadowing the this-worldly, future-oriented mythopoeia 
he will later create.
The precise point at which verbalizations cease being 
merely abstract and become mythopoeic may be too subtle to 
fix. Coleridge has said that art commences "as soon as the 
human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image 
exclusively of articulate s p e e c h . I n  any case, by 
describing consciousness as a gull or as being "like" a 
sparrow, a character has begun to invent personal myth 
designed to mediate his experience. The connotations of 
gull need no delineation, but sparrow is a far richer word, 
with a literary history relevant to both Quentin and Harry—  
indeed, central to their self-devised myths. Following 
classical associations of the bird with lecherousness, 
Chaucer called the sparrow "Venus' sone" in The Parliament 
of Fowls and portrayed the Summoner of The Canterbury Tales
^^See "On Poesy or Art," in Perkins, p. 492.
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as "hoot" and "lecherous as a sparwe."^^ In Old Testament 
lore the bird symbolizes worthlessness. Psalm 84 praises 
the temple of the Lord as a place where even "the sparrow 
hath found a house." In Psalm 102 the Psalmist likens 
himself to "a sparrow alone on the housetop," helpless 
because a wrathful God has "cast me down." Quentin's and 
Harry's relation to the image certainly fits attributes of 
lechery, worthlessness, and helplessness each ascribes to 
himself. But inasmuch as it appears at a point when the 
character is developing his meditation on sex and death into 
an abstraction designed either to counter (Quentin) or to 
understand (Harry) the nature of time and conscious 
experience, the image— an obvious allusion to Jesus' well 
known use of the sparrow in the Gospel of Matthew— serves as 
a myth-inspiring memento mori.
The mythopoeic confrontation between Quentin's 
consciousness and the sparrow that pitches on his window 
ledge occurs just four pages into the monologue (i.e. 
several minutes after he awakes).
A sparrow slanted across the sunlight, onto the window 
ledge, and cocked his head at me. His eye was round 
and bright. First, he'd watch me with one eye, then 
flick! and it would be the other one, his throat
^^Geoffrey Chaucer, in The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer, 
ed. F. N. Robinson (Boston; Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 314, 
23.
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pumping faster than any pulse. The hour began to 
strike. The sparrow quit swapping eyes and watched me 
steadily with the same one until the chimes ceased, as 
if he were listening too. Then he flicked off the 
ledge and was gone. (p. 79)
The carefully crafted monologue shows that before Quentin 
encounters this highly mythopoeic perception, he had been 
experiencing an associational chain of thoughts that began 
when he accidentally perceived his friend Spoade walking to 
class. The perception had interrupted Quentin's 
recollection of a conversation with his father about loss, 
time, virginity, and death, and the sparrow's slanting 
across the light restores Quentin's pondering of these 
matters. Whereas the image begins with an annoying change 
in light and also involves a sharp, fading sound, it reminds 
Quentin of the pain associated with his existence in time. 
Moreover, Quentin's biblical knowledge intensifies the 
moment, as the sparrow reminds him of Christ's emphasis on 
the eternal existence of the soul.
And fear not them which kill the body, but are not 
able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is 
able to destroy both soul and body in hell.
Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of 
them shall not fall on the ground without your Father.
But the very hairs on your head are numbered.
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Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than 
many sparrows. (Matt. 10; 28-31)
The image of the sparrow having expired as "the last 
stroke ceased vibrating," Quentin's imagination immediately 
endows it with symbolic significance. In effect, he 
accentuates his feelings about Caddy by valuing them above 
any concern about the consignment of "both soul and body 
[to] hell": "Because if it were just to hell; if that were
all of it. Finished. If things just finished themselves. 
Nobody else there but her and me. If we could just have 
done something so dreadful they would have fled hell except 
us. I have committed incest I said" (p. 79). As the image 
fades, Quentin moves from mythopoeic perception to the 
creation of a mythopoeic abstraction. At the thought of his 
need to commit a "dreadful," damning sin, incest comes 
impulsively to mind, and he will soon use this imagined sin 
as a pretext for his being cast with Caddy into "a hell" 
where they will be "more than dead . . . the two of us amid 
the pointing and the horror beyond the clean flame" (p.
116).
Quentin perceives the sparrow while trying to 
understand the anguishing irreversible losses he has 
suffered. Caddy's loss of her virginity becomes his psychic 
loss, as the recalled conversation with his father 
indicates: "Father said it was men invented virginity not
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women. Father said it's like death; Only a state in which 
the others are left . . . and I said. Why couldn't it have 
been me and not her who is unvirgin." (p. 78). To Quentin, 
Caddy's "unvirgin" condition and the decline of the Compson 
family exist as synecdoches of the loss of self-awareness 
that will ineluctably occur over the passage of time. Mr. 
Compson starkly poses the problem when he tells Quentin "you 
cannot bear to think that someday it will no longer hurt you 
like this." (p. 177). Christ's association of the sparrow 
with the fate of the soul after death symbolizes Quentin's 
search for an appropriate response to the ravages of time.
We recall that he begins the monologue irritated about 
waking into "time again" (p. 75), thereby indicating his 
preference for being "outside of time"— a condition he 
associates with sleep, death, and Caddy's virginity. His 
father's analogy between death and virginity suggests the 
synonymity of these conditions, and Faulkner's 
retrospectively written "Appendix" (1945) to The Sound and 
the Fury shows that Quentin's reification of this figure of 
speech becomes the sine qua non of the desired vision he 
believes will be realized and fixed for eternity once he 
takes his life: Quentin "loved not the idea of the incest
which he would not commit, but some presbyterian concept of 
its eternal punishment." This "concept" entails a 
consciousness-in-death, a "hell where he could guard Caddy 
forever and keep her forevermore intact amid the eternal
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fires."IG
Hopelessly psychotic, Quentin attempts to reverse the 
temporal order through an illusory scheme of rationalized 
illogic. He had reasoned that if he could persuade his 
father that he and Caddy committed incest, then her other 
lapses from virtue "wouldn't be so and then the world would 
roar away." But Quentin cannot turn this myth into reality 
merely by verbalizing it. Unable to reverse merely by 
utterance of a falsehood "the sequence of natural events and 
their causes which shadows every mans brow," he seizes upon 
death as his only recourse to effect "an apotheosis in which 
a temporary state of mind will become symmetrical above the 
flesh and aware both of itself and of the flesh it will not 
quite discard" (p. 1 7 7 ) . in brief, he believes the only 
willed response to the exacerbating temporal order is the 
ultimate one that ends it altogether.
Harry's allusion to Jesus' image of the sparrow appears 
when he is seeking to contend with his temporal experiences. 
Like Quentin, he senses a relationship among loss, time, 
virginity, and death, so the biblical association of the 
sparrow with life after death aptly fits his immediate
^^William Faulkner, "Appendix," in The Sound and the Fury 
(New York: Vintage, 1956), p. 411.
^^Andre Bleikasten describes Quentin's apotheosis as "not 
at all a state of not-being but rather an ek-stasis, that is, 
literally, a standing outside and beyond his self— without any 
self-loss," in The Most Splendid Failure (Bloomington: Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1976), p. 140.
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situation.^® As indicated above, Harry's use of the image 
in a simile shows that he is consciously creating poetry. 
Unlike Quentin, he is aware of the difference between 
language intended to mediate experience and immediate 
experience itself. Like many of Faulkner's narrators and 
characters, he has a penchant for using the indefinite 
pronoun "it." The word appears several times in the 
metaphorical contrast between "inside of time" and "outside 
of time" he presents to McCord;
You know: I was not. Then I am, and time begins,
retroactive, is was and will be. Then I was and so I 
am not and so time never existed. It was like the 
instant of virginity, it was the instant of virginity: 
that condition, fact, that does not actually exist 
except during the instant that you know you are losing 
it. (p. 137)
l^At Charlottesville, Faulkner noted "that some people 
get a certain amount of pleasure in hunting around in a 
writer's work for reasons, for symbols, for similarities, and 
of course they are very likely all there." Further, a "writer 
would use a symbol at the drop of a hat if that was the 
simplest way to throw the light on the particular incident 
he's telling about, and it's perfectly valid, I think, for 
anyone to seek for those symbols"; see Frederick L. Gwynn and 
Joseph Blotner, eds., Faulkner in the University: Class
Conference at The University of Virginia, 1958-1959 
(Charlottesville: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1959), p. 121. The 
position of the sparrow in both works offers further evidence 
that they ought to be cross-referenced.
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The indefinite pronoun enables Harry to relate several 
forms of physical experience that figuratively parallel the 
period of time when he has been aware of the value of his 
relationship with Charlotte. He initially compares this 
period of heightened awareness to the span of life itself—  
"inside of time." This initial antecedent then becomes "the 
instant of virginity," an intensive moment in contrast to 
Harry's previously blunted sensitivity. The "condition" of 
virginity exists only when "you know you are losing it."
This "instant" suggests Harry's current situation "inside of 
time," aware that the fluid condition of time necessarily 
foredooms him to lose Charlotte. Toward the end of his 
profuse expatiation on time, through a blending of images 
that correspond to the indefinite pronoun, the "instant of 
virginity" becomes the orgasmic moment that suggests the 
termination of life and time. Harry's self-comparison to a 
"sparrow insulated by its own non-conductive dead feet from 
the high-tension line" therefore implies an equation of his 
previous death-in-life condition of unawareness to the state 
of complete unawareness that is death. His allusion to the 
sparrow as well as his metaphoric use of a painfully real 
event— his loss of virginity— discloses a capacity for 
poetic distancing that Quentin's blending of mythopoeic 
perception and reified mythopoeic abstraction precludes.
Even before the onset of the misfortunes that will take 
Charlotte's life, Harry has used his poetic faculty to
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develop insights into the nature of time that will enable 
him to construct a myth of memory in accordance with his 
considered priority of "remembering" her. Harry's 
synecdochal images of loss foreshadow the kaleidoscopic flow 
of events he experiences prior to Charlotte's death in the 
final chapter of The Wild Palms. In jail, awaiting trial 
for manslaughter, he clings to his ability to think, waiting 
determinedly for a satisfactory explanation of the meaning 
of his experience. The explanation depends upon Harry's 
capacity to verbalize it, which he comes close to doing 
after Rittenmeyer's first visit to the jail: "he almost
touched it. But not yet. . . .  it would return; he would 
find it, hold it, when the time was ready" (p. 312). Again 
the ubiquitous indefinite pronoun appears. Here the word 
represents some explanatory combination of "what" and 
"how"— "what meaning can I find in my experiences" and "how 
can I ensure the continuing existence and development of 
that meaning?"— though Harry can presently express only the 
former of these questions.
The "second time he almost got it" occurs between 
Rittenmeyer's visits (p. 316). When the tail of a hurricane 
strikes "somewhere in the Gulf," Harry's consciousness 
fixates on the wind and develops a series of evocative 
images that almost leads to the answer he seeks.
It would be even quieter inland . . . upon the clipped
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sward . . .  it would be clipped and green and quiet, 
the body, the shape of it under the drawn sheet . . . 
Only that can't be all of it, he thought. The waste.
Not of meat . . . But memory. Surely memory exists 
independent of the flesh. But . . . it wouldn't know 
it was memory, he thought. (pp. 315-16)
The indefinite pronoun enables Harry to blend one image 
into another until he reaches the threshold of his 
apotheosis of memory. The wind becomes the sward, which 
then becomes Charlotte's body, which becomes the "all of it" 
or the meaning of their relationship. The penultimate 
antecedent, the reality of her rotting body, he must bravely 
confront before he can discover this meaning. But he must 
learn something new of her during Rittenmeyer's second visit 
before he realizes that the meaning he desires lies in the 
very mythopoeic power he has already used so effectively in 
the search to find it.
Harry achieves his answer when Rittenmeyer's anger 
reveals that Charlotte's love for Harry had compelled her to 
exact from her husband a promise that he will help Harry—  
the very man who had taken her away from him! This 
recognition sets in motion once again the mythopoeic process 
that Harry eventually vows to nurture for the rest of his 
life:
it was just a simple falling of a jumbled pattern
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. . . and so there was just memory, forever and 
inescapable, as long as there was flesh to titillate. 
And now he was about to get it, think it into words . . 
. It was there, waiting, it was all right, it would 
stand to his hand when the moment came. (p. 323)
In this passage, which confirms Harry's facility with the 
poetic process, he reconciles himself to nature by thinking 
the "jumbled pattern" of underlying meaning "into words."
His discovery of Charlotte's selfless pleas on his behalf 
evokes a powerful feeling about her, enabling him to 
recognize the possibility for future experiences of this 
kind. His understanding that he must stay alive to prolong 
their love is reaffirmed moreover when he connects his 
intense feelings for her to some sensory perceptions that 
evoke her memory. He sees the "light on the concrete hulk" 
of the abandoned warship, "as if he lived there"; he hears 
"a preliminary murmur in the palm" that signals the 
beginning of "the light offshore breeze"; he inhales "the 
smell of swamps and wild jasmine"; and he sees "the dying 
west and the bright star" (p. 324). These perceptions 
elicit strong feelings about Charlotte, causing him to 
recognize that "memory was just half of it, it wasn't 
enough." The meaning of his relationship ("it") depends 
upon his ability to store memories of her as well as to 
experience fluid "avatars" informed by sensory perceptions.
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Harry's myth is thus a belief in the mind's mythopoeic 
capacity for "humanizing nature" by combining perceptions 
into unified expressions of "thoughts and passions." It is 
a this-worldly myth that deifies man's faculty for shaping 
his experience of organic nature. Faulkner exemplified the 
faculty through the writing of The Wild Palms, reconciling 
himself thereby to a present painfully colored by the past. 
His medium was poetry, the dynamic experience of discovering 
insights into experience. In developing Harry's story, he 
confirmed his belief in the power of consciousness to 
understand its ontological reality and to construct 
thereupon an essentially rational, but flexible, structure 
of belief that allows for adjustment to the unpredictable 
flux of events while sustaining the individual in his 
progress toward meaning. He showed in Harry Wilbourne that 
this meaning never materializes absolutely, but develops 
incrementally within the mind committed to its revelation. 
Harry can make himself an active receptor of feelings that 
relational perceptions may evoke in the future, or he can 
create mythopoeic theodicy, such as his ironic use of Jesus' 
sparrow to convey the gravity of his former death-in-life 
condition of unawareness. Through his characterization 
of Quentin and Harry, Faulkner effectually worked out the 
conflict between his desire for eternal consciousness and 
his recognition that death terminates consciousness. In 
other words, he balanced the religious perspective of his
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culture against the realistic scientism of modernity. The 
contrasting myths of these characters represent two of the 
prominent modern responses to death, the one of Christian 
mysticism, the other of existential resolution. In a single 
Modern Library volume, the stark contrast they make would 
have underscored Faulkner's interest in the ambiguous 
potential of the mind's capacity for mythmaking.
The prophetic words of Hamlet just prior to his 
entrance into the banquet hall that will be the scene of his 
death ironically emphasize the confrontation with death that 
Quentin and Harry experience: "we defy augury. There is
special providence in the fall of a sparrow. If it be now, 
'tis not to come; if it be not to come, it will be now; if 
it be not now yet it will come— the readiness is all" (V. 
ii. 2 1 9-2 3 ).19 The sparrow augurs Quentin's imminent death, 
but the "special providence" he believes will be realized in 
death differs from the orthodox implications of the term. 
Like Hamlet, desperate for a solution to his dilemma, he has 
no doubt of the divine order that, according to Christian 
orthodoxy, underlies creation. But his paradoxical feelings 
about Caddy compel him to adapt the Christian tenet of 
consciousness-in-death to his own mythopoeic vision. Thus, 
his reified myth of memory makes of hell a heaven, as his 
paradoxical reward of eternal damnation in a condition
l^wiiiiam Shakespeare, The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. G. 
Blakemore Evans (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1974), p. 1183.
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"aware both of itself and of the flesh it will not quite 
discard" sustains his illicit feelings (p. 220). That is, 
Quentin takes his verbalized abstractions for concrete 
reality. Harry, by contrast, is awed by his enigmatic 
sexual feelings, yet uses his experience of them consciously 
to construct metaphors intended to dispel his confusion.
His conclusion that "if memory exists outside of the flesh 
it wont be memory because it wont know what it remembers" 
convinces him that only by retaining the fluid condition of 
consciousness will he be susceptible to experiences that 
will evoke and intensify his recollections. Thus, from his 
memory of past realities, he knowingly develops abstractions 
designed to enhance the likelihood of such experiences in 
the future. Harry is aware that perceived phenomena, the 
inseparable nexus between man's physical being and his 
spiritual one, provide the basis of his valued ongoing 
mythopoeia. In contrast to Quentin and according to a 
metaphysics significantly different from Hamlet's, Harry 
knows that "the readiness is all." Yet, instead of applying 
this superior knowledge to the end of creating a new, 
dynamic life for himself— as Charlotte had suggested he do—  
he embraces rather a life of intense introspection, choosing 
to apply it solely to the production of intense memories of 
her. Harry, then, is yet another artist-figure whose 
utilization of mythopoeia undermines the high valuation of 
life the novel espouses.
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Not unlike Quentin and Harry, nor in this regard 
different from the author who created her, Rosa Coldfield 
seeks a theodicy to account for what she deems to be her 
terribly gratuitous experiences. Having been frustrated, 
despite her insistence that reality deliver up experiences 
commensurate with her sense of what ought to be, she is left 
with language as the resource for the vindication she 
desires. Her expressed theodicy, which is developed for the 
most part in Chapter V of Absalom, involves her perspective 
on the relation of time, being, and creation. It is a myth 
of time as certain heightened "instants" isolated in her 
consciousness as a result of the stark experiences that 
filled them. These instants evoke postulations of being 
that obsess her and provide the basis of her mythopoeic 
interpretation of man's fundamental condition, eliciting 
questions and presenting implications about man's capacity 
for creation. Like that of the typical artist-figure in 
Faulkner's fiction, she requires a healthy process of de­
mythology if she is to have any opportunity to achieve 
awareness of the implications of man's place in a contingent 
world and the concomitant potential for acceptance and 
growth it carries. No less an outraged prophet than her 
characterological predecessor Quentin, or her descendant 
Isaac McCaslin, Rosa finds a shocking discrepancy between 
her view of what the morality of her culture ought to be and 
what it in fact has shown itself to be. This morality is
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embodied in her image of Thomas Sutpen, innate cultural hero 
by virtue of his position in the Confederate army and as 
patriarch of what remains of her family. It is also 
embodied in the orthodox Christian religiosity and the 
racial hierarchy of her upbringing. In sum, Rosa's 
expectations are incarnate in a general image of cultural 
values with which the facts and events of her life conflict.
Rosa's primary symbols are not specifically Christian, 
like the sparrow of Quentin and Harry, but rather more Greek 
and discursive. Yet the informing mythos of her own 
idiosyncratic mythopoeic utterance is Judaeo-Christian, 
specifically with regard to her demand for justice and her 
self-perception as sacrificial lamb. This half of the 
internal dialectic voiced in her "summer of wisteria" 
monologue vies with her propensity for Greek discourse that 
will penetrate the empirical dimensions of being. If 
essentially undeluded about the impossibility of recovering 
from oblivion the "might-have-been," she is nonetheless 
outraged at the ontological conditions that forbid 
fulfillment as she envisions it. Hers is a conflict not 
between "what was, what used to be" and "what should, what 
might have been," but between what never was, except in the 
noumena of her mind, and what never could have temporal or 
phenomenal existence. Her past, present, and future consist 
therefore of "one constant and perpetual instant" of 
"surrender" to "that might have been which," according to
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her mythos, "is the single rock we cling to above the 
maelstrom of unbearable reality." Yet despite her 
indictment of "high heaven's very self" for allowing her to 
exist in a world whose chief characteristic is process, she 
retains a culturally-conditioned religious conviction which 
assures her of the reality of "that justice" which, despite 
its unwillingness to distinguish between "gristle bone and 
tender flesh," will nevertheless sustain its paradoxical 
ruthlessness "for appointed right and truth."
Rosa's tragedy parallels Harry's in that she apparently 
glimpses the aestheticist ontology an understanding of which 
might enable her to overcome her misplaced Platonism, yet 
cannot effectively utilize this knowledge. Nowhere is 
Faulkner more textually insistent on the relation of being 
and man's capacity for creation than in Rosa's analogy of 
the activity of the artist with that of the individual's 
attempts to mold the course of events. Her negative view of 
man's capacity for creation notwithstanding, she effectively 
images Faulkner's concept of the open— potential— temporal 
character of man's relation to the world. For her,
living is one constant and perpetual instant when the 
arras-veil before what-is-to-be hangs docile and even 
glad to the lightest naked thrust if we had dared, were 
brave enough (not wise enough; no wisdom needed here) 
to make the rending gash. . . . not cowardice which
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
80
will not face that sickness somewhere at the prime 
foundation of this factual scheme from which the 
prisoner soul, miasmal-distillant, wroils ever upward 
sunward, tugs its tenuous prisoner arteries and veins 
and poisoning in its turn that spark, that dream which, 
as the globy and complete instant of its freedom 
mirrors and repeats (repeats? creates, reduces to a 
fragile evanescent iridescent sphere) all of space and 
time and massy earth, . . . which in all the years of 
time has taught itself . . . only how to re-create, 
renew; and dies, is gone, vanished: nothing. (pp. 142- 
43)
Despite its being the language of a terribly frustrated 
character, Rosa's expressive mix of literal description with 
metaphor conveys an idea of the primary formative principle 
of man's existence which Faulkner's mature fiction 
repeatedly images. Individual experience is fundamentally 
constituted by the relation of man's innate creative faculty 
to the spatio-temporal components of immediate 
consciousness. The significance here is not so much Rosa's 
strained use of poetry to assert a philosophical attitude, 
but the suggestion that man's relation to the world is 
basically poetic, or aesthetic, insofar as these terms 
indicate the necessity for perspectival actualization as the 
generic form of response to both phenomenal and noumenal
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data. The double accent falls on the oxymoronic Bergsonian 
view of time as "one constant and perpetual instant" of 
potential, in Faulkner a complex constituted by the 
immediate contents of consciousness and by man's capacity to 
make an effective "rending gash" into the "arras-veil" of 
the instant. It is an instant which, in its openness to 
man's input, offers him a quantity of "freedom," though Rosa 
feels that man neglects to take advantage of this potential. 
Instead, he engages in futile creation that merely "mirrors 
and repeats" all foregoing instants. Man therefore fails 
effectively to utilize his inherent "spark" of potentiality. 
"Living" is thus seen as an instant in which man's 
unrealized capacity to act comes into conflict with the 
perpetually potential or "open" character of his existence. 
Rosa's disappointment thus results from her awareness of the 
conflict between the typical individual's (including her 
own) genuine potential and his general inability to fulfill 
it. But man's lack of wisdom and bravery notwithstanding, 
the basic ("constant and perpetual") characteristic of 
"living," namely its docility in relation to man's capacity 
"to make" and its receptivity ("even glad to the lightest 
naked thrust") to his acts, holds open the possibility for 
effecting some change in the course of events. Rosa's 
anger, however, at the discrepancy between ought and is 
blinds her to the possibility that inheres in her own 
language.
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In Go Down, Moses, Isaac McCaslin's similarly 
unrealistic expectation of Judaeo-Christian mythos to 
realize itself undermines his attempt to positively 
influence the lives of his slave-descended relatives. "The 
Bear, Part 4" discloses Isaac's discovery of the horrible 
crimes perpetrated by Carothers McCaslin, Isaac's 
grandfather, on his slaves. The unit is structured around a 
lengthy and involved, almost formal argument between Isaac 
and his surrogate-father-cousin McCaslin Edmonds, about 
Isaac's decision to forego his inheritance in an attempt to 
expiate the sins of his family. Isaac's position, an 
inherently semantic one, is that he cannot "repudiate" his 
inheritance since the "earth" belongs not to individual men, 
but to "the communal anonymity of brotherhood."^® In 
contrast to this position, McCaslin argues that their 
grandfather nevertheless "did own it, . . . else why do you 
stand here relinquishing and repudiating?" (p. 258).
Isaac's moral perspective, based on a particular value which 
denies man's right to own anything pertaining to "earth," 
opposes McCaslin's adherence to the de facto situation. 
Although Isaac, like his cousin, employs principles of logic 
to support his position at various points throughout their 
convoluted debate, his fundamental argument is an appeal to
®William Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York: Vintage,
1973), p. 257. All further references to this work appear in 
the text.
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an emotionally informed moral conception. In Go Down,
Moses, a novel published about one year before evidence of 
the idealistic original conception of the project that 
became A Fable surfaced, the ironic results of Isaac's 
attempts to expiate ancestral sins undermine his idealism.
The deceptive tone of the narrative voice that frames 
the debate, however, suggests that Isaac represents the 
ideological center of the novel. While a close reading 
shows that this voice conveys the limited, skewed 
perspective of Isaac, a less detached encounter of the text 
may lull the reader into compliance, if not out-and-out 
identification, with him. For example, the reader is likely 
to be won over by the voice's assertion that old Carothers, 
despite "knowing better," could attempt to foster in his 
heirs the belief that he actually owned the land and 
therefore could bequeath it. Such rhetoric subtly begs the 
question, and when it is immediately followed by a 
characterization of "the strong and ruthless man"— of which 
category the patriarch is purportedly one— as a person who 
"has a cynical foreknowledge of his own vanity and pride and 
strength and a contempt for all his get," the unquestioning 
reader is likely unthinkingly to embrace Isaac's position 
(pp. 254-55). After all, what sort of reader can easily 
identify with the vain, "ruthless," contemptuous cynic? Yet 
what is absent from this language, and what a holistic 
consideration of Part 4 ought to reveal, is the severe
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limitations of Isaac's perspective, which is warped by his 
terrible anger toward his ancestor. His perspective is 
reductive in the extreme, and Faulkner's dispassionate 
orchestration of the entire section, especially the 
dialogue, effectually discloses the compelling unspoken 
potential this perspective ignores.
When the narrator asserts Isaac's sense of "the reason" 
that Carothers "believed he had tamed and ordered" the land, 
the assertion is not a fact, but a speculation that the 
patriarch justified his claim of land ownership by virtue of 
the fact that he had forced his slaves to remove "the forest 
from it . . .  in order to grow something out of it" for the 
purpose of turning a profit (p. 254). All of this is 
Isaac's emotion-driven point of view regarding his 
grandfather, one projection among an infinity of other 
possibilities. Isaac's passionate clinging to it as truth 
underscores Faulkner's thematic treatment of the question of 
exactly what constitutes truth and how one gets at it. The 
text's disclosure of Isaac's severely restricted methodology 
for determining truth exemplifies Faulkner's general theme 
of the relativity of truth and of the consequential 
centrality of valuation to human being.
Isaac values what he describes as the "communal 
anonymity of brotherhood" (p. 257). He weaves an elaborate 
myth in support of this ideology, drawing on his 
interpretations of both Old and New Testament texts and on
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highly personalized readings of world and American history. 
Like Quentin and Rosa, he stands sorely in need of a process 
of de-mythology, and before being offered it through his 
cousin's deconstructive reading of Isaac's mythos, he has 
the opportunity to derive it for himself through an 
experiential encounter with Ponsiba, a grandchild of the 
patriarch and his slave-daughter Tomasina. This relative 
has left the McCaslin plantation to marry a young black man 
who has applied the myth of Canaan to his new circumstances, 
predicated on a federal land grant "for military service." 
Observing the man "sitting there in the only chair in the 
house," "before that miserable fire," in "ministerial 
clothing," and wearing "a pair of gold-framed," lenseless 
spectacles— "reading a book" rather than attempting to work 
the farm— Isaac discloses his capacity for myth-debunking by 
asking the rhetorical question, "What corner of Canaan is 
this?" (pp. 275-79).
Even so, to justify his repudiation of the McCaslin 
inheritance, which, as the concluding stories of the novel 
"Delta Autumn" and "Go Down, Moses" manifest, constitutes a 
repudiation of responsibility comparable to that of 
Ponsiba's husband, Isaac similarly relies on a highly 
idiosyncratic reading of Judaeo-Christian mythos, with 
himself as sacrificial Christ-figure of the family.
According to this reading, Isaac has been "chosen" by God to 
rectify— at least in terms of the McCaslin family— the
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terrible divergence of His creatures from what was intended 
when "He created the earth, made it and looked at it and 
said it was all right, and then He made man" (p. 257). This 
divergence involved the practice of chattel slavery that 
Isaac's "grandfather and his kind, his fathers, had brought 
into the new land which He had vouchsafed them," thus 
violating the demand that they vouchsafe God in return "pity 
and humility and sufferance and endurance" (p. 259). Isaac 
can fulfill this demand, he believes, by repudiating his 
right to inherit the "tainted" McCaslin property. The basis 
of his argument is a Platonic view of truth, which, 
ironically, he arrived at experientially in the episode 
involving the fyce and Old Ben.
In a reverie strategically located toward the end of 
the dialogue with McCaslin, Isaac recalls an earlier 
discussion of the two kinsmen in which his cousin had 
presented an interpretation of Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn" 
designed to gloss the boy's experience. In this dialogue, 
McCaslin asserts the Platonic view of truth: "Truth is one.
It doesn't change. It covers all things which touch the 
heart— honor and pride and justice and courage and love. Do 
you see now?" But for Isaac, at least at this point in his 
personal development, "truth" is not abstract, merely 
"somebody talking in a book," but wholly experiential. He 
had experienced the paradox of hunting the famed bear "four 
years and at last met it with a gun in his hands and he
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didn't shoot." Why? As Faulkner's text manifests, Isaac is 
paralyzed by his own reading of the fyce's courage. He has 
experienced the Pre-Socratic, Heideggerian interplay of 
world and earth, an eventually disclosed truth; and his 
cousin's assertion that "what the heart holds to becomes 
truth, as far as we know truth" rings on ears deafened by 
his internalized re-collection of the experience (p. 297). 
The reader should recall, though, that earlier in "Part 4" 
Isaac, in defining his view of truth, uses his cousin's 
rhetoric from the earlier dialogue. Proleptically 
countering McCaslin's sarcastic query that the "men who 
transcribed His Book for Him were sometime liars," Isaac 
asserts that the apparent relativity of truth is an 
illusion, since "there is only one truth and it covers all 
things that touch the heart" (p. 260). As McCaslin remarks 
early in the main dialogue, Isaac has the interpreter's 
propensity of "proving your points and disproving mine by 
the same text" (p. 261).
To undermine Isaac's biblical and historical 
reifications, McCaslin not only points out to his cousin the 
contradictions in the letter's referential authorities, but 
also demonstrates the force of the principle of 
perspectivism by offering his own readings of these sources.
For example, to Isaac's fundamental argument that justice 
eventually must be done and that it is incumbent upon him to 
act out his role in it, McCaslin asserts "there was still
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1865" (p. 282). In this assertion McCaslin is not claiming, 
as Rosa does, that God definitely is using one terrible 
event to retire another one, but that the defeat of the 
South certainly constitutes this possibility. McCaslin also 
asserts the "sons of Ham" argument to deflate Isaac's 
literalist reading of the B i b l e . H e  cogently postulates 
the apparent limitations of Isaac's creator God, to whom 
McCaslin irreverently refers as "this Arbiter, this 
Architect, this Umpire." Did He condone what he saw, and 
thus implicate Himself? Did he choose not to act, despite 
having the capacity? Did he even "see"? According to this 
linguistic framework, which, as such, can be no more or less 
convincing than Isaac's own logic-based interpretations, one 
must deduce that the creator is "perverse, impotent, or 
blind: which?" (p. 258).
At the end of the dialogue, Faulkner discloses to the 
reader the subjective teleological dimension of Isaac's 
application of Judaeo-Christian mythos to his present family 
circumstances. It is an apocalypse of personal freedom from 
the sociocultural guilt of his forbearer. Yet Isaac's is 
no less a purely visual, noumenal apocalypse than that of 
Quentin, as the rhetoric of the detached moderating voice of
^^McCaslin implies, that is, that if Isaac chooses to 
read part of the Bible literally, then, to uphold the 
principle of consistency, he must apply a literal reading to 
all of it— in which case, as the antebellum argument from 
Southern apologists for slavery held, God condemned the 
descendants of Ham to servitude.
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the dialogue indicates. For the historical circumstances of 
the "two threads" of labor and sustenance referred to early 
in the dialogue created "the frail and iron thread strong as 
truth and impervious as evil and longer than life itself and 
reaching beyond record and patrimony both to join him with .
. . bones whose names while still fleshed and capable even 
old Carothers grandfather had never heard" (p. 299). This 
is the thread that, according to the implicit Weltanschauung 
of Go Down, Moses, morally binds Isaac to the flux of 
history, both local and universal. His grand mythopoeic 
artifice fails to accommodate this assertion of "earth" 
within its created boundaries, with the result that both he 
and the McCaslin descendants that follow him suffer what 
otherwise might have been gratuitous experiences.
In each of the four major artist-figures considered in 
detail here, Faulkner images the highly deleterious 
potential of man's predilection for mythopoeic utterance 
when confronted by terrible experiences that evoke 
metaphysical uncertainty. Quentin, Rosa, Harry, and Isaac 
all project elaborate cosmologically based mythoi, with 
themselves as the structural centerpiece. Faulkner spares 
no opportunity to show us the influence of pronounced 
physiological states on these characters' idiosyncratic 
visions of the world and the too specific place they would 
take in it. What ought not to be lost on the reader, 
however, is the positive aestheticist force of each of these
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projects. Whereas each character voiced an image of himself 
in an attempt to manage his personal crisis, so, too, did 
Faulkner, in creating them, confront the problem of 
imperfectibility, his own as well as the world's. The 
difference, of course, between his and theirs, is the 
difference between an aestheticist and a nihilist view of 
the paradox of conflict that informs being. It is, finally, 
a difference of valuation, specifically, whether or not to 
value life itself, as the long and agonizing process of 
completing A Fable, his grandest aesthetic undertaking, 
amply confirmed for Faulkner.
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Chapter III
Strife, Structure, the Dissemination of Voices, 
and the Destruction of Truth in A Fable
It is at best a highly questionable practice to make 
Faulkner's commentary on his texts the centerpiece of a 
critical interpretation. He often spoke of them in somewhat 
cryptic metaphorical terms, forgot or confused precise 
details in attempts to recall parts of texts, and 
occasionally appears to contradict himself in separate 
references to a particular item in his fiction. Still, 
Faulkner's remarks about A Fable provide approaches to the 
novel that must be considered in any serious undertaking to 
interpret it. One cannot disregard his eagerness to explain 
to his friends and family, with increasing frequency as the 
process of composition wound to its conclusion, the meaning 
of the book. Nor should one forget, however, that 
Faulkner's conviction regarding his intentions was no less 
secure during the early stages of composition than it was in 
its last stages, though these relative perspectives stood in 
almost complete contrast to each other.^ Completely to 
ignore either Faulkner's remarks about the project or the 
significant amount of physical evidence of his struggle to
^Joseph L. Blotner, Faulkner; A Biography (New York: 
Random House, 1969), p. 1465 ff.
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compose it, therefore, would be to ignore an important 
avenue of insight into how and, to some extent, why the 
novel assumed its final dimensions. Yet as Faulkner himself 
not infrequently insisted, the texts ought finally to be 
allowed to speak for themselves. In terms of both structure 
and content, and in the relation thereof, A Fable upholds 
the principle of aestheticism suggested by some of his 
earlier texts as the fundamental characteristic of 
existence. The interrelation of man's physiology, of his 
perspectival experience of time, and of his propensity for 
myth is imaged in the involved relation of structure, 
texture, character, and voice that comprises the novel.
A Fable consists of a major line of narrative into 
which a secondary line offering parallels, contrasts, and 
even actual connections is woven. Intersecting these two 
lines are a multitude of related narratives of various 
lengths. The main plot, which patently corresponds to 
elements of the Passion Week and other aspects of the Jesus 
story, involves a first-world war conflict between a French 
corporal and the generalissimo of the entire French army, 
who also happens to be the biological father of the 
corporal. The corporal has led a mutiny of the enlisted men 
of both the Allied and the German forces, for the purpose of 
bringing an end to the war. The corporal and his twelve 
"disciples" have been arrested, and the generalissimo offers 
to rescind the order for their execution if the corporal
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
93
will acknowledge the danger of his actions and publicly 
renounce them. The secondary plot presents a stolen 
three-legged racehorse and an English groom who, accompanied 
by an old negro preacher and his grandson as jockey, 
traverse the south and midwest winning races and thereby 
creating a renown of legendary proportions.
The initial chapter of the novel starkly introduces the 
main characters and themes that the secondary characters, 
themes and fables will provide implicit commentary on.
There are two main characters, the Supreme General in 
command of the entire Allied forces in World War I and his 
son, the French corporal, though the latter figure is truly 
prominent only in terms of his place in the allegory 
suggested by the main plot or fable. In terms of action his 
presence is negligible, even though ideologically he 
represents one of the principal elements of conflict in the 
novel. Of the several levels of conflict disclosed in this 
short chapter, the one that involves the large questions 
about the nature of man with which Faulkner is concerned is 
the most significant. The major question the novel poses 
might be simply stated as follows: Is conflict,
particularly on a world-social level, an inevitable 
characteristic of human being? If so, what is the most 
practicable way to manage it? If not, how can man determine 
and extenuate the sources or causes of the human acts that 
eventuate in it? Another aspect of the same problem
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involves man's capacity, not necessarily to sustain his 
existence, but rather to improve the quality of it. Is 
human nature constant? Is nothing under the sun new, or 
does man contain an inner capacity to improve himself?
These are the questions Faulkner poses not only in A Fable, 
but at least implicitly in all of his writings.
Toward the end of 1943 when Faulkner began to consider 
the project that would be published much later as A Fable, 
he apparently thought of it in simple terms. He intended it 
to be "a thing," he wrote literary agent Harold Ober in late 
October, of "about 10-15 thousand words," "an indictment of 
war perhaps."2 The word "perhaps" offers a clue to the 
significant qualification in his initial intentions 
regarding the project, for it discloses his reservations, 
probably for the most part unconscious at this point, about 
his ability to write an unconditionally pacifistic narrative 
polemic. Before he would submit the final draft for 
publication in late 1954, the "10-15 thousand words" were to 
become more than 100 thousand, and the delicate tension that 
is evident in his expressed intention would expand into the 
wholesale strife that informs this novel as well as his 
earlier masterpieces. Indeed, the same basic conflict had 
driven the development in 1928 of his most significant 
character, Quentin Compson, and influenced some of his most
^Joseph Blotner, ed.. Selected Letters of William 
Faulkner (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 178.
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impressive novels and characterizations during the fifteen 
intervening years. This strife was largely born of the 
contradiction between the promise of moral perfection 
embodied in the influential Christian ethos of his culture, 
with its implicit promise of earthly justice and happiness, 
and Faulkner's failure to obtain these ends in his personal 
life or to find them manifest in the world of his 
observation. A Fable, to no less an extent than The Sound 
and the Fury and Go Down, Moses, is the result of the 
author's pursuit of a satisfactory theodicy.
From Faulkner's correspondence with his associates at 
Random House, one learns of how he encountered the initial 
idea for the book. A Hollywood director "told it in casual 
after-dinner talk to a producer" who knew and liked 
Faulkner's work. The three agreed that Faulkner "should 
write the story, the other two put up the money, [and they] 
would make the picture independently and own it between 
[them], share and share alike." Further, Faulkner was free 
to "write the story in any from [he] liked," the proceeds 
from any play or novel to be his "exclusively." Having sent 
the first half of the story along with the letter to Ober, 
he proceeded to outline its concluding half: "It continues
on, through the Three Temptations, the Crucifixion, the 
Resurrection. The Epilogue is an Armistice Day ceremony at 
the tomb of the Unknown Soldier." This letter of November 
1943 indicates that money, not literary substance, was
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uppermost in his mind. Faulkner intended "to rewrite it as 
a magazine story to be printed later by Bennett and Bob [his
O  *
editors at Random House], and as a p l a y . N e a r l y  two 
months later he wrote Ober that "the first draft of the 
fable" was complete and that he had "started rewriting 
it. The next epistolary reference, which occurred one 
week later in a letter to Robert Haas, demonstrates that 
during the process of writing the first draft of the story 
Faulkner's view of the project had changed from a merely 
pecuniary to an altogether serious one. Still referring to 
it as "the fable," he outlined its basic allegory:
The argument is (in the fable) in the middle of that 
war Christ (some movement in mankind which wished to 
stop war forever) reappeared and was crucified again.
We are repeating, we are in the midst of war again. 
Suppose Christ gives us one more chance, will we 
crucify him again, perhaps for the last time?
That's crudely put; I am not trying to preach at 
all. But that is the argument: We did this in 1918;
in 1944 it not only MUST NOT happen again, it SHALL NOT 
HAPPEN again, i.e. ARE WE GOING TO LET IT HAPPEN AGAIN? 
now that we are in another war, where the third and
2"To Harold Ober," 17 Nov. 1943, Blotner, pp. 178-79.
4"To Harold Ober, Saturday, 8 Jan. 1944," in Blotner, 
Selected Letters, p. 179.
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final chance might be offered to save him.^
These remarks, constituted by a mix of philosophical, 
poetic, and grammatical problems, suggest Faulkner's 
inconclusiveness regarding even the precise question he 
meant to answer. For instance, the rhetorical question 
(Will we crucify Christ for the last time?) corresponds to 
no definite referent. Is it a follow up to the announced 
allegory of Christ as "some movement in mankind," or, as it 
seems to be, a theological acknowledgement of the mystical 
power of a judgmental Christ who may be offering mankind a 
"last" chance? If logic is applied to the remarks, then a 
mixture of the mystical and the empirical occurs, as the 
curious question is evoked of how a "movement in mankind" 
can be said to be offering mankind a "last chance." 
Moreover, if the mystical interpretation holds, what is 
Faulkner implying about the consequences of yet another 
"crucifixion" of Christ?
Grammatically the statement is also troublesome. Not 
only is the antecedent of "that" unclear, but the "this" of 
the sentence which follows it points to no definite term. 
"We" did what in 1918? Is Faulkner referring to the French 
military's squelching of the mutiny among the ranks— the 
historical paradigm for Faulkner's "movement in mankind
5"To Robert K. Haas, Saturday, 15 Jan. 1944," in Blotner, 
Selected Letters, p. 180.
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which wished to stop war forever"— or is the implication far 
broader, referring perhaps to the slaughter of hundreds of 
thousands of people, resulting not in peace but in the 
recrudescence of conflict on an even greater scale in 1939? 
Moreover, if "it" must not happen again, what possible 
courses of action might prevent it? And is Faulkner's 
apocalyptic reference to a "third and final chance" being 
"offered" to be taken literally?
This first authorial indication of utter seriousness 
regarding the work "crudely" suggests Faulkner's theme. 
Although he gainsays any charge that he is proselytizing, 
the tone of the remarks is patently pacifistic. The blunt 
appeal to biblical authority sets up an apparently 
straightforward allegorical reading. Man must somehow find 
a way to reverse his historical tendency towards 
international conflict. Implicit in the allegory is the 
interpretation that men en masse will behave according to a 
wholly predictable pattern of conflict that carries the 
potential for self-annihilation, this despite his awareness 
of models (i.e., Christianity) that seem to offer him an 
alternative. Yet the apocalyptic linkage of the 
crucifixion, the devastation of Europe during World War I, 
and the ongoing world crisis evokes Faulkner's impulse to 
believe that mankind has the potential somehow to avoid in 
its resolution of the current problem the terrible 
consequences of the first two events. With development of
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the appropriate attitude and accompanying political 
strategy, man can eliminate the sort of perspective that 
erupts in world conflagration. Thus, the Utopian impulse 
that informed Faulkner's initial thinking about A Fable 
ignored his earlier conclusions, imaged most sharply in 
Quentin Compson and Isaac McCaslin, about the inherent 
limitations of the human condition. Presumably, the hero of 
this work would be a Christ-figure who, in contrast to his 
biblical paradigm, elicits from the masses complete 
adoration and a concomitant perfection of behavior that 
eliminates conflict from the world. The finished work would 
be an epic depiction of this hero's entrance onto a scene of 
world conflagration and his apotheosis as the savior 
thereof.
It seems reasonable to conjecture from Faulkner's 
remarks that the title of the short story as originally 
conceived, "Who?", points to the proponent of pacifism, who 
is buried in the tomb of the unknown soldier at the end of 
the story, as the figurative embodiment of the authorial 
point of view. That Faulkner struggled with the simplicity 
of this perspective is suggested by statements in letters to 
his correspondents at Random House during the following 
years. In a letter of April, 1946, he indicated to Ober 
that the title of the work was no longer to be "Who?" and 
that, generically, not only was it not a fable, but
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"something new for me, really not a novel."® Yet, nearly a 
year later, he hoped the book "can be accepted as a fable, 
which it is to m e . T w o  months later, in June, 1947, he 
wrote; "It's getting right now. It was a tragedy of ideas, 
morals, before; now it's getting to be a tragedy of 
people."® By this time the ideological focus of the project 
had shifted from the Christ-f igure to a far more complex 
perspective.
Faulkner himself spoke to the process that probably
underlay the shifting theme of the project that became A
Fable. Assuming that Faulkner had in mind a "specific
historical pattern" in its composition, an inquirer at the
University of Virginia asked him if this framework 
"circumscribed" his imagination in a manner different "from 
the way in which it ordinarily w o r k s . I m p l i c i t  in the 
question is the assumption that in the writing of this novel 
Faulkner began with and persisted in a clear idea of what he 
intended to convey, while in his "ordinary" method of 
writing, presumably the one he employed in writing The Sound
®"To Harold Ober, received 18 April 1946," in Blotner, 
Selected Letters, pp. 232-33.
^"To Robert Haas, Monday, March 24, 1947," in Blotner 
Selected Letters, p. 247.
®"To Harold Ober, received on June 9, 1947," in Blotner, 
Selected Letters, p. 250.
^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, eds., 
Faulkner in the University (New York: Vintage, 1965), p. 50.
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and the Fury or Light in August, the text took its form on 
the basis of the free play of his imagination. In his reply 
to the question, Faulkner suggested a dialectic of "pattern" 
and "imagination" as the dynamic of his creative process.
"I think that whenever my imagination and the bounds of that 
pattern conflicted, it was the pattern that bulged," he 
asserted. Then, speculating that "the reason that a man has 
to rewrite and rewrite" is "to reconcile imagination and 
pattern," he went on to offer one of his best descriptions 
of the general process of art. Given its relevance to A 
Fable, it bears repeating in its entirety here:
Of course, any work of art in its conception, when it 
reaches a point where the man can begin to work, has 
got to have some shape, and the problem then is to make 
imagination and the pattern conform, meet, be amicable, 
we'll say. And when one has to give, I believe its 
always the pattern that has to give. And so he's got 
to rewrite, to create a new pattern with a bulge that 
will take this bulge of the imagination which insists 
that it's true, it must be.^®
Having begun the projected story with the specific 
intent to utilize the Christ myth as an allegory of 
modernity's potential to eliminate conflict from its world.
^^Gwynn, Faulkner in the University, pp. 51-52
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Faulkner soon relinquished this embrace of utopianism to his 
fertile imagination's far broader conception of man's 
inherent inability to purge the world of strife. Soon into 
the project originally designed to show that man "MUST NOT" 
fail "again" in his effort to avoid another figurative 
crucifixion of Christ, Faulkner, remembering what his 
characterization of Quentin Compson disclosed to him about 
man's physiologically-based perspectival condition, 
recognized the futility of all human subscriptions to the 
concept of millennialism. The text of A Fable bears witness 
to this recognition, as the shift of the ideological focus 
of the novel from the corporal, the Christ-figure, to his 
supposed antipode, the Satanic marshal or "old general," 
indicates Faulkner's tribute to the "new pattern" created by 
the "bulge" of his imagination as his work progressed.
The passionate assertiveness of Faulkner's description 
of the Christ analogy notwithstanding, it is, like the core 
of his writing, essentially interrogatory. As a descendant 
only two generations removed from an ancestral community 
that suffered some of the worst effects of the Civil War, 
and as one who experienced both the excitement and the 
horror of the Great War during his highly impressionable 
late teens, Faulkner had first-hand knowledge of the 
terrible ambiguities of armed conflict. And while the 
holocaustic tenor of the allegorical remarks may well have 
reflected, at the time they were expressed, a genuine
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concern for the preservation of western civilization as the 
theme of the project, at some point the old question of the 
significance of man's capacity for artistic creation and 
reception came to be the dominant one. Try as he might in 
his inception and development of A Fable to convince himself 
of an innate, but untapped, human capacity to overcome 
imperfection, he could not repudiate his earlier conclusion, 
imaged most starkly in Quentin in The Sound and the Fury, 
that man's manifest capacity for invention was by no means 
without disastrous potential. By the date of publication of 
A Fable some ten years after its inception, the emphasis was 
no longer on the search for a conviction-informed way to 
eliminate conflict, but rather a resigned acceptance of its 
inevitability. Indeed, in a preface that Faulkner wrote 
after finishing the book, but decided against including, he 
not only disavows pacifism as his theme, but also asserts 
that in order "to put an end to war," "the men who do not 
want war may have to arm themselves as for war and defeat by 
methods of war" those who believe in "the validity of 
war. Whereas in The Sound and the Fury the primary 
crisis is individual, here it is western culture itself at 
the crossroads of despair and tragedy. Yet the key to his 
resolution in both cases is art, the primary element of 
which is the dynamic relation of artist and audience.
^^Quoted in Joseph Blotner, Faulkner; A Biography (New 
York: Random House, 1974), II, 1494.
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Quentin's audience, of course, as always, is himself. By 
contrast, the audience in A Fable is the anxiety- and dread- 
ridden populace of the district, a microcosm of all of 
France as well as the entire western world, and the artist 
is the apparent moral opposite of the Christ-figure who 
embodied the initial authorial stance.
Thus, Faulkner's already hard-won certainty of man's 
propensity for conflict eventually prevailed again over his 
strong idealistic urge, various manifestations of which 
constitute the primary formal element of many of his major 
characters. The exception is the character who came to be 
the hero of A Fable, the "old general," Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Forces who are "co-embattled" against Germany 
during World War In this character Faulkner resolves
the problematic of man's dualistic creative/receptive 
faculty which he evoked in his characterization of Quentin 
and reconsidered in the succeeding major artist-figures in 
the canon. The old general embodies Faulkner's conclusion 
that this faculty, though susceptible to perversions that 
diminish the quality of life, is the means also to mythoi 
that nourish individual, community, nation and, potentially, 
world. The source of both harmful delusions and sustaining 
illusions, man's artistic impulse is a primary constituent
-^William Faulkner, A Fable (New York: Random House,
1954), p. 4. All further references to this work appear in 
the text.
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of his being.
Around the old general revolve all other rhetorical 
elements of the novel, whether literal or metaphorical. 
Having initially conceived A Fable as "an indictment of 
w a r , a t  some point Faulkner remembered what he had 
concluded earlier about the inevitability of conflict, and 
the ideological center of the novel shifted from the 
corporal, who embodies belief in what Eric Voegelin terms 
metastasis, to the old general, who recognizes that conflict 
is endemic in the human c o n d i t i o n . T h u s  Faulkner became 
aware that his intended epic image of a world free of 
conflict had ineluctably evolved into yet another novelistic 
image of the strife that inheres in man's existence.
Discussing the prophet Isaiah's attempt to transcend 
existence "into a divinely transfigured world," Voegelin 
introduces the term metastasis to signify "the state of the 
psyche in which the experience of cosmic rhythms, in the 
medium of historical form, gives birth to the vision of a 
world that will change its nature without ceasing to be the 
world in which we live concretely."^" This is not the place 
to consider Voeglin's detailed sketch of the Hebrew
^^"To Harold Ober," in Blotner, Selected Letters, p. 178.
^^Eric Voeglin, Order and History, Volume One; Israel 
and Revelation (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press,
1956), p. 452.
^^Voeglin, Order and History, I, p. 452.
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prophets' struggle with this propensity, but to note rather 
that it is fundamentally the same one that informs Quentin's 
visionary "ekstasis"^^ and Isaac McCaslin's millennialist 
myth of himself as Jesus, come again to redeem the McCaslin 
family. In A Fable this impulse to empiricize myth rises to 
comparable narrative heights in the three characters who 
constitute the "trinity of man's conscience" referred to on 
the dust jacket of the novel's first printing. The 
structure of the novel, which results to a large extent from 
the stationing of these characters in relation to the old 
general, is a major element of Faulkner's intention to 
undermine the reified mythoi of adherents of metastasis.
The dust-jacket reference to "the trinity of man's 
conscience in the persons of the young aviator, the Old 
Quartermaster General and the dedicated soldier from the 
ranks" is problematic, particularly since Faulkner referred 
to the triptych in response to a question at the University 
of Virginia, where "trinity" becomes "trilogy," the 
connotations of which are significantly different. Nowhere 
is such a trinity overtly mentioned in the text, so it is 
available to the reader only by inference and through three 
extraneous references, the two mentioned above and the 
aforementioned discarded "Preface" to the novel. The 
problem with critical inference regarding this issue is one
l^Andre Bleikasten, The Most Splendid Failure 
(Bloomington: Univ. of Indiana Press, 1976), p. 140.
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of balance, since the textual prominence of Gragnon, who is 
not one of the trinity, overrides that of Levine, the 
aviator, who is. Furthermore, the trinity, at least as 
Faulkner interpreted it at Virginia, does not include the 
Christ-figure, the corporal who inspires the mutiny, nor 
does it account for the sentry. Yet another problem with 
the remarks on the dust jacket involves determining just 
whom Faulkner meant by "the Old Quartermaster General"— the 
old general, or the Norman classmate who succeeds him in the 
position. Faulkner clearly meant the generalissimo when he 
mentioned the Quartermaster General at Virginia, though this 
character's tenure in the position is brief. Moreover, in 
the discarded preface, Faulkner names "the old Quartermaster 
General who says in the last scene, 'I am not laughing; what 
you see are tears,'" as the "passive third" of the 
t r i n i t y . N o t  Faulkner's remarks, however, but the textual 
positions of Levine, the old Norman, and the runner
^Blotner, Faulkner, II, p. 1494. Lewis P. Simpson has 
written convincingly of the interchange between Faulkner and 
a young student at the University of Virginia in "A Fable of 
Civilization," in his The Brazen Face of History (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 209-31. Simpson 
focuses on Faulkner's stipulation of the old general as the 
person of the trinity who embraces acceptance. My reading of 
this character essentially agrees with Simpson's, though it 
depends to a large extent on the Norman classmate of the 
general being in this position. As Faulkner did on several 
occasions when trying to recall elements of his fiction, he 
apparently confused characters in this attempt to illuminate 
the old general. The mistake, however, may suggest a 
fundamental similarity between the two generals, despite their 
significantly different views of man.
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establish their thematic relation as the intended referents 
of the trinity.
A Fable is comprised of ten chapters, which Faulkner 
referred to as "actions" in a note scribbled on an early 
page of the typescript setting copy.^® Although scholars 
have ignored this textual fact, the old general quite 
literally stands at the center of the novel. This 
centrality results to a large extent from Faulkner's 
structural emphasis on time, but it also contributes to the 
rhetorical end of highlighting the general's relation to the 
characters of the trinity. Always interested in individual 
experience, in this novel Faulkner focuses rather on a 
spectrum of relations within a broad span of time. The 
present is dawn on the Wednesday two days after a regimental 
mutiny which ultimately eventuated in the refusal of rank- 
and-file soldiers of both sides to continue the war. The 
mutinied regiment is being driven in lorries into the city 
of Chaulnesmont, the Allied command center, where their fate 
will be decided by the old general. The harried people from 
the district that spawned the regiment are converging on the 
Place de Ville, site of the Hotel where the command sits.
At the end of this comparatively short initial chapter.
^“Michael Millgate, ed., William Faulkner Manuscripts 20, 
Volume III; A Fable (New York; Garland Publishing, 1986), p. 
7. Faulkner wrote: "Printer: There are ten actions. Each
one begins at top of new left or right page, with the simple 
cross and the day designated. Please allow ample sinkage."
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Faulkner images the major conflict of values in the novel as 
the corporal and the old general, with the throng as 
backdrop, poignantly stare "full at each other across the 
moment" (p. 17). In the course of the novel, this present 
moment will give way to the daily progression of events, but 
not until a flashback details the events leading up to and 
including the mutiny on Monday, then progresses to Wednesday 
through a series of scenarios and sub-plots that include 
internal flashbacks, as it were, some of them extending over 
a number of years. The structure of the novel poses a 
problem quite simply because the old general does not 
reappear for the next 175 pages, by which point Faulkner has 
interposed a number of extremely complicated incidents and 
characters not apparently related to the confrontation 
imaged in the first chapter, and presented in a texture so 
rich in detail as to be virtually incomprehensible without 
concentrated reading and reflection. These incidents and 
characters achieve full meaning only in relation to the old 
general. The chapter in which he resurfaces, "Wednesday 
Night," which is both the thematic and the structural center 
of the novel, generally alternates between narration of past 
incidents that grounded his moral education and of present 
moments in which he is forced to apply the knowledge 
acquired through these experiences. However, the long 
chapter is more a kunstierroman than a bildungsroman, 
because in his method and perspective the old general
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embodies the premier type of the artist according to 
Nietzsche's precise definition of art in the grand style.
The point at which the reader should notice the special 
relation between the general and the characters of the 
trinity occurs in the chapter that follows "Wednesday 
Night." Here Faulkner unravels the fictional knots tied in 
the three characters' earlier appearances in the text. The 
resolution of each character's crisis occurs in its own 
textual segment— first the runner, then Levine, finally the 
Norman— separated from the one that follows it by a space in 
the text. Moreover, immediately after these three segments, 
the focus shifts to the imprisoned corporal and his 
disciples, with the lengthy "temptation" dialogue between 
general and corporal soon to follow, thus accentuating the 
thematic importance of the trinity's ideological relation to 
the general.
Levine is the character about whom Faulkner said in the 
discarded preface, he "sees evil and refuses to accept it by 
destroying h i m s e l f . I n  the reference to the "trilogy" 
years later at the University of Virginia, Faulkner 
similarly referred to him as "the one that said. This is 
dreadful, terrible, and I won't face it even at the cost of 
my life."20 Levine reads the fraudulent show designed by
l^Blotner, Faulkner, II, p. 1494.
20gwynn, Faulkner in the University, p. 62,
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the conflicting forces to mislead the enlisted men as a flaw 
in the very nature of being that he cannot live with.^l 
Like Quentin, Rosa, and Isaac, his problem with existence is 
that it fails to live up to the promise of the myths it 
elicits. More specifically, the myths that the culture of 
these characters has bequeathed to them often fail to stand 
the test of time and reality. Herbert Schneidau describes 
this perspectival situation as a "failure to identify 
morality and c u l t u r e . C o n f r o n t e d  by this general 
eventuality, as people inevitably will be, one must face the 
conditions of existence on their terms and either embrace 
them or else respond creatively— by remythologizing, as it 
were— or both.
The old Norman or quartermaster general eventually 
sees, with the help of the old general, the inherent 
conflict that informs existence and precludes the 
elimination of evil. When he learns of the general's role 
in the resumption of the war and the execution of the 
corporal, he recognizes that his nearly lifelong devotion to 
a myth of the old general as the "savior" of both France and 
"Man" has been a waste of his selfhood (p. 264). As
21in this regard Levine recalls Ivan Karamazov's 
repulsion toward an existence in which the suffering of 
children occurs, in Dostoevsky’s The Brother's Karamazov.
^^Herbert N. Schneidau, Sacred Discontent; The Bible and 
Western Tradition (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press,
1976, p. 16.
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quartermaster general he had been compelled to participate 
in bringing the German general "across the lines" for the 
apparently cynical meeting designed to counter the effect of 
the mutiny. His essentially Christian perspective eliciting 
from him feelings of extreme guilt— particularly since the 
runner's battalion and the "unarmed German force" it met 
were destroyed by artillery when they attempted to repeat 
the earlier mutiny— he wishes to resign the position and so 
appears before the old general (p. 327). In the view of the 
Norman, the military enacted the conspiracy merely "in order 
to hold our last desperate and precarious place" on earth 
(p. 327). The people therefore, he asserts, "are capable of 
saving themselves" and need only to be "defended, protected" 
from the military (p. 328). To defuse this argument, the 
old general informs the Norman that the mutiny failed 
because Polchek betrayed the corporal, "as that or them or 
at least one among them for whom man sets in jeopardy what 
he believes to be his life and assumes to be his liberty or 
his honor always does" (p. 330). The Norman, then, fails to 
take into account all of man's "capacities," the implicit 
logic being that man's inherent imperfection necessitates 
general social adherence to order and commitment (p. 330). 
Contrary to the quartermaster general's initial belief that 
the marshal will execute the corporal out of fear that the 
letter's success will result in a diminishment of the 
former's power, the marshal in fact acknowledges, both here
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and in the long dialogue with the corporal, how essential 
idealism is to the well-being of man, as his expression of 
the paradox of this conflict indicates:
"If I gave him his life tonight, I myself could 
render null and void what you call the hope and dream 
of his sacrifice. By destroying his life tomorrow . .
. I will establish forever that he didn't even live in 
vain, let alone die so. Now tell me who's afraid? (p. 
332)
The most important foil to the old general is the 
battalion runner, who in the course of the novel moves from 
one extreme to another. Besides the general, greater 
narrative attention is devoted to this character than to any 
other in the novel. He is developed in the second longest 
chapter in the novel, "Tuesday, Wednesday, Wednesday Night," 
and the process is one of development by implication, so to 
speak, since the chapter actually involves the Reverend Tobe 
Butterfield's narration to him of the horsethief episode 
involving the sentry; the runner's attempt to use the sentry 
for the purpose of accomplishing the corporal's pacifist 
goal constitutes, of course, an image of the story's effect 
on him. In this regard Faulkner exemplifies once again 
man's propensity to take for reality events merely depicted 
in language. The runner interprets the story as an example 
of the power of love, then enacts his own repetition of this
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myth in coercing the sentry to lead a mutiny of his 
regiment.
Before the war the runner had been an artist of sorts 
("not only a successful architect, but a good one") and an 
intellectual "aesthete" ("doing a little more than his share 
of the talking about art or politics or life or all three," 
p. 60). Being "among the first London volunteers," a hero 
at the Battle of Loos and lately an officer, he approaches 
his company commander with the request that he be allowed to 
resign his commission, not because he loves man so much that 
he prefers to "sleep in the same mud he sleeps in," but 
because, rather, he hates man and wants to be "free" from 
any responsibility for him (p. 61). The runner's 
misanthropy, however, is not due to the fundamental 
ignobility of man or to man's predilection not to fulfill 
his potential, but (and here his thinking parallels 
Levine's) to the absurdity of man's condition, which for the 
runner is signified by the fact that he, "by the simple 
coincidence of wearing this little badge on [his] coat,
[has] not only the power, with a whole militarized 
government to back [him] up, to tell vast herds of man what 
to do, but the impunitive right to shoot him with [his] own 
hand when he doesn't do it" (pp. 61-62). This caricature of 
the metaphysical uncertainty of human being compels the 
runner to "realize how worthy of fear and abhorrence and 
hatred [man] is" (p. 62).
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The runner's myth of the preposterousness of man's 
condition is no less illusory than the imaginary 
reifications of Faulkner's earlier artist-figures.
Moreover, the runner's view of man ironically results from 
the same perspective that will lead him to embrace an 
apparently opposite view after his observation of the 
response Harry, the sentry, gets from rank- and-file members 
of the battalion. The runner's two responses to the human 
condition, the first one of repulsion and (quite literal) 
resignation, the second of hope and action designed to 
ameliorate, spring from the same unwillingness to accept the 
world on its contingent terms. Thus, to counter his own 
myth of the inherent degradation of man, he invents a myth 
of self-resignation from any responsibility for what occurs 
within this condition.
This attitude, however, is replaced by what appears to 
be its opposite extreme when the runner observes the "clump 
of thirteen men in horizon blue" and the relation of the 
sentry to his debtors, learns of the mutiny of Gragnon's 
regiment, and makes the acquaintance of the "old porter" who 
has enlisted in the army to facilitate his quest to find his 
missing son (pp. 67-68). Influenced by this character's 
reading the realization of Christian mythos in the unfolding 
of events, the runner, with his own pronounced faculty for 
mythopoeia, embraces the porter's view of the corporal as 
Christ returned for the initiation of the millennium.
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Accordingly, in his mind the corporal and his followers take 
on the force of mystical power in their confrontation with 
"ruthless and all-powerful and unchallengeable Authority," 
which "would be impotent before that massed unresisting 
undemanding passivity" (p. 68). No less now a man of action 
than when he publicly shamed himself with a prostitute in 
order to lose his commission, the runner attempts yet again 
to institute an abstract mythopoeia within the dynamic 
stream of event, forcing the highly reluctant sentry to lead 
the men of the battalion into a futile repetition of the 
earlier regimental mutiny.
The runner's metastatic politics of "unresisting 
undemanding passivity" is predicated on his reading of love 
as a potentially overarching force in human affairs. There 
is, of course, the love of the porter for his son, manifest 
in his unyielding, self-sacrificial search for him. But it 
is two other, highly unusual manifestations of love that 
convince the runner the conditions of the millennium are 
implementable. These are the relation of his creditors to 
the sentry and the devotion of the sentry and Tobe to the 
renowned horse. In "Tuesday Night," Faulkner underlines 
the first relation as one of love by having a colonel 
describe it that way to a staff major who is investigating 
it, "because the only word I can think of is love" (p. 59). 
The more emphatic myth of love, however, is that spun by the 
Reverend Butterfield. Not only he and Harry are devoted to
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the horse; apparently the entire populations of villages and 
towns the group passed through confederated to prevent 
federal and state authorities and hired investigators from 
capturing them. Hearing Tobe witness to this capacity of 
man to unite in the pursuit of a single end, the runner is 
propelled further into his illusion of the possibility of 
forced peace. Faulkner undermines his idealism, though, 
through other voices in the chapter and, after the long 
biography of the old general in "Wednesday Night," in the 
segment depicting the runner's misguided forcing of the 
sentry's hand and the subsequent annihilation of the 
battalion and its German counterpart.
The frame narrator of "Tuesday, Wednesday, Wednesday 
Night," for instance, asserts the "inherent doom" of the 
story of the sentry and the horse, "since, being immortal, 
the story, the legend, was not to be owned by any one of the 
pairs who added to its shining and tragic increment, but 
only to be used, passed through, by each in their doomed and 
homeless turn" (p. 154). In contrast to this view of the 
myth of love as an archetype to be "passed through" stands 
the runner's conviction that the kerygma can be (and is, in 
the person of the corporal, being) established in the realm 
of human affairs. Another passage images the detached 
perspective of the ex-Federal deputy's lawyer, who envisions 
himself "against, as a frieze or tapestry," the roster of 
heroes "who were the milestones of the rise of man,"
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including "Caesar and Christ." The effective modus operandi 
of these figures, whose primary values— according to this 
reading— only apparently conflict, is, "by putting some of 
him [man] in motion in one direction, by him of him and for 
him, to disjam the earth, get him for a little while at 
least out of his own way" (p. 101). This remark ironically 
comments on the active remythology of the old general, whose 
self-perpetuating grand legend not only palliates, but 
infuses with hope the troubled relatives of the regiment.
In contrast to the runner's sense of man's worthiness of 
"fear and abhorrence and hatred" (p. 62), the general 
reveres man for having "that in him which will enable him to
outlast even his wars," namely, his capacity for creative
adaptation, even to the worst of his shortcomings (p.
352).23
Faulkner establishes the old general's mesmerizing, 
myth-provoking effect on others through their remarks about 
him. General Gragnon’s army commander, for instance, 
despairs before him; "If I were a saint, I would weep" (p. 
230). Why? Why not, rather, rejoice? It may be because of
the paradox that the old general, seen here as an example of
23?he antecedent of "that" is, of course, man's 
"deathless folly," the general's term for the paradox of man's 
creative relation to the world. It is this faculty that leads 
to the spate of inventions by means of which man will continue 
to respond to existence, so that his capacity to be "still 
talking, still planning" will enable him to escape the from 
"last red and heatless sunset" of earth to "the next star in 
the blue immensity of space" (p. 354).
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the man-of-men concept, embodies the moral force necessary 
to confront and manage evil, but, as a man himself, contains 
too much knowledge of the inherent evil in man to approach 
sainthood himself. Or, it could be that the saint weeps for 
joy that this man constitutes the moral pinnacle of man. In 
this sense, he represents man's moral, social and 
psychological potential. He "executes," as it were, on the 
basis of both morality and intellect. But the narrator of 
Gragnon's hearing does not agree with Lallemont's 
perspective. In the view of this voice, virtue and 
deliberation play no role in the determinations of the old 
general, who merely sits "for a specified time over the 
meaningless papers . . . until the moment came not to judge 
nor even condemn, but just to fling away the impending 
papers and execute" (p. 228). Both views are 
interpretations, as is Gragnon's sense that the old general 
has photographic memory— "that he remembered the name and 
face of every man in uniform he had ever seen." "It's true. 
He knows me at once" (p. 230). This is Gragnon's natural 
myth-making capacity at work, a reflection of the author's 
too, as it suggests the legend that has naturally been 
building up around the old general.
To be sure, the old general has assumed the position of 
a powerful presence in the novel at this point. He stands 
at the vortex of the social situation it depicts: Gragnon's
hearing and the city's tumult. This hearing, in which the
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division commander requests the execution of the regiment, 
is one of many that metaphorically interplays with Tobe 
Butterfield's hearing. The request is based on Gragnon's 
myth of the providential "beneficence" that, in his mind, 
necessarily undergirds a life predicated on adherence to 
principle. "It [the request] had been right" (on the bases 
of "honor and integrity") and "it was still right" (on the 
basis of "that quality" that enabled Gragnon to become 
division commander), since the "honor and integrity" which 
the "beneficence" had seen in him, rather than the 
"beneficence" itself, was forcing "the compulsion" (p. 231). 
Gragnon fails to recognize that his presumably logical 
argument is fundamentally aestheticist. For Faulkner it is 
another aspect of man's psychological propensity for myth. 
The mind not only needs the lie, but also quite naturally 
contributes to its establishment. Thus another paradox 
occurs in the establishment (substantiation) of falsehood, 
something that is fundamentally insubstantial. Gragnon is 
engaged in mythopoeia as much as Quentin, though less 
obviously. Even if the ascetic character of his early 
religious socialization in an orphanage, coupled with his 
military training, may account for his easy embrace of such 
an abstraction as "beneficence," Gragnon elevates this 
invention, predicated on his self-perceived capacity for 
absolute faithfulness to the "rules," to a position of 
mystical force. It because it must since it cannot
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but be, given his absolute devotion to it. The rules of 
existence are thus and so, and I have followed them to the 
letter, so my expectations must be realized. Accordingly, 
Gragnon's "speech," reported by the narrator but gratuitous 
to the text, has no connection "with what lay on the table," 
the sword proffered in submission to the perceived rules of 
engagement (p. 231). Although Gragnon adjudges his "speech" 
to be authentic, like many of the utterances in response to 
disappointment imaged in the novel, it lacks the practical 
connection to the primary value the novel espouses through 
the image of the old general, in both his actions and his 
language— namely, the sustenance of life itself. In saying 
that "the beneficence itself didn't need the gesture," the 
narrator exposes the fallacy of Gragnon's myth (p. 231). 
Gragnon's proffering of the sword, a miniature symbol of the 
larger "gesture" of executing the regiment, is inferior to 
the old general's gesture of sparing them and scapegoating 
the corporal. The latter action, though equally poetic, 
enforces the superior value.
Gragnon must blindly serve his destiny by asserting 
abstractions— proffering the sword, making the speech, 
executing the regiment, and taking his own life— that, for 
all their poetry, undermine the aesthetic possibility that 
inheres existence and is imaged in the old general's ongoing 
poetic actions. Gragnon's stoic intention to kill himself 
as the only orderly response to the "fixed" situation he
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perceives is all the more patently absurd when the reader 
remembers that the whole business of the mutiny was set in 
motion so that the group commander, "Mama Bidet," could get 
his baton. Yet despite Gragnon's point of view that the 
whole war is the consequence of natural forces "conceived .
. . by some immaculate pollenization like earth's 
simultaneous leafage . . . "out of the mutual rage and fear 
of the three ocean-dividing nations themselves," he persists 
in his form-based Stoicism (p. ??). The German general's 
attention to ritual is similarly absurd. The modus operandi 
of both characters is outside the dynamic stream of events, 
the paradoxical (aestheticist) fusion of which constitutes 
the potential for occurrences that one cannot project with 
absolute precision, but can absolutely negate with such 
rigidity of action as that of Gragnon and the German 
general. This sustained moment of possibility Heidegger 
attempts to clarify with his dialectic of unconcealment and 
concealment, of unretarded process or ontogenesis. Gragnon's 
static myth of the beneficence vitiates it.
Gragnon perceives "the old gray inscrutable supreme 
general" as having "the face of one who long ago had won the 
right to believe in nothing whatever save man's deathless
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folly" (pp. 2 3 2-3 3 ).24 This viewpoint initiates the old 
general's biography and, at its point of utterance, actually 
seems to be the voice at the ideological center of the 
novel. And although the first-time reader lacks the 
information needed to discern this erroneous perception of 
the division commander, Gragnon mistakenly says that the old 
general merely presides and therefore does not need "to 
control" the plan "as it took its ordained undeviable 
course" on the basis "of the vast solvent organizations and 
fraternities and movements" which hold power in the western 
world (p. 233). This sarcasm expressed toward the 
establishment corresponds to the pacifist attitude which 
induced Faulkner's original plans for A Fable. By 
publication date it has become the shortsighted perspective 
of a character who stands as a major foil to the protagonist 
who embodies the Weltanschauung the novel images. The 
entire lengthy passage is overstatement, some of it in rich 
Shakespearean syntax that indicates Faulkner's penchant for 
employing the bard's strategy of putting into the voice of a 
character truths larger than the more limited one of his 
immediate understanding. The "design" Gragnon postulates is 
no design at all, but the consequence of an irreducible
2 -This is actually the language of a third-person voice 
which announces that it refracts the perspective of Gragnon. 
For example, it remarks, "As the group commander himself had 
practically told him this morning . . ." and "In fact, it
seemed to him now that . . . "  (p. 231).
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complex of material forces in their historical evolution (p. 
2 3 2 ).25 Moreover, it is an erroneous projection on his 
part, since the attack— in practical terms the old general's 
sacrifice of Gragnon to Bidet— was purely personally 
motivated and not an altogether significant part of the war 
at all. Yet the old general does design on the basis of a 
controlled strategy which allows the disclosure of value- 
sustaining imagery to occur. This strategy takes into 
account the fluidity of existential evolution and the 
spectatorial capacity of consciousness within it. Gragnon's 
lengthy reflection, in dialogue with the old general's 
statements and actions, is reductive in its "all or nothing" 
interpretation of the event. He sees it absolutely in terms 
of his destiny. The failure itself disgraced him, thus 
demonstrating his inability adequately to train all the men 
in his command, the specific nature of it, the mutiny, being 
largely irrelevant. Gragnon's "quality" of incorrigible 
belief in the necessary realization of his myth of "the 
beneficence" demands that he make the request that the 
regiment be executed (p. 231). But the old general 
recognizes a more fundamental social need as the society for
" . . . all that vast powerful terror-inspiring
representation which, running all democracy's affairs in 
peace, comes indeed into its own in war, finding its true 
apotheosis then, in iron conclave now decreeing for half the 
earth a design vast in its intention to demolish a frontier, 
and vaster still in its intent to obliterate a people" (p. 
232, my emphasis).
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which the regiment fights is likely to experience moral 
disintegration if the regiment is executed.
An examination of another of the fables within A Fable 
that Faulkner interprets in his correspondence will 
demonstrate the fallacy of the will to truth that 
purportedly informs the genre. It occurs within the story 
of the groom, the old negro, and the stolen racehorse— one 
of the two major fables of the novel. A federal deputy 
hired by the millionaire owner of the horse, having become 
fascinated by the developing legend, not only has resigned 
from the pursuit, but also has committed himself to 
facilitating the party's continuing evasion of the 
authorities. When the groom is apprehended and arrested in 
a small Missouri county seat, the deputy returns to his home 
in New Orleans, sending in his place an expensive attorney 
whose task is to protect the groom and the old negro. The 
groom mysteriously disappears from the jail, but in the 
meanwhile the negro, reportedly hiding in the tail of his 
frock coat tens of thousands of dollars won betting on the 
horse, is captured by the deputy, who, at the insistence of 
a mob of irate citizens, takes him to the courtroom for a 
hearing. The attorney asks for and is given (by the mob) 
ten minutes "to consult" with his client, during which 
interval the attorney's chauffeur attempts to drive the 
negro away from the town (p. 173). Sensing the ruse, 
however, the mob apprehends the old negro in the street and.
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in a moment of irony that recalls a number of scenes in 
Faulkner, merely compels him to leave town. "We dont like 
rich niggers here," the mob's spokesman tells him (p. 189).
In a financial bind, Faulkner was trying to sell this 
part of the work to a magazine. Corresponding about it with 
Ober, he offered this interpretation of the scene:
the last 60 pages are a complete story in a way: 
an anecdote of a mob (man at his basest) per­
forming an act of right and justice despite 
himself, because of base motives. They freed two 
thieves not because of pity for them but because 
they would defend at all costs man's right to get 
that much money, no matter how.^6
This glossing of his own text by the author offers 
interesting clues about what he intended to convey in A 
Fable. The book begins with a mob scene, ends with one, and 
includes many others. Does Faulkner consider all of them 
representative of "man at his basest," and do they 
indisputably appear to be that way in the text? What of the 
indicated a priori view of "right and justice"? Is Faulkner 
indicating that "despite himself," i.e., his baseness, man 
(the mob) will inevitably discover justice? Moreover, is 
man in the mob condition, as the unusual parenthesis
26"to Harold Ober, Friday 28 Nov. 1947," in Blotner, 
Selected Letters, pp. 260-61.
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suggests ("mob" is the antecedent of "himself," thus making 
"mob" and "man" synonymous), in Faulkner's view 
representative of the true nature of man? There can of 
course be no definitive answers to these questions, just as 
Faulkner's interpretation of the anecdote necessarily lacks 
absoluteness. Other plausible views may readily be 
demonstrated, and Faulkner's rhetorical strategies 
contribute to the inherent ambiguity.
The question the anecdote elicits in Faulkner's mind 
may be phrased "What is the nature of justice?" or "How does 
man, communally considered, arrive at justice in the 
resolution of a dispute?" The text obscures even the 
specific charge to be adjudicated in the case of the old 
negro. Most of the narrative focuses on the attorney's 
perspective, which changes from conviction that the mob will 
do nothing to fear that their actions may culminate in a 
lynching. One point is clear. Before the mob acts, they 
insist on hearing the case in the courtroom, and their tacit 
understanding is that the attorney will present it. But the 
reader must surmise for himself the charge, although the 
obvious one is horsetheft. Having anticipated this charge, 
the attorney charts a defense that is typical in its "legal" 
circumlocution: The prosecution cannot demonstrate "that
the man had not been trying simply to find the owner and 
restore him his property all the time" (p. 168). Hence the 
attorney's (and the reader's) confusion when the mob ignores
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the theft and focuses instead on the answer to the question 
its spokesman puts to the old negro: "How much did you and 
that fellow really win on that horse?" They interpret the 
reply, "It was a heap," as indicative that he is a "rich 
nigger," which they will not allow in the community. Their 
judgment is that he be on the train "when it leaves and dont 
come back" (pp. 188-89).
Thus, one is left with the question "what constitutes 
justice?" in this instance. A Fable postulates no 
painstaking sociocultural evolution of a legal institution 
capable of resolving conflict, such as the one Aeschylus 
images in the Oresteia. If justice has been done, whose 
justice is it, since the legalities (i.e. prosecution for 
theft) have been completely ignored by the process? One 
easy answer is that the community's sense of justice has 
prevailed. Another is that justice will eventually out, 
regardless of the players and the circumstances. Faulkner's 
interpretation in the letter to Ober contradicts the first 
answer and does not dispute, though neither does it affirm, 
the second. More importantly, the text in ways too numerous 
to document undermines both possibilities. Instead, it 
demonstrates the impossibility of verbalizing an absolute 
answer.
Several voices in A Fable reflect on the tradition of
rapacity that arguably undergirds the wealth and power of
western civilization. The Norman, for instance, asserts 
that
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rapacity does not fail [since] all governments and 
nations which ever rose and endured long enough to 
leave their mark as such, had sprung from it and 
in and upon and by means of it became forever 
fixed in the amazement of man's present and the 
glory of his past; civilization itself is its 
password and Christianity its masterpiece,
Chartres and the Sistine Chapel, the pyramids and 
the rock-wombed powder-magazines under the gates 
of Hercules its altars and monuments, Michael- 
angelo and Phidias and Newton and Ericsson and 
Archimedes and Krupp its priests and popes and 
bishops, (pp. 259-60)
In addition, the attorney describes his prepared defense of 
the old negro as being "in the old fine strong American 
tradition of rapine" (p. 168). But if the tradition of 
"legalized" rapine and its concomitant, the power of the 
west, are to be sustained, "illegal" rapine such as the 
theft of the millionaire's racehorse must not be 
sanctioned. This view of the west may be described as one 
in which the people have been conditioned to accept 
"legalized theft" as the norm. The community, however, does 
not act according to this theory. Rather, its "justice" 
undermines the system and thereby demonstrates a weakness in
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the letter's theoretical foundation. Faulkner's view that 
the mob has performed "an act of right and justice" is thus 
disputed by the view of rapacity expressed by this 
character.
Faulkner also demystifies the notion of absolute 
justice through the language of the primary narrator of the 
anecdote. This detached voice describes the courtroom as 
"the tabernacle, the shrine itself, of [Man's] last tribal 
mysteries," thus suggesting superstition as an influential 
factor in the institutionalization of justice. The voice 
challenges the Aeschylean image of justice as being 
partially grounded in a human capacity for reason. Man
decreed it, built it, sweated it up . . . t o  be no 
symbol nor cradle nor any mammalian apex, harbor where 
the incredible cockleshell of his invincible dream made 
soundings at last from the chartless latitudes of his 
lost beginnings and where . . . the voice of his 
affirmation roared murmuring home to the atoll-dais of 
his unanimity where no mere petty right, but blind 
justice itself, reigned ruthless and inattentive amid 
the deathless smells of his victories: his stale 
tobacco spit and his sweat. Because to begin with, he 
was not but they, and they only by electing to be, 
because what he actually was, was ^ and in the first 
place he was not a mammal and as for his chartless
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latitudes, he not only knew exactly where he came from 
six thousand years ago, but that in threescore and ten 
or thereabouts he was going back there. (pp. 172-73)
The juxtaposition of Darwinian empiricism with 
Christian millennialism, presented in a satirical tone 
weighted heavily toward the naturalistic view, debunks the 
notion that reason significantly influences the adjudication 
of human conflict. It may not be the view of the author, as 
it is merely one voice among many that vie for recognition 
in the text, but it undermines any claim, including 
Faulkner's in the letter to Ober, that the people's response 
to the old negro constitutes "universal justice." The voice 
respects the "mammal" man's "invincible" capacity both to 
dream and to acknowledge that justice is neither "blind" 
(objective) nor "inattentive." It ridicules, though, man's 
belief in justice predicated on a "unanimity" that on the 
one hand denies its biological classification (mammalia) 
while on the other hand it asserts its divine status in a 
providentially ordered universe it projects ("he was going 
back there").
Another rhetorical strategy that suggests the 
free-floating character of justice occurs during the 
ten-minute interval when the turnkey tries to get the old 
negro to the attorney's automobile, in which the chauffeur 
would drive him to the sanctuary of a near-by town. In a
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one-paragraph digression of some 500 words, the attorney 
reflects on the chauffeur, "a swaggering demi-d'Artagnan of 
a mulatto murderer" whose release the attorney had secured 
after a year in prison, not because he "held any brief even 
for the murder of this particular woman, but because of the 
way it had been done: . . .  as the lawyer imagined it,
[the mulatto] simply ran past her with one single neat 
surgeon-like back-handed slash of the razor . . . the two of 
them running on side by side for two or three paces in the 
moonlight until the woman fell, the man not even spotted and 
the blade barely befouled" (pp. 182-83). Such verbal pyro­
technics may astound the reader. Surely he will be confused 
about the placement of this virtuoso display of writing in 
the middle of the anecdote. Yet it sets up the "judgment" 
of the mob by demonstrating the capriciousness of justice.
It also indicates the attorney's fear of man (he wants a 
chauffeur capable of defending him) and his belief that the 
mob's action is likely to be anything but just.
A few paragraphs later, just prior to the judgment that 
the defendant leave town, the narrative voice presents 
another internal view of the attorney. This time, the 
attorney postulates the invincibility of "man" when either 
of two conditions is evident: (1) the "ability to move en
masse at his own impulse"; and (2) "silence in which to fall 
into thought and then action" (p. 187). Somewhat humorously 
but nonetheless seriously, the attorney envisions evolution
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as a solution to the problems posed by the first condition. 
In a thousand years the reliance on automation will have 
"effaced the legs from a species just as that long-ago and 
doubtless at the time not even noticed twitch of Cosmos 
drained the seas into continents and effaced the gills from 
their fish." The second condition, however, which must be 
"conquered" before peace can be sustained, seems 
unconquerable. This "silence in which man had space to 
think and in consequence to act on what he believed he 
thought or thought he believed" informs the mob's 
confrontation of the old negro (p. 187). This confron­
tation, which stands in synecdochal relation to the general 
condition of conflict in A Fable, highlights the problem of 
language and interpretation developed throughout the text 
and contributes to the irony of the mob's "adjudication" 
which follows it.^^
In Faulkner perhaps to a degree unmatched by any other 
prominent writer of prose fiction, the problem of the will 
to truth through language predominates. Consider the scene 
in Go Down, Moses when Uncle Isaac McCaslin recalls a 
conversation with McCaslin Edmonds. Having quoted a stanza 
from Keats' "Ode on a Grecian Urn," Edmonds tells him the 
poet "was talking about truth. Truth is one. It covers all
^^Compare Nietzsche's suspicion of thinking in Beyond 
Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York; Vintage, 
1966), pp. 45-47.
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things which touch the heart— honor and pride and pity and 
justice and courage and love. Do you see now?" Isaac, 
though, "didn't know. Somehow it seemed simpler than 
that."28 The text of A Fable indicates that its writer, 
like Isaac, distrusts the capacity of language to convey 
truth. The "fable" of the old negro, the attorney, and the 
mob not only presents a variety of perspectives but remains 
open to as many responsible "readings" as there are 
responsible readers to produce them. The strength of 
Faulkner's own metastatic will to truth notwithstanding, his 
stronger sense of man's essentially perspectival condition 
eventually took control of his invention of this novel. 
Consequently, the aesthetic principle imaged under the 
ironic title A Fable is not that of art as representation of 
truth, justice or event, but rather that of art as the 
inherent repetition of the "open" or radically potential, 
"happening" condition of perpetual conflict that 
paradoxically constitutes the ground of existence.
2®william Faulkner, Go Down, Moses (New York: Vintage,
1973), p. 297.
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Chapter IV 
The Artist's Directive:
Remythologizing the Kerygma in A Fable
Faulkner's fiction intersects with the most fundamental 
question of western discourse, that of man's capacity for 
conscious decisions that shape his experience. Having 
presented over the course of about fifteen years (1928-1942) 
several sharply delineated images of highly intellectual 
protagonists who struggle with this problem in attempting to 
resolve personal crises, in 1943 Faulkner began ten years of 
work on A Fable, a novel in which yet another protagonist 
struggles to understand the conditions of existence, with a 
view to the potential for amelioration. One important 
difference from the preceding series of characters, however, 
involves the magnitude of the crisis which the character at 
the structural center of A Fable faces. In contrast to the 
personal crises imaged in earlier novels, the conflict 
imaged in this novel involves the entire western world. But 
the problem remains essentially the same, namely, to what 
extent can man engage in actions that predictably shape the 
quality and conditions of his future. In A Fable Faulkner 
crystallizes as it were everything his development of the 
earlier characterizations had revealed to him about the 
relation of consciousness to the world, embodying in the
135
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primary protagonist of this novel (1) an understanding of 
the basic ontological principle that the character of the 
temporal guarantees the recurrence of conflict and, despite 
this factor of the contingent as the ground of man's 
existence, (2) an awareness of man's inherent capacity for 
and susceptibility to formal creative acts that extenuate 
his suffering and sustain his existence.
Scholarship has for the most part misread the character 
in A Fable who embodies this understanding, the old 
general— the marshal or Generalissimo, Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Forces.^ The old general is an anomaly within
^Delmore Schwartz, for instance, in one of the early 
considerations of A Fable, argues that, far from taking steps 
to sustain man, the old general has concluded that "human 
beings are worthless" and that "everything truly human" is 
contemptible. See "Faulkner's A Fable," in Donald A. Dike and 
Davis H. Zucker, eds.. Selected Essays of Delmore Schwartz 
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 298-99; Joseph
Urgo, in one of the few recent studies of the novel, agrees 
with "Schwartz's contention that the old general is an evil 
force against which good human forces ought to fight." Among 
the mistakes that Urgo makes in what is an interesting 
misreading of A Fable is his identification of the authorial 
point of view with the language of a narrator who refracts the 
point of view of a particular character. Urgo quotes 
Gragnon's reflection that "vast solvent organizations and 
fraternities and movements . . . control by coercion or
cajolery man's morals and actions," for instance, to support 
his negative view of the hierarchy the general rules. Urgo 
also argues that the general dissembles when he asserts to the 
corporal that man "is capable of enduring and will endure." 
Yet Urgo offers no substantive support for his extravagant 
claims (1) that what the general "really means . . .  is that 
man can endure authority" and (2) that when the general "says 
that man will 'prevail,' he means survive even his reign." 
See Faulkner's Apocrypha: 'A Fable,' 'Snopes,' and the Spirit
of Human Rebel^'on (Jackson: Univ. Press of Mississippi,
1989), pp. 108-112; for contrasting views of the general, see 
Philip Blair Rice, who reads the general as "functionally the 
supreme representative of Caesarism," yet "an ambiguous figure
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Faulkner's fiction, because coming to terms with the 
writer's characterization of this figure is essential to 
comprehension of his resolution of the discursive problem he 
had considered in earlier major protagonists— the problem of 
freedom versus necessity— or, to state the matter 
differently, the Platonic problem of the value of art and 
its relation to life. In contrast to the old general's 
methodology and perspective, Faulkner's earlier artist- 
figures' attempts to resolve personal crises through art 
stand as strategies severely limited by the characters' 
failure to understand that art as a human activity is not
from the beginning" who although he expresses "the more 
difficult faith in man," cannot be accepted "as the author's 
final spokesman," in "Faulkner's Crucifixion," in William 
Faulkner; Three Decades of Criticism, ed. Frederick J. 
Hoffman and Olga Vickery (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1960), pp. 377-79, and Heinrich Straumann who 
writes that the general "unites in himself . . .  a light and 
dark principle [which] is immanent in all the orders and 
values of existence," in "An American Interpretation of 
Existence: Faulkner's A Fable," in Four Decades of Criticism
(Michigan State Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 335-57; Michael 
Harrington in Faulkner's Fables of Creativity (Athens; Univ. 
of Georgia Press, 1990), p. 116-18, similarly writes that the 
general seems "to incarnate both the heights of human
aspiration and the depths of human corruption." Moreover, "he 
seems also to be in many respects the ultimate artist-figure 
in A Fable . . . not only aware of the ramifications of the 
fable in which he is involved but capable, to a certain 
extent, of orchestrating it"; in the most thorough reading of 
the entire novel to date, that of Keen Butterworth in A 
Critical and Textual Study of 'A Fable' (Ann Arbor: UMI
Research Press, 1983), p. 66, the general is read as the
embodiment of tragedy in that he "must choose to execute his 
son because the son's idealism has threatened" the "heritage" 
of "modern civilization itself," of which the general is the 
primary guardian. The affinity of my reading with those of 
Harrington and Butterworth should become obvious in the 
development that follows.
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only basic and compulsory but also the means through which 
man has the potential to bring some order to an essentially 
chaotic world. To be specific, the old general marks the 
ideological culmination of Faulkner's ongoing narrative 
study of the significance of art in human affairs. This 
protagonist embodies the implicit postulate that, man's 
capacity for creation being his most distinctive 
characteristic, the values for which creates significantly 
influence the quality of his experience.^ In utilizing his 
understanding of the temporal functioning of man's dualistic 
creative/receptive faculty to make himself the centerpiece 
of a sustaining cultural myth, the old general discloses a 
supreme state of consciousness that substitutes for 
Christian valuation an axiology upholding the sustenance of 
human existence.
The old general is the rhetorical linchpin of the 
various strands of plot. The main plot— involving the old 
general and his biological son, the corporal whose 
pacifistic evangelism brings to a halt World War I— presents 
the most general image of the issue to which each of the 
sub-plots speaks: Given the nature of man and the
conditions of life, is conflict inevitable? Has man the
^Loic Bouvard recalls Faulkner's telling him that "the 
most important thing is that man continues to create, just as 
woman continues to give birth," in "Interview with Loic 
Bouvard," in Lion in the Garden: Interviews with William
Faulkner, 1926-1962, ed. James IT Meriwether arid Michael 
Millgate (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 73.
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potential permanently to eliminate conflict and, if not, 
what recourse has he in the midst of it? Each major 
character in the book either explicitly formulates his 
perspective on this problem or else constitutes an image 
thereof. Although specifically the general upholds the 
financial, political, moral and military superstructure of 
his culture, he does so out of a conviction that this 
framework will most effectively sustain the culture he 
heads. In contrast to the limited, confining moral visions 
of Quentin Compson, Rosa Coldfield, Isaac McCaslin and the 
quartermaster general, to the metaphysical solipsism of 
Harry Wilbourne, to Gragnon's extreme adherence to military 
ethos, to Levine's naive nationalism, and to the radical 
activism of the battalion runner, the old general's artistry 
is practically oriented. He brings to the task of 
responding to an immediate conflict an effectual 
interpretation of the relation of consciousness to the world 
that each of these characters either lacks or ignores. This 
interpretation asserts the inherently conflictive character 
of man's existence, the physiological basis of human being, 
and the perspectival as the fundamental condition of human 
understanding and intercommunication. The old general's 
ideology of preservation, based on his conviction that these 
conditions are fundamental to existence, underlies the 
sustaining cultural myth he creates.
A Fable bears witness to Faulkner's agreement with
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Nietzsche that the primary influence on human behavior is 
physiology. Man experiences states of feeling that derive 
from the relation of his bodily self to the phenomenal world 
in which it exists. A major consequence of this condition 
is "perspectivism," Nietzsche's view that there are no 
facts, only interpretations. From this conclusion follows 
the correlate that the individual must choose from competing 
sets of interpretations the one he will embrace. Hence the 
concept of valuation. Nietzsche asserts that the crisis of 
confidence in the Christian values of two millennia is the 
source of the general condition of neurosis that pervades 
modern mankind. Having considered the individual 
implications of this problem in protagonists developed in 
his major work from The Sound and the Fury to Go Down,
Moses, Faulkner holistically images the cultural 
significance of the problem in A Fable. While he is by no 
means as explicit as Nietzsche about the need for a new 
valuation to replace the longstanding ineffectual Christian 
influence, he nevertheless concurs with Nietzsche that the 
task of sustaining mankind necessarily devolves upon the few 
who have achieved superiority of perspective. Faulkner 
ascribes to the old general the attitudes toward life that, 
for Nietzsche, comprise this perspective, which results in a 
theory of art-as-praxis that Nietzsche terms "the Grand 
Style."
According to Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche's
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fragmentary discourse on aesthetics, the "essence and 
essential determination of art" involves the unity of art as 
a countermovement to nihilism— a metaphysical problem— and 
of art as an "object of physiology"— a physical one. When 
these apparently antithetical aspects of art actually 
include each other, what results is the production of art in 
the grand style, in which "measure and law are confirmed . . 
. in the containment of chaos and the rapturous." What 
occurs in the grand style is "a triumph over" plenitude, an 
emphasis on measure, the experience of sustained tranquility 
as one's manner of being, and the propensity to resist "what 
is animated."3 it understands valuation to be the basis of 
man's actions and aesthetics to be the key to decisions 
about value. It also discerns that "aesthetic delights are 
biological d e l i g h t s , a n d  that the movement from the latter 
to the former, from sheer feeling to "estimates of aesthetic 
value," is informed by "logical feelings," an expression 
intended to convey man's capacity for "having a feeling for, 
letting one's mood be determined by, order, boundary, the 
overview."5 in his creative "freedom with regard to the 
extreme opposites, chaos and law," the artist in the grand 
style does not crudely compel chaos to take form, but
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 132. 
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 165. 
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, pp. 120-21.
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employs "that mastery which enables the primal wilderness of 
chaos and the primordiality of law to advance under the same 
yoke, invariably bound to one another with equal necessity." 
The physiological, then, "is the basic condition for art's 
being able to be a creative countermovement" to nihilism.® 
Recourse to Heidegger's assessment of Nietzsche's 
discussion of the romantic/classical opposition will clarify 
this concept of the grand style. Although classical art as 
defined by Nietzsche is not purely synonymous with the grand 
style, the two approaches are fundamentally similar, 
particularly in terms of the detachment of the artist who, 
with "unconstrained disposition" (the essence of "mastery"), 
yokes the powerfully antithetical forces of chaos and law 
into "an event's self-imposed l a w . T h i s  is, to be sure, 
terribly strained language, but Heidegger refers to the 
Greek term techne, not in the sense of "making" or 
"producing," but as "that knowledge which supports and 
conducts every human irruption into the midst of beings."® 
This definition, which comprehends the strategy of the old 
general in relation to the fear-driven multitude in A Fable, 
stands in contrast to the "romantic" art of Quentin and 
other important artist figures in Faulkner's earlier
®Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, pp. 125-28. 
^Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 128.
®Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 80, my italics,
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fiction.
According to Nietzsche, "a romantic is an artist whose 
great dissatisfaction with himself makes him creative— one 
who averts his glance from himself and his fellows, and 
looks back."® For the romantic artist "what is properly 
creative is discontent, . . . desire and hunger," but this 
is a general attitude that ironically foreshadows "its 
opposite." Faulkner's narrative images for the mythopoeia 
of Quentin, Isaac, Harry, Rosa, Gragnon and the "trinity-of- 
conscience" characters in A Fable discloses that each 
character's myth is an attitudinal reification of a 
projection of consciousness, not, as it purports to be, an 
absolute representation of reality. Indeed, Rosa's image of 
the "instant" as "arras-veil" and Harry's expressed ontology 
that underlies his aesthetic methodology support the anti­
romantic view of the open character of experience. In the 
old general, Faulkner actually images the "opposite" 
approach to existence, "the contrary possibility . . . that
®One is reminded of Sartre's erroneous identification of 
Faulkner's "metaphysic of time" with the image of "a man 
sitting in a convertible looking back." "In Faulkner," he 
writes, "the present does not exist, it becomes; everything 
was." This assessment certainly applies to Quentin, Rosa, 
Harry, and Isaac, but it hardly fits the creative energy of 
Charlotte Rittenmeyer in The Wild Palms or the controlled 
artistry of Doom in "A Justice" and the old general. See 
Jean-Paul Sartre, "Time in Faulkner: The Sound and the Fury,”
in William Faulkner: Three Decades of Criticism, ed.
Frederick J. Hoffman and Olga W. Vickery (New York: Harcourt
Brace Jovanovich, 1963), p. 228.
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the creative is not a lack but plenitude, not a search but 
full possession, not a craving but a dispensing, not hunger 
but superabundance." Whereas "creation out of discontent 
takes 'action' only in revulsion toward and withdrawal from 
something else"— as the disaffection of Quentin from his 
perception of Caddy, of Isaac from his perception of his 
family's history, and of the battalion runner from his 
perception of the inherent degeneracy of "man"— creation 
from a sense of the plenitude of existence, a sense which 
the old general repeatedly shows himself to be in possession 
of, "flows purely out of itself and its own f u l l n e s s .
The former approach is reactive, the latter active.
Heidegger defines the Greek term ethike episteme as 
"knowledge of ethos, of the inner character of man and of 
the way it determines his behavior," and aisthetike episteme 
as "knowledge of human behavior with regard to sense, 
sensation, and feeling, and knowledge of how these are 
d e t e r m i n e d . T h e  old general's "active" response to the 
needs of the community stems from his observation of its 
chaotic state and his comprehension of its capacity for 
response to an image that corresponds to its inherent sense 
of order. In other words, he perceives the particular 
aesthetic state of the people and appeals to it through an
Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 132. 
Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 77-78.
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image that corresponds to their inherent "primordial" 
propensity for "the overview." Faulkner's repeatedly 
emphasizes the citizenry's heightened physiological state, 
induced by fear that their relatives in the mutinied 
regiment will be executed by order of the marshal. They are
wrenched by anguish and terror . . . and drawn to the 
city whether they would or not . . .with no other will 
and desire except to relinquish their grief and anxiety 
into the city's vast conglomerate of all the passions 
and forces— fear, and grief, and despair, and impotence 
[theirs], and unchallengeable power and terror and 
invincible will [what they perceive to be 
characteristic of the general] . . . the grieving and 
the begrieved on one hand, and on the other the lone 
gray man supreme, omnipotent and inaccessible . . . who 
dealt in wholesale death and who could condemn the 
whole regiment and miss its three thousand men no more 
. . . that he would miss the nod of his head or the 
reverse of the lifted hand which would save them.^^
To emphasize further this opposition between the general and 
the frenzied community, the narrator presents an image of 
"that whole band of irredeemable earth from the Alps to the 
sea, studded with faces watching in lipless and lidless
^^William Faulkner, A Fable (New York: Random House,
1954), p. 124.
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detachment for a moment, a day or two days, for the old gray 
man at Chaulnesmont to lift that hand" (p. 125). It is the 
primary opposition in the novel both, thematically, in its 
implicit posing of the question of how best to resolve a 
cultural crisis in a manner that sustains man and, 
rhetorically, in its providing the tension around which the 
novel is structured.
In the first reference to the old general, Faulkner 
delineates the attitudes the character will manifest 
throughout the novel. He is a man "who no longer believe[s] 
in anything but his disillusion and his intelligence and his 
limitless power" (p. 13). This description suggests that he 
once strongly embraced some belief, but subsequent to an 
unfortunate effect of this embrace, disillusion has replaced 
belief, so that the old general's desired manner of being 
now involves engaging only in actions that enhance his 
personal strength. The tone and substance of this 
description will, to be sure, initially alienate the 
character from many readers. However, by the end of the 
novel, it should be clear that the detachment that resulted 
from his former naivety facilitated the establishment of 
himself as the centerpiece of a sustaining national myth.
His dis-illusion about the corporal's idealism makes 
possible the legend he creates to sustain the political 
order and, by implication, man. In contrast to the 
Christian perspective— long reified in the western world yet
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never so powerful— the old general's art is grounded in this 
world, for, playing on their hope, fear, and suffering to 
create a surrogate theodicy, it responds to immediate 
psychological needs of the people.
When the corporal engineers the mutiny that threatens 
to stop the war, the general's problem is twofold: how to
act, and in whose interest? To be sure, the eminence of 
this character, in this particular situation, compels a 
decision, the assertion of which necessarily constitutes 
simultaneously an ascription of value. The old general is 
presented with a number of possibilities, each representing 
a value vying to predominate. There is Gragnon, the 
rebelling regiment's division commander, whose rigid 
adherence to the military code of honor and sense of his own 
position within it force him to request execution of the 
entire regiment. There is Marthe, sister of the corporal 
and daughter of the woman on whom the old general sired him, 
who, hoping to prevent her brother's execution, appeals to 
the old general's sense of personal guilt. There is the 
German general, who, believing war to be a prerequisite for 
the survival of humanity— and military officers therefore to 
be the most superior human beings— seeks a pact that will 
result in the resumption of hostilities between Germany and 
the Allies. And there is the corporal, the Christ-figure, 
who refuses to renounce his cause, preferring the symbolism 
of martyrdom to his own life. These values, however, the
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old general judges to be secondary to what for him is the 
ultimate value, namely, the sustenance of the culture he 
heads.
In A Fable, through the microcosmic image of the French 
district caught up in a frenzy of "anxiety and dread," 
Faulkner images an entire culture at a critical juncture of 
its history (p. 4). The community, fearful that the general 
will embrace Gragnon's request that the mutinied regiment be 
executed, stands as it were on the threshold of emotional 
annihilation. The fifth chapter of A Fable, "Tuesday, 
Wednesday," depicts the frenzied mass, obsessed by fear that 
the execution is imminent, driven between Chaulnesmont and a 
prison compound several miles away where the regiment awaits 
the general's decision. "They had no plan," the narrator 
relates, "only motion, like a wave" (p. 130). They lack a 
"reassuring certitude which," in the words of Derrida, "is 
itself beyond the reach of freeplay." This absence of 
confidence in a "fundamental ground" is the source of their 
anxiety, "for anxiety is invariably the result of being 
implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of 
being as it were from the very beginning at stake in the 
g a m e . "^3 The pendulum could swing either way, on the one 
hand into utter nihilism, and on the other into a faith
^^Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences," in Writing and Difference, 
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), p.
279.
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which, although quite literally predicated on illusion, 
provides the hope needed for their cultural sustenance. In 
short, the people are ripe for a reassuring illusion, which 
the general implements by executing the corporal, who, like 
Jesus, has become "a protagonist for anguishment, an object 
for execration" (p. 129). Contrary to the views of numerous 
voices that comment on the old general, his experiences have 
provided him with the broad social perspective that enables 
him to create such an image, and in actively usurping "the 
legend of God," he presents it.
At Virginia, asked about the old general, Faulkner 
patently indicates that this character's most basic trait is 
his pronounced creative capacity and predilection. He is 
the "dark, gallant, fallen" angel "who had been cast out of 
heaven . . . because God Himself feared him." Responding to 
the questioner's puzzlement that the old general is the 
father of the corporal, Faulkner pointed to the general's 
artistry:
That was a part of Satan's fearsomeness, that he could 
usurp the legend of God. That was what made him 
fearsome and so powerful, that he could usurp the 
legend of God and then discard God. That's why God
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feared
Prom an orthodox perspective, this comment blatantly crosses 
the border of acceptability into the realm of out-and-out 
sacrilege. Yet it has mostly been ignored in criticism on 
the n o v e l . To assert that Satan not only could but did 
"usurp the legend of God" and that Satan did discard God is, 
first, to elevate Satan over God in terms of their relative 
capacity to invent legends. Moreover, Faulkner undermines 
the omnipotence of God (as McCaslin Edmonds does in the 
rhetorical questions he poses to Isaac McCaslin— see p. 86 
above) by asserting that God "feared" Satan. While these 
assertions disclose Faulkner's intention to consider in A 
Fable questions related to man's general propensity for 
mythmaking and, perhaps more importantly, for myth- 
embracing, they also demonstrate his interest in the 
specific influence of Christian mythos on western 
civilization. The basic narrative strategy involves the 
invention of an intertext to this mythos that parallels the 
paradigm in its basic structure, but inverts the relative 
value of its principal components. Thus, according to this 
revaluation of "the fairy tale which conquered the western
l^Frederick L. Gwynn and Joseph L. Blotner, Faulkner in 
the University (New York, Vintage, 1965), p. 63.
^^The notable exception is Lewis P. Simpson in the essay 
"A Fable of Civilization," in his The Brazen Face of History 
(Baton Rouge; Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 209-31.
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world," God assumes the inferior position and Satan is 
invested with primary p o w e r . T h e  strategy here does not 
exclusively entail the process of figurative 
demythologization Faulkner had employed in the development 
of Quentin and the intervening artist figures in his 
fiction; instead, like Nietzsche in Thus Spake Zarathustra, 
Faulkner remythologizes Christian mythos to the end of 
imparting to the reader an image of the relation of art and 
sociopolitics.
Otto Rank writes that "the specifically artistic 
impulse to create and the moulding of its forms of creation 
[are] outgrowths of the contemporary culture and the 
individual dynamism underlying the artist-personality." The 
"motive power of the individual urge to create" interplays
^^Paulkner, The Wild Palms (New York: Vintage, 1966),
p. 130.
am influenced here not only by Herbert Schneidau's 
definition of demythology as a rhetorical strategy whereby 
prophets like Jeremiah and Amos attempt to undermine 
deleterious social practices and attitudes predicated on 
illusory perspectives ("myths"), but also to Rudolph 
Bultmann's attempt "to strip the mythological framework [of 
the kerygma] from the truth" it enshrines. The methodology of 
both the Hebrew prophets and Bultmann is descriptive, while 
Faulkner's might be called "imagistic," insofar as this term 
signifies the novelist's "demythologizing" narrative images of 
the harmful reifications of Faulkner's artist figures. In A 
Fable he turns to the process of remythology in his narrative 
reconsideration of the kerygma. See, generally, Herbert 
Schneidau, Sacred Discontent: The Bible and Western Tradition
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1976) and Rudolph
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," in Kerygma and Myth, 
trans. Reginald H. Fuller, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (London: 
S.P.C.K., 1964), p. 4.
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with "canons of style evolved from the collective 
unconscious."^® As an image of individual man's use of the 
creative faculty, the old general differs from Faulkner's 
earlier artist figures in his ability to objectify his 
recourse to Christian mythos rather than internalize it, as 
do Quentin, Rosa, and Isaac. These earlier characters 
interpret personal experiences mythopoeically, specifically 
on the basis of idiosyncratic readings of the kerygma. In 
using this mythos for emotional resolutions of ultimately 
irresolvable conflicts, they follow a cultural practice that 
spans two millennia, one that Faulkner had grave 
reservations about by the time he wrote The Sound and the 
Fury. The old general understands his culture's 
predeliction for recourse to Christian mythos in its futile 
attempts to realize ideals. A product of the culture that 
he acts to sustain, the general recognizes the archetype 
that inheres in the ongoing crisis. His "motive power" 
(perspective or "individual dynamism") being to establish 
and sustain the sociopolitical order, the general's 
reaccentuating "usurpation" of the legend of God 
acknowledges the community's unconscious propensity for a 
positive response to this mythos.
The long biographical flashback that primarily 
constitutes "Wednesday Night"— an ironic saint's life of
l®Otto Rank, "Author's Preface," in Art and Artist (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1989), pp. xiv-xvi.
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sorts— establishes the general's moral authenticity. In 
developing the biography, Faulkner relies on several 
narrative voices, each with its own self-assured view of the 
general's character. One voice, for instance, provides the 
broad social view of the general, which holds that he is the 
embodiment of a "splendid fate" that even the strictest of 
circumstances, such as his enrollment at St. Cyr, will not 
enable him to "escape" (p. 245). Behind this point of view 
lies the remythologizing hand of the author, whose strategy 
for controlling the reader's perspective is to have the 
general in fact "escape" this projected fate, at least in 
one of the dominant senses in which it is indicated. The 
general fulfills his destiny in terms of the stature that he 
achieves, but he does not embody the amoral values that each 
of the secondary narrators assumes to be an inevitable 
concomitant of his "fate." Thus the primary tool of the 
artist in this strategy is irony, which is the operative 
condition of perspectivism.
Faulkner's narrative images of various observers of the 
general's life— including his classmates at St. Cyr, a staff 
captain, and a particular "Norman" classmate at St. Cyr—  
create a foreshadowing structure of irony that sets up the 
final scene of the novel, the general's interment, which 
demonstrates his lasting influence on the people. In 
contrast to the morally insubstantial rise to eminence that 
these perspectives predict, a reflexive reading of the novel
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demonstrates that the general, both a literal and a 
figurative embodiment of moral authenticity, lived his life 
as though aware of the sociocultural significance of his 
death. As images of the tendency of both individuals and 
groups to perceive an object or series of events and misread 
it into truth, the numerous misinterpretations in "Wednesday 
Night" confirm the general's mythmaking strategy in relation 
to the people. As dead military hero, the general 
ironically sustains the people, who are cast in the novel's 
final scene as an unthinking mob that offers frenetic, 
Dionysian devotion to the corpse about to be interred in a 
national monument. From a purely aesthetic standpoint, the 
general does with his life what Faulkner does by imaging the 
points of view of the various observers, namely, utilize the 
perspectival character of man's existence to invent an image 
thereof that sustains man while indicating his inherent 
creative potential.
Through a practical use of man's faculty for creation 
and its psychological sibling, the spectatorial impulse—  
what Nietzsche terms "aesthetic doing and observing"— the 
general creates a legend of himself that fulfills the 
people's unconscious need for illusions that counter the 
onset of an emotional void.^^ Relying on his Bergsonian
^Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. 
Walter Kaufmann, in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Viking, 1968), p. 518.
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sense of the temporal quality of man's experience, through 
these observers Faulkner indicates the general's propensity 
for vanishing from public sight, only to reappear later in 
an ongoing dialectic of absences and presences that 
constitutes the structure of the legend he develops. By way 
of the fundamentally poetic interplay of their consciousness 
with this recurrent structure, the observers become 
"preservers" of the general's legend "with an essentiality 
equal" to that of the general who creates it.^® For 
example, one narrator relates that the old general, then "a 
captain with a brilliant and most incredible future, had 
vanished" only "to reappear thirteen years later as a 
brigadier" (p. 244). The "people who up to that time [when 
he vanished] thought they knew him, know neither where he 
has been nor why, though they are certain they know how" he 
has acquired the higher rank. The old general's ironic 
response to these expectations demonstrates his awareness of 
the sociopolitical significance of art, in this case a 
national legend that results from the people's spectatorial 
capacity and inclination. The old general apparently knows, 
even at the inchoate stage of the military career that 
provides the initiatory structure of his maturation, the
^^Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in 
Martin Heidegger: Poetry, Language, Thought (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), p. 71. "It is the work that makes the 
creators possible in their nature and that by its own nature 
is in need of preservers."
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capacity of art for establishment and preservation, and he 
responsibly employs his burgeoning stature in his direction 
of a life-sustaining legend— of which he is the 
centerpiece— that spans several decades.
The legend of the old general is engendered within the 
exclusive community of his anomalous upbringing. Until he 
enters St. Cyr, "the world outside the Faubourg St. Germain 
had scarcely ever seen him," and few have ever heard of him 
"except as a male Christian name." He grew up, the reader 
is told, "in the somber insulate house of his mother's 
eldest sister in the rue Vaugirard," which is where the 
runner goes on his visit to Paris to research Harry. This 
sister who raised him was the wife of an opportunist, "a 
cabinet Minister who was himself a nobody but a man of 
ruthless and boundless ambition who had needed only 
opportunity and had got it through his wife's money and 
connections." The youth grows "to the threshold of manhood 
. . . his uncle's heir and heir to the power and wealth of 
his bachelor godfather," the federation chairman "who had 
been his father's closest friend." Like Gragnon, he is "an 
orphan, an only child," though the conditions of his 
upbringing contrast starkly with those of the division 
commander (p. 246). Faulkner thus suggests by this implicit 
contrast that the humble upbringing often championed in 
myths and legends does not necessarily produce strong 
character, nor does its opposite, the silver-spooned
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upbringing, necessarily produce poor character and values.
In contrast to his more revealing foil, however, Isaac 
McCaslin, who is also "the last male of his line," the 
general embraces the paternal responsibility his upbringing 
entails.
The reader learns in "Wednesday Night" that the old 
general is personally disinterested, but interested in the 
endurance and well being of mankind. By the end of the
novel, it is clear that at some point in the process of the
old general's maturation, he chose his own destiny, as it 
were, which was different from the "destiny" everyone who 
knew anything about him had predicted (p. 246). At this 
point (and Faulkner chooses not to image its actual 
occurrence), the general begins to act so as to contribute 
to the quite naturally developing image of himself. He thus 
fulfills his destiny in accordance with his chief value— the 
sustenance of his culture. In contrast to the multitude of 
unconnected people who are delineated in his reverie by the
window, the general enjoys power and prestige that give him
the opportunity for large cultural influence. That he 
chooses to use it to establish particular values makes him 
heroic, at least according to the point of view of the 
primary narrator.
Fellow classmates at St. Cyr experience "surprise," 
"amazement," and "downright unbelief" that the youth (who 
would become the general) was there "at all," not because of
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his apparent "fragility and indurability," but because they 
read him as the embodiment of a "golden destiny of an 
hereditary crown prince of paradise." The "golden youth," 
the "Parisian," he is the heir to money and influence, not 
only by virtue of connections, but also of his youth, gender 
and place, specifically, Paris. He "had only to reach 
majority in order to inherit that matchless of all 
catastrophes: the prestige of exhausting his life" by
riotous living (p. 247). Yet instead of opting to employ 
the special relation to Paris that his connections offer 
him, he chooses to be "just another anonymous one is a class 
of candidates for professional careers" (p. 248). Through 
this remark Faulkner ironically highlights the essential 
nobility of character of the old general, whom a previous 
perspective in the novel had cast as an unthinking, 
merciless head of a sociopolitical establishment that is 
indifferent to the well-being of its denizens. The general 
works to establish security for the masses, sacrificing the 
inherited life of luxury in favor of the responsibility of 
his social eminence. Rather than the "lover" of Paris, he 
becomes her protector.
Relying on the irony inherent in the principle of 
perspectivism, Faulkner employs a narrator who demonstrates 
the discrepancy between the youth's genuine character and 
the classmates' imaginary projection of his deviousness. 
According to this projection, it can only be that "not he
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but his family . . . compelled him into the army" since he 
has become a "threat" to their name and position. The 
family needs to "quarantine" him, both to protect its 
reputation and to provide him with a "refuge" from the 
consequences of his behavior, placing him beyond both his 
capacity to harm them by association and the capacity of 
justice to harm him by forcing reparations for what he has 
done. According to this perspective, the family is 
perpetrating a scheme to "gain a sort of blinding redundance 
on the great name's original splendor from the golden braid 
which his hat and sleeves would someday bear," (p. 249) 
because if war provides the youth with opportunity, he will 
"be a general at forty" and eventually a marshall of France 
"when the nation buried him" (p. 242). This reading of the 
youth's presence at St. Cyr, however, proves to be erroneous 
when he does not use the influence. With "the highest marks 
ever made at the academy," which obviate the jealousy they 
might otherwise have felt toward him for the "Quartermaster 
Captaincy which rumor said was waiting for him at the 
Academy's exit," he is a superior student who has no need 
for special treatment (p. 249). Even so, when the general 
leaves without the captaincy, exiting instead with a 
subalternship, the classmates— still reading yet thinking 
they are literally perceiving truth— see the refusal of the 
captaincy as a show or "gesture," "not the youth's" but the 
relatives' who are directing Lhe development of his national
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image. Thus, this interpretation goes, the refusal is not 
genuine since the family is "powerful and potent enough to 
afford even discretion and modesty" and will therefore 
privately confer the captaincy. But what transpires instead 
is the youth's departure ("quietly, almost surreptitiously") 
for Africa, with neither unearned rank nor undue equipage, 
for the purpose of fulfilling the requisite field-service 
obligation (p. 250). Ironically, the classmates expect a 
gesture from the family, but get from the youth one that is 
the opposite of their projections. Extending into the 
future, it is the first element of the sustaining national 
image of himself that he is directing. Already at twenty- 
one, about to embark on a major period of the process of 
maturation that has been underway since his entrance into 
the academy, the youth manifests characteristics that will 
serve his establishment of this image more than three 
decades later.
To account for the youth's enigmatic departure, the 
classmates conclude that he will go to a "remote frontier" 
where there will be no check to his relatives' ability to 
secure pleasure for him. This projection, predicated on 
their unexpressed belief in "rapacity itself"— which is 
postulated by the primary narrator as a force that overlays 
human affairs and is, paradoxically, "compassionate," 
"omnipotent," "all-seeing and all pervading"— leads the 
classmates to conclude, perhaps unconsciously, that the Quai
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d ' Orsay will gently signal ("out-breathe") the youth's 
success in the heroic saving of a fragment of the empire 
that was lost during the Napoleonic wars. A "national 
unanimity" will proclaim him in a response so "loud and 
long" that it will "obfuscate" the mere facts of the case 
and "distract the mind from all curiosity regarding them." 
The family's scheme will have eventuated therefore in the 
creation of a protagonist "without past on a stage without 
yesterday," accompanied only by his "accomplishment," "like 
two masques for a pantomime furnished out of the bloodless 
lumberroom of literature." The people will observe, "with 
amazed admiration," the youth matured into supreme marshal 
of France, though in substance he will be "like wisps of 
mist or vapor" among "concrete-bedded mastodons" and "like 
the saint in an Anglo-Saxon tale" who cheaply buys her 
sainthood by exchanging her maidenhood for it (p. 251). And 
"not one" of "the sheeplike acclaiming mass" will want to 
check the details of his heroism. Having been created out 
of whole cloth, he will be "immune even to the uproar" that 
acclaims him in a ritualistic triumphal march. The general 
indeed achieves the legendary status postulated in this 
voice, but as a consequence of his virtue and 
responsibility, not his utilization of the principle of 
rapacity (p. 252).
Through the youth's disappearance across the 
Mediterranean, by means of which he continues the
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development of his legend, Faulkner underlines his 
aestheticist ideology, casting this evanescence in 
figurative terms of the birth of destiny. The classmates 
learn not only that the youth from the "port base" "to 
assigned duty somewhere in the interior," but also that no 
one knows "exactly where and on exactly what service" (p.
252). Even so, they had expected both the obscurity of 
place and the secrecy of event, since part of the family's 
scheme would have him situated somewhere "actively and even 
aggressively private, like an oasis in the desert's heart 
itself," "where on a lion-robed divan he would await untimed 
destiny's hasteless accouchement" (p. 253). Yet "truth," in 
Heidegger's sense of the term as developed in the "Origin," 
is not predictable but disclosive. Instead of the flight to 
an oasis, the youth goes to a place where the conditions of 
his existence are exactly the opposite of what the 
classmates think they will be. Or, stated differently, the 
conditions as they actually exist are exactly what the 
classmates thought the family would spare him through the 
use of its unlimited power. Expecting his existence to be 
"benignant and inscrutable, irascible and hieroglyph like an 
American Indian totem pole in ebon Eden innocence," they 
discover that he has gone to the worst possible post and, 
moreover, that he serves not only "his own one year tour of 
command, but that of his successor too, and was now ten 
months forward in that of what would have been his
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successor's," so that those watching his career, "except 
that one" who will succeed him in the post, think "that 
earth itself had faltered, rapacity itself had failed" (p.
253). The youth's ironic action of apparently needlessly 
continuing to serve at the post challenges the classmates' 
myth of the force of rapacity. He chooses not to wait 
passively for the birth of destiny, but to adopt a stance 
toward its transpiration. Through the Heideggerian conflict 
between what the classmates know and expect of their fellow 
student (earth) and what he actually does (world), the youth 
adds another element to the sustaining national image of 
himself.
The most thematically resounding view of the old 
general belongs to an individual classmate at St. Cyr, the 
future quartermaster general, whose view differs from that 
of the classmates in general. Like his counterparts in the 
"trinity of conscience," he reads the phenomena he 
encounters and constructs around them a mythos that 
satisfies his value system, itself based on a particular 
mythos whose manifestations are widespread in his culture.
As the third unit of Faulkner's "trinity of conscience"— the 
one who represents acceptance— he stands "Number Two to the 
other's One on the day of graduation." Among the students 
at St. Cyr, he is the first to connect the youth's "face 
with his great name," and he sees in him "the promise of a 
destiny which would be the restored . . . glory and destiny
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of France too" (pp. 246-47). The classmate's great­
grandfather had been a protege of Desmoulins "until 
Robespierre executed them both." Like this ancestor, a 
political idealist willing to sacrifice his life for a 
deleterious ideal, the classmate had come to Paris to be an 
art student, "but relinquished his dream to the Military 
Academy for the sake of France as the great-grandfather had 
done his to the guillotine for the sake of Man" (p. 254).
And like the great-grandfather in his susceptibility to 
mesmerization by a figure with a strong personality, the 
classmate "looked once at that one which to all the world 
else had been that of any seventeen-year-old youth and 
relinquished completely to it" (p. 254). Satisfying his 
impulse to respond through art to the severe lack that his 
encounter with the youth elicits, he "picked up the three 
figures— uncle, nephew, and godfather . . . and turned them 
around and set them down again in the same positions and 
attitudes but obversed" (p. 254).
The classmate's mythopoeia occurs, however, not 
immediately, but "several years" after he makes the 
acquaintance of the youth, "almost ten in fact after that 
day when [the classmates] had watched that sun-stricken 
offing behind Oran accept that fragile stride and then close 
markless behind it like a painted backdrop." This image is 
reminiscent of several in Go Down, Moses, in which Isaac 
McCaslin responds to the phenomenal unraveling of images
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that constitutes his experience. The narrator ironically 
remarks that the youth walks into the desert "carrying 
unreality with him to establish where before there had been 
none." When after four years the youth is still in the 
desert, whether or not he had been "an actual threat once," 
he is "now an enigma burying its ostrich-head from the staff 
commission which would drag him back to Paris and at least 
into vulnerable range of his old sybaritic renunciation."
For six years he performs "voluntarily" a "duty" which every 
officer in the army but he should have been compelled to 
perform "before it came to him" (p. 254). Continuing the 
strategy of imaging the development of the legend of the old 
general as a process of the interplay of occurrence and its 
backdrop of nothingness, of evanescence and materialization, 
Faulkner has the narrator relate that the youth "vanishes 
from Africa too," six years later, "none knew where except 
the Norman classmate's passionate and hungry hope." 
Nothingness, which in this case results from the absence of 
the youth from the public arena, is necessary to the legend 
that is developing around his figure. After the sojourn in 
Africa, he "vanished not only from the knowledge of man but 
from the golden warp and woof of the legend too," with 
nothing left but "a name in the Army List," with the 
position of sublieutenant. Underscoring the youth's 
powerful presence in the mind's eye of his classmates, 
despite his quite literal absence, the narrator remarks that
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he is "not even dead, not even whereabouts unknown" (p.
255).
In a scene reminiscent of Conrad's motif of a small 
group of men who offer various vantage points on a 
particular subject, Faulkner brings together five military 
men, including the Norman classmate, who discuss sometime in 
1885 the known events of the youth's life since he left the 
Academy two years earlier. This framework enables the 
author to continue the development of the Norman's response 
to the youth and simultaneously to image the more detached 
rhetorical level of events regarding the general's artistry. 
Included in this group is a staff captain who is descended 
from "a Napoleonic duchy whose founder had been a butcher 
then a republican then an imperialist then a duke." In this 
minor character Faulkner offers a foil not only to the 
Norman, with his genuine devotion to the golden youth, but 
to the youth himself. Only "five years out of St. Cyr," the 
staff captain seems to "three of the four watching and 
listening to him" to be "the true golden youth which that 
other one of eleven years ago whom he was talking about had 
refused to be." He brings to mind what the nephew might 
have achieved by this point, "since this one had behind him 
only the simple proprietors of banks and manipulators of 
shares." The "burly blunt brutal" staff captain talks 
glibly of "the almost forgotten sublieutenant . . . who 
should have been the ideal pattern and hope not merely for
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all career officers but for all golden youth everywhere," as 
Napoleon was for "ancestorless," impoverished, 
conscienceless Frenchmen— a remark that foreshadows the 
symbolic embodiment of hope the general becomes for the 
people by the end of the novel. The captain notes the 
paradox of the youth's sense of something so grand that he 
would sacrifice for it his unparalleled opportunities, yet 
"so ephemeral" as to keep him there for only six years—  
another of Faulkner's ironic images for man's perspectival 
condition. The staff captain, his point of view skewed by 
his status as a sort of sybarite manque, wonders what can be 
"so incipient with satiation and at last revulsion that 
after only six years the subaltern master must vacate it."
In the opinion of the staff captain, the youth enjoys the 
benefits of his relation to the powerful Comite de Ferrovie 
(pp. 255-56). Yet what kept the youth there, and what 
induces him to leave, is not personal gratification, but his 
sense of duty to his countrymen.
Having learned that the youth must relinquish the post, 
the Norman classmate, thirteen days later, "looked from the 
back of the camel across the glaring markless intervening 
miles, as a thousand years later the first pilgrim must have 
looked at the barely distinguishable midden which the native 
guide assured him had been, not Golgotha of course but 
Gethsemane," a "nest of ragged and meagre palms." Yet the 
"outpost" where the youth is stationed is a garden only in
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the the mythos of the Norman, and in a terribly ironic 
sense, as the novel will soon disclose the general's 
affinities with Pontius Pilate. Like the "first" pilgrim, 
the Norman pursues the apogee of his spiritual sensibility, 
which is embodied in a charismatic individual whom he 
actually perceives to be a re-incarnation of God. At first 
viewed as the liberator of France from Prussian occupation, 
in the classmate's evolving mythos, which Faulkner broadly 
reports rather that depicts, the future general incarnates 
the long-anticipated second coming of Christ. The irony 
here is stark since the old general is a usurper of the 
legend, not, as the Norman thinks, its embodiment or 
fulfillment. Yet he is the embodiment of a legend, a 
sustaining, albeit not a Christian, one. The Norman is 
"passionate for suffering, sick with hope," thus recalling 
Isaac McCaslin's hope and belief in the eventual realization 
of his vision of Christian mythos (p. 258). In the 
relationship of the Norman to the youth, the self-made 
proselyte, true to his ancestor's outstanding 
characteristic, addresses the incarnate God. In effect, the 
quartermaster general is a would-be prophet, a John the 
Baptist. Like Isaac McCaslin, he understands mythmaking, 
yet fails to see its limitations, especially as prophecy.
He reads the youth as God returning in "the shape of man's 
living hope," but only from the broadest, most coldly ironic 
vantage point of the novel does the youth embody the
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realization of anything like "man's hope" (p. 263).
In contrast to the Norman classmate's reading of 
Christian mythos into ongoing events, the old general 
recognizes the basic analogy, but remythologizes it to suit 
his end of establishing order. The general's remythology 
reaccentuates, as it were, the dominant biblical version of 
the sociopolitical archetype of rebellion versus authority, 
stressing its currently relevant elements. I borrow the 
term "re-accentuate" from Mikhail Bakhtin, who defines it as 
one of two processes whereby the transformation of language 
phenomena occurs "at a very rapid rate of exchange." The 
process "involves the tact with which an author assigns his 
accents, sometimes smudging and often completely destroying 
for us their finer nuances." Reaccentuation occurs as the 
result of "a change in the background animating dialogue." 
One of Bakhtin's goals in uncovering this process is to show 
the tensional interplay of authorial intentionality with the 
"living word," which, as it were, cuts its own semantic path 
"and is therefore in all things true to itself." Due to 
the intentional residue "embedded in them," language 
phenomena (i.e., the kerygma) "have proved capable of 
uncovering in each era and against ever new dialogizing 
backgrounds ever newer aspects of m e a n i n g . T h e  process
See "Discourse in the Novel," in The Dialogic 
Imagination; Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin, trans. Michael 
Holquist, ed. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson, (Austin: 
Univ. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 419-20.
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is analogous to Hans-Georg Gadamer's view of hermeneutics, 
which reads "understanding" as "mediation" rather than 
"reconstruction"; "Understanding itself is not to be 
thought of so much as an action of subjectivity, but as the 
entering into an event of transmission in which past and 
present are constantly mediated."^2 Both Bakhtin's concept 
of reaccentuation and Gadamer's hermeneutics of mediation 
parallel Faulkner's emphasis on the sociopolitical interplay 
of art and interpretation in A Fable and Heidegger's 
postulation of the aesthetic strife between world and earth 
that results in the disclosure of truth. Making decisions 
characteristic of Nietzsche's concept of the "grand style" 
and publicly establishing his image in a manner that 
parallels Heidegger's conception of the "origin" of art, the 
old general invents a reaccentuated image of Christian 
mythos that effectively palliates the anxious people.
Faulkner's allegory of the masses versus authority in 
"Wednesday Night" indicates the old general's identification 
of the current crisis with the biblical pretext and his 
awareness of the potential for abuse that inheres in both 
unbridled freedom and tyrannical power. The masses at the 
bottom of the war-time hierarchy in Chaulnesmont 
figuratively parallel the masses of old Jerusalem, just as
22gee David Linge, "Editors Introduction," in 
Philosophical Hermeneutics: Hans-Georg Gadamer, trans. David
E. Linge (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976), p. xvi.
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the old general parallels the power structure in Rome. But 
if this is so, then my argument that the old general 
embodies the primary point of view of the novel means that 
this perspective is figuratively lodged in Roman values.
This is true, but in the qualified sense that by the end of 
the process of writing Faulkner had overcome his earlier 
expressed conviction that absolute pacifism is a viable 
moral option in a complex world. He is neither wholly 
critical nor wholly supportive of the spiritual power 
embodied in the image of the ancient city of Jerusalem and 
represented in the novel most prominently by the runner, the 
corporal, and the quartermaster general. Yet in the extreme 
positions taken by these characters, spirituality, in 
attempting to establish itself absolutely, is equally 
dangerous as unrestrained, inappropriately value-centered 
power. While Faulkner does not altogether repudiate 
attempts to realize such abstract ideals as justice and 
honor, he images his recognition that man in general lacks 
the political sensibility, practical wisdom, and detachment 
that are necessary for absolute freedom. Without the 
constraint of law and the embodiment of order in a highly 
visible authority structure, chaos will hold the day. In 
effect, in this allegory occurring in the mind of the old 
general, Faulkner underscores his re-reading of the kerygma 
in A Fable. He underlines power, but it is power predicated 
on a particular value.
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At the bottom of the social hierarchy are "anonymity's 
absolute whose nameless faceless mass cluttered old 
Jerusalem and old Rome too while from time to time governor 
and caesar flung them bread or a circus as in the old snowy 
pantomime the fleeing shepherd casts back to the pursuing 
wolves fragments of his lunch, a garment, and as a last 
resort the lamb itself" (p. 242). This metaphor apparently 
points to the corporal as the lamb of God or, ideologically, 
as complete righteousness being grossly sacrificed by self- 
serving, avaricious authority. The larger point, though, 
which is only available upon a holistic consideration of the 
novel, is that such a reading (and, by implication, the 
Kerygma's reading of the sociopolitical world) 
oversimplifies the conditions of human existence and 
postulates the impossible as highly probable and realizable 
if mankind will recognize and take appropriate steps in 
relation to certain correctable flaws. Here the political 
entity is cast in the guise of the shepherd, while the 
hungry masses are seen as pursuing wolves— the laborers, 
beggars, and thieves who do not "always understand that what 
they do constitutes beggary and theft" (p. 242). In his 
sympathetic, though detached, reading of the people's 
situation, the general acknowledges to himself that these 
unaware "wolves," "whose luck is out always" and who have no 
nexus to power, "are denied any opportunity whatever to 
share in the rich carnival of their country's wasting
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lifeblood" (p. 242). A desperate and largely despairing 
group, they have "nothing in fact save a reversion in 
endurance without hope or pride even in the endurance to 
endure." Here the general postulates the possibility of 
stoic pride in one's capacity to endure, but suggests that 
these people lack even the consciousness of this capacity. 
They simply endure, without self-congratulation or solace in 
the virtue. They exist as "tolerated and rightless aliens" 
from the power and comfort superstructure, "without hope of 
betterment," wanting only "permission to exercise" endurance 
(p. 242). The last resort, the sacrifice of the lamb, 
appeases them and suggests the old general as shepherd of 
the people's needs in his decision to execute his son, the 
corporal.
Understanding the importance of predictability to the 
sustenance of order, the general's war-contextual usurpation 
of Christian mythos counters the community's fear-driven 
incapacitation by yoking, in a powerful single image, "the 
primal chaos of wilderness and the primordiality of law."
It is the general's life-centered valuation, however, in 
contrast to the arrogant national solipsism of the "Austrian 
paper hanger," that aligns the general with the primary 
authorial voice in A F a b l e . E v i d e n t  in the grand style.
^Referring derogatorily to Hitler, Isaac McCaslin tells 
Roth Edmonds that "when the time comes and some of you have 
done got tired of hollering we are whipped if we dont go to 
war and some more are hollering we are whipped if we do, [the 
country] will cope with one Austrian paper hanger, no matter
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writes Heidegger, is "resistance to external pressure to 
change" (cf. the general's resoluteness in the face of the 
arguments of Gragnon, the German general, the quartermaster 
general, Marthe, and the corporal) and to "what is animated" 
(the frenzied mass). The general's tragedy involves the 
conflict between his primary value, life— dependent in his 
view upon maintaining the existent political order— and the 
claims of his biological family. Through the personal 
shortcomings evinced in his relationship with the corporal's 
mother, the general paradoxically suffered into the truth of 
a new value that necessitates aggravating his relation to 
his eastern family in the interest of the preservation of 
his culture, his sense of guilt and the need to make 
reparations for his past irresponsibility being overridden 
by the higher value, the sustenance of man in genere.
One may say of the corporal that he seeks, through an 
aestheticist strategy like that of the general, to cultivate 
and establish a particular value— absolute pacifism— in the 
observing Western consciousness. He prefers the future- 
oriented symbolism of his martyrdom to his own existence.
His "crucifixion" will be an "irruption into the midst of 
beings" that will, like all such emergences, assume its 
particular significance on the basis of the interpretations
what he will be calling himself," in William Faulkner, Go 
Down, Moses (New York; Vintage, 1973), p. 339.
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it r e c e i v e s . Y e t  the general's decision goes "forward in 
the midst of physis and on its basis," letting what is 
"already coming to presence arrive" in the course of events 
that began with the mutiny of Gragnon's regiment.25 The 
corporal, by contrast, like his protege the runner, attempts 
to force the issue. His actions constitute over-reliance on 
the ability of the aesthetic to establish a particular 
condition within man's existent realm of contingency. He 
embodies the same propensity for deleterious embrace of 
illusory ideals that Faulkner recognized as a young man and 
studied in such early characters as Bayard Sartoris and 
Quentin Compson. D. H. Lawrence speaks to this problem in 
his analysis of Doestoevsky's "Grand Inquisitor" episode in 
The Brothers Karamazov, Faulkner's paradigm for the 
relationship between the corporal and the old general. 
Lawrence recognizes in the episode "the final and 
unanswerable criticism of Christ," whose "inadequacy . . . 
lies in the fact that Christianity is too difficult for men, 
the vast mass of men." It "is impossible because it makes 
demands greater than the nature of man can bear. And 
therefore, to get a livable, working scheme, some of the 
elect, such as the Grand Inquisitor himself, have turned 
round to 'him,' that other great Spirit, Satan, and have
24Heidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 80. 
25neidegger, Nietzsche, I, p. 82.
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established Church and State on 'him.'" Faulkner's re­
reading of the paradigm presents the old general as one who, 
like Ivan Karamazov's Inquisitor, understands that "to be 
able to live at all, mankind must be loved more tolerantly 
and more contemptuously than Jesus loved it, loved, for all 
that, more truly, since it is loved for itself, for what it 
is, and not for what it ought to be. The ideology of A 
Fable's primary voice is not contained in the question of 
what happens if the corporal succeeds, but of what ought to 
be made to happen given the impossibility of his success.
The general embodies the same capacity for protective 
patronization, but ultimately evinces confidence in man's 
capacity to create himself, as it were, beyond problems—  
many of his own devising— with which he is perpetually, 
contingently confronted. The general asserts that man has 
"that in him" which will, paradoxically, enable him to free 
himself from "his enslavement to the demonic progeny of his 
own mechanical curiosity," namely, his "deathless folly" (p.
352) for creative response to his own deleterious 
creations— "a voice planning still to build" something 
beyond what currently exists (p. 354); "he must endure, at 
least until he himself invents evolves produces a better 
tool than he to substitute for himself" (p. 347). Implicit
D. H. Lawrence, "The Grand Inquisitor" in Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, ed. Ralph E. Matlaw (New 
York: W. W. Norton, 1976), pp. 829-31.
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in this expressed respect for man's capacity for invention 
is the general's sense of his high responsibility to guard 
against man's creating himself out of existence. The 
general appreciates the tension between his position or 
"articulation" and the idealistic one represented by the 
corporal (p. 347). Underscoring the importance of dream, 
desire, and imagination, the general tells the corporal that 
his championing "of an esoteric realm of man's baseless 
hopes and his infinite capacity . . . for unfact . . . can 
exist side by side together" with the general's ideology of 
"this mundane earth" (p. 348). For, ultimately, man's 
creations, be they "tanks bigger and faster and more 
impervious and with more firepower than ever before" (p.
353) or strategies (such as the corporal's and the runner's) 
designed completely to eliminate conflict, are "inherent 
with the same old primordial fault since [man's creations] 
in the end will fail to eradicate him from the earth" (p.
354).
The general's ideology of preservation, then, in tune 
with that of the primary voice of A Fable, appreciates the 
strife of contingency and creativity that inheres in the 
relation of consciousness to the world. It accepts 
idealism, be it of Jesus or of Hitler, as an inevitably 
recurring form of that strife. Its fundamental ideology, 
however, flows from a concept of valuation that, while 
eschewing tyranny, limits nonetheless his propensity for
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self-harm by establishing a framework of responsible order. 
In A Fable, Faulkner manipulates the perspective of the 
reader in the same manner that the general manages the 
people's perspective in the construction of his mythopoeic 
legend— by misdirection, suspense, and, finally, irony which 
discloses the ideology of the dominant point of view. The 
symbolic public autobiography the general establishes by a 
remythology of the kerygma is literally false and illusory, 
but on a pragmatic level it contains the paradoxical truth 
that the nation can sustain itself by belief in the general 
as the receptacle of its aggregated power. If the general's 
image is illusory yet true, A Fable as Faulkner's 
remythologized image of Christian mythos, designed with a 
far more detached audience in mind, embodies the truth that 
all metastatic myths are inherently illusory. As a 
narrative image of the inevitability of conflict, the novel 
asserts the ambiguous, value-dependent potential that 
inheres in man’s ontologically secure capacity for freedom.
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